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91 INTRODUCTION
worried, Florida, old, lonely, grey, careful,
sentimental, wise, stubborn, bingo, forgetful,
wrinkle, rigid, traditional, bitter, conservative,
dependent, ancient, gullible, cautious
elderly stereotype primes, Bargh, Chen and
Burrows (1996)
This thesis brings together two topics. On the one hand, there is the phenomenon that
members of social groups often try to differentiate themselves and their group from
other groups. First examples that come to mind are political parties which try to
emphasize the difference in their political claims, and often seem to take on certain
attitudes just because they want to contradict what another party said. Another
example might be youth groups, which seemingly out of an urge to distinguish
themselves from other groups--or from the generation of their parents--choose
clothes and music with the goal to differ. As we will see in the course of this thesis,
this phenomenon is pervasive in many social contexts, and well-documented.
On the other hand, this thesis looks at behavior that occurs outside of conscious
awareness and without any conscious intention. The reader is probably familiar with
curious errors in everyday behavior, in which we recognize the workings of our
associative mind. Freudian slips of the tongue are a nice example, in which we say
something that is contrary to our conscious wishes, and yet so true that it becomes
embarrassing. Another example are cases in which an environmental cue leads to the
automatic execution of a habit, and we find ourselves moments later performing an
action that we did not plan at all. I am sure that the reader is familiar with those
situations.
So, the two topics of this thesis are intergroup differentiation and unconscious
behavior. They are brought together to the hypothesis that intergroup differentiation
can happen unconsciously, without a conscious plan to act like this, and sometimes
even without the possibility of consciously introspecting what is going on.
While this is the main hypothesis of the present thesis, the starting point--the initial
motivation to pursue the topic at hand--were experiments that reported quite the
opposite. They seemed to suggest that our unconscious cognitions follow other rules
than our conscious cognitions, and that we mimic and assimilate to other groups
when conscious awareness is not there to guard our actions. Consider one of these
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experiments: In what was probably the most impressive study in their seminal paper,
John Bargh and colleagues (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996) had half of their
participants think about sentences related to the stereotype of the elderly. The
important words in these sentences--the associations with the elderly stereotype--are
copied at the top of this section. Importantly, the participants were not aware of the
unifying topic "the elderly." Afterwards, they were told that the experiment was over,
and that they could leave. But while they walked to the elevator, the time it took
them to get there was measured. It turned out that those who had thought about the
elderly stereotype walked slower; it took them about 1 s longer for the 10 m walk.
Apparently, these participants unconsciously mimicked the behavior typically
ascribed to elderly people.
For me, this was an intriguing finding since it showed that our behavior could be
influenced by such subtle cues. But I found it even more intriguing that the
participants walked slower instead of faster! This puzzle was the starting point for
this thesis. I was interested in how structures in our social environment, such as sharp
divisions of people into social categories which I have experienced myself in the past
(see Figure 1), our experience of membership in a group, and the categorization of
self and others into a common group, shape our nonconscious behavior.
Before the layout of this thesis is explained, I would like to introduce the issue of
unconscious cognition and effects. How the mind operates without consciousness,
what consciousness exactly is, and what it might be good for, has been the topic of
much debate in social psychology in the recent years. Instead of repeating the
arguments in this thesis, I want to cite Julian Jaynes (1976, p. 22) in order to sketch a
distinction which is most relevant here. It is the distinction between consciousness
and reactivity:
We are constantly reacting to other things without being conscious of them at
the time. Sitting against a tree, I am always reacting to the tree and to the
ground and to my own posture, since if I wish to walk, I will quite
unconsciously stand up from the ground to do so. ... Reactivity covers all
stimuli my behavior takes account of in any way, while consciousness is
something quite distinct and a far less ubiquitous phenomenon. We are
conscious of what we are reacting to only from time to time.
11
The major part of the present thesis will look at this reactive behavior. The question
will be how individuals unconsciously react to social stimuli, and how the
categorization of these stimuli decides on the form of the reaction. Furthermore, I
will describe how conscious cognition can sometimes lead to unconscious behavior.
In all this, I will not constantly try to prove that thinking and behavior can really be
unconscious. The reader who is interested in a more elaborate discussion of this topic
is referred to works from Bargh and colleagues (Bargh, 1997b; Bargh & Chartrand,
1999; Wegner & Bargh, 1998). Instead, I would like to cite Jaynes (1976, p. 23)
again, who found a wonderful metaphor to question the belief that consciousness is
the sum of our mental processes occurring at every moment:
It is like asking a flashlight in a dark room to search around for something that
does not have any light shining upon it. The flashlight, since there is light in
whatever direction it turns, would have to conclude that there is light
everywhere. And so consciousness can seem to pervade all mentality when
actually it does not.
The following chapters will try to shed some light, so to speak, on what is going on
in this darkness when the flashlight is not looking. The chapters are organized in a
bottom-up hierarchy. In Chapter 2, very simple causes of automatic effects are
considered. In the subsequent chapters, progressively complex causes are
investigated. More specifically, in Chapter 2, I will cite evidence that behavior is
reacting to environmental stimuli without conscious awareness, planning or
decisions. To explain these findings, models of the human memory and the relation
between perception and action will be discussed. While Chapter 2 focuses on non-
social stimuli, in Chapter 3, I will report evidence showing that images or stereotypes
of social categories can have equivalent effects, and also lead to reactive behavior
outside of awareness. The study on mimicking of elderly people was a first example
of the evidence discussed in Chapter 3. The theoretical and functional explanations
for these effects are discussed, and implications for the domain of intergroup
behavior will be sketched, with the conclusion that the current understanding of
effects of stereotypes on behavior cannot be the whole picture. In Chapter 4, I will
first discuss how traditional theories of intergroup relations, which have mainly
ignored the distinction between reactive behavior and conscious behavior, explain
and predict differences between and similarities within categories. I will then draw
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on a recent theory of social comparison (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000a) in order to
develop a model of reactive behavioral contrast from stereotypes. Assumptions and
hypotheses of the model are summarized at the end of Chapter 4; the next chapters
then go on to present my attempts to test these hypothesis empirically. In sum, the
bottom up hierarchy describes increasingly complex causes of unconscious
behavioral effects: First trait activation, then activation of traits by activated
stereotypes, and finally modification of stereotype-activated traits by conscious
thoughts.
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2 KNOWLEDGE ACCESSIBILITY AND AUTOMATIC BEHAVIOR
adhere, agree, comply, conform, copy, customary,
emulate, follow, habitual, imitate, maintain,
mimic, obey, oblige, respect, simulate,
supportive, uniform, uphold
Conformity primes, Epley and Gilovich (1999)
There is one central assumption on which all arguments in this dissertation rest:
When concepts are readily accessible in memory, the likelihood of behavior
according with the concept is increased. So, for example, if the concept of criticism
is highly accessible in your memory, perhaps from reading a harsh review of the
latest movie a few minutes ago, you might now go back to this assumption and read
it a few times, scrutinizing its validity. Importantly, this assumption implies that for
this kind of effect, there is no need for a deliberate decision to behave in this way.
Rather, the behavior is caused directly by the event. That is, if you admired the harsh
review and consciously planned to be equally critical in the future, the assumption
would appear trivial.1 In contrast, the point is that the link between knowledge
activation and behavior is automatic, i.e. not conscious. It is of course still possible
that you are aware of both the knowledge-activating event and the behavior. The
important point is that the link between the two remains outside of conscious
awareness. So, your critical behavior may be accompanied by conscious thoughts
about your style of reading, but without any reference to the knowledge-activating
event. In the words of Bargh and Chartrand (2000), the focus is on "passive, or
unintentional, forms of cognitive mediation in an attempt to keep it distinct from
motivational mediation as much as possible" (p. 253).
Given the importance of the assumption, the definitions should be as clear as
possible. I shall focus on concept, accessibility, priming, and automaticity. First of
all, concepts are knowledge structures in memory that serve two major purposes.
Concepts are used to categorize members of a category, or, to put it differently,
concepts allow perceivers to discriminate members of a category from non-members.
The term category in general refers to the actual (physical) exemplars of a concept.
Once members of a category have been identified, knowledge stored in a concept is
                                                
1 Instead, the question would then be how your attitudes translate into conscious intentions
and actual behavior, see Ajzen (1991).
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used to understand, predict, and interact with the members of the category (Barsalou,
1992). All knowledge used to fulfill these functions with respect to a category can be
called a concept. Importantly, not only physical objects (e.g., cars) can be members
of a category. Likewise, events (e.g., holidays) and behaviors (e.g., running) can be
regarded as categories. We have conceptual knowledge to perceive running, and also
to understand its process (e.g., knowledge about force and muscles), predict its
consequences (e.g., knowledge about respiration), and to act (e.g., prepare ourselves
for a 10 km run). Barsalou (1992) pointed out that concepts are often just
investigated with regard to the features associated with a concept, e.g. engine and
needs fuel for the concept of cars. In fact, many of the experiments reported in the
following two chapters use feature lists to activate a concept. However, following
Barsalou, considering how the relations between the features (e.g., tanks contain
fuel), and the dynamics (when fuel is burned, the car moves) are represented is
crucial to understand how conceptual knowledge allows us to interact with the
environment. In the following, the terms concept, and synonymously construct, will
be used to refer to knowledge about categories of objects, persons and behavior in
general.
The term accessible is employed in accordance to Higgins (1996). He defined
accessibility as "the activation potential of available knowledge." The more
accessible a mental representation is, the more likely it comes to mind later on. An
event that increases the accessibility of conceptual knowledge is called priming.
Priming events are events in the environment that temporarily activate an individual's
mental representations, or a specific concept. In the example above, the movie
review worked as the priming. Activated knowledge can then have effects on
perception, the way of thinking, and on behavior (Bargh, 1997b).
At this point, it is necessary to comment on the term automatic. Priming effects are
often referred to as automatic, since they seem to capture an automatic response of
the individual to the environment. In the following, the term will also be used in this
way from time to time, when I denote effects of priming on behavior as automatic
behavior. However, a more restricted and precise definition of automatic processes
distinguishes them from priming. For instance, Bargh and Chartrand (2000) suggest
that "automaticity research focuses on more permanent, 'hardwired' sources of
activation--that is, chronic accessibility of social knowledge structures" (p. 256), and
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"generally concerns chronic individual differences in mental representations that
transcend the current context" (p. 258). Automatic processes are not a homogenous
group of processes, but can have separate qualities. These qualities are (1) awareness
of the operation of the process, (2) efficiency of the process (i.e., does it operate
when another task is performed), (3) whether the process is unintentional, and (4)
controllability (Bargh, 1994). For instance, breaking when a traffic light is red may
be very efficient, at least sometimes unintentional, for many people most likely
controllable (i.e., they can override it), and sometimes registered in conscious
awareness and sometimes not. Priming research in contrast emphasizes mainly the
lack of awareness of the potential influence of the priming event (Bargh &
Chartrand, 2000). This criterion is also central in the studies that will follow.
As said above, priming can have effects on perception, thinking, and behavior. Of
these three areas, this thesis is especially concerned with influences of knowledge
accessibility on behavior. In principle, priming events can have indirect and direct
effects on behavior. Indirect effects are mediated by previous effects on perception,
thinking or evaluation. If for instance a priming event (e.g., a movie) activated
"dangerous," you might afterwards interpret ambiguous behavior by a stranger as
threatening, and behave accordingly (Higgins, Rholes & Jones, 1977; Neuberg,
1988). Thus, the priming has an indirect effect on the way you behave. A second
example of indirect effects on behavior may be mediations by mindset priming. If a
priming event activates a deliberative mindset, i.e. dwelling extensively on the pros
and cons of a specific action, subsequent actions may be preceded by a longer period
of deliberation and thinking (Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, & Steller, 1990). Here, again,
behavior is influenced by a priming effect on cognitive processes. When a priming
activates a goal, this goal may in turn guide actions which are then mediated by the
primed goal (Bargh, 1997b). Finally, primed evaluations of an object or person may
lead to behavior, exemplified in approach-avoidance behavior (e.g., Neumann &
Strack, 2000a). In all these cases, behavior is influenced by priming in an indirect
way, mediated by conceptualization, mindsets, motivation, or evaluation.
Direct effects of priming on behavior, however, are assumed to be a result of the
following mechanism: Mental representations of behavior (e.g., motor actions,
scripts) become more accessible as an effect of the priming, and because of this
increased accessibility these behaviors are then more likely to be performed. So, a
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movie containing violent scenes may prime scripts of physical aggression, which can
then guide later behavior. Since the priming events are (in most cases) perceptions of
events in the environment, this direct route is called perception-behavior link (Bargh
et al., 1996). The next section reports evidence for such direct effects of perception
on behavior (for an overview, see Table 1 of the Appendix), before theoretical
models are discussed.
2.1 Evidence for Automatic Behavioral Effects of Construct Priming
In what now is a classic study, Darley and Batson (1975) gave half of their male
participants a copy of the parable of the Good Samaritan, and told them that they
would have to give a talk about the parable. The other half of the participants
expected to give a talk about effectiveness in their future jobs. In the terms of
priming research, the Good Samaritan parable activated the topic of helpfulness,
while the job effectiveness condition did not activate helpfulness, but task-relevant
behavior. These participants then had to change buildings, and on their way each of
them encountered a "victim," actually a confederate of the experimenter, who was
sitting on the floor, apparently sick and not moving. When primed with the parable,
53% helped the "victim"; when preoccupied with task-relevant behavior, only 29%
helped. Although this difference was not significant due to a low N, a later reanalysis
by Greenwald (1975) concluded that the results were actually favorable of the
hypothesis that reading the parable increased helping behavior.
The same topic was again tackled by Macrae and Johnston (1998). In their studies,
the priming did not involve reading a text, but unscrambling 15 sentences of which
10 either contained words related to helping or not (a so-called scrambled sentences
priming). After the priming, the experimenter staged a situation in which she
dropped some pens while carrying a pile of books; helping behavior was indicated if
the participants picked up the pencils. Almost all of the participants primed with
helpfulness picked up the pencils within 10 s (93.7%), but fewer of the other
participants did so (68.7%).
These findings indicate that the likelihood of helpful behavior can be increased by
previous occupation with the topic in the form of verbal information. Similar
findings indicate that other forms of behavior can be influenced in a similar manner.
A scrambled sentences priming with words related to rudeness can cause participants
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to interrupt a conversation earlier (Bargh et al., 1996). Similarly, unscrambling
sentences with aggression-related content can increase the number of shocks
delivered to a learner in a standard aggression paradigm (Carver, Ganellen, Froming,
& Chambers, 1983). Epley and Gilovitch (1999) used scrambled sentences to prime
the concepts of conformity or nonconformity, and studied how much the participants
afterwards agreed with confederates whose attitudes were different from their own.
Compared to a no-priming control group, the conformity priming increased
agreement with the confederates, but a non-conformity priming did not work in the
opposite direction.
Apart from scrambled sentences primes, other priming procedures have been used as
well. Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1998) had their participants think about
either the concept of intelligence or the concept of stupidity for 5 minutes.
Subsequently, they had to answer Trivial Pursuit questions. Participants who had
thought about intelligence answered more questions correctly than those who had
thought about the concept of stupidity. Wilson and Capitman (1982) gave their male
subjects a prose passage describing a student's life, including a boy-meets-girl
passage which supposedly activated a social script related to friendliness and dating
(Schank & Abelson, 1997). After reading the passage, they were brought in contact
with an attractive female confederate; those who read the prose passage beforehand
behaved more friendly towards her then those who did not.
2.2 Explanations for Behavioral Effects of Construct Priming
These findings are certainly intriguing. How can we explain that "action can unfold
when the 'lights are off and nobody's home'" (Macrae & Johnston, 1998, p. 402)?
Explanations rest on several assumptions. First, actions and action tendencies are
represented mentally, and are associated with concepts. Second, they become active
when associated concepts are activated, and can then influence overt behavior, unless
they are overridden by other processes. Third, this works not only with low-level
motoric behavior, but also with more complex representations such as "intelligent
behavior." The following sections review these assumptions in detail.
Motor representations in memory
Before literature on explanations for automatic behavior is reviewed, it is worth to
discuss the mental representation of action. Importantly, note that this discussion is
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not meant to be a comprehensive review of the literature on motor representation, but
rather a cursory look at three recent theories which seem interesting candidates to
explain the background of behavioral priming.
It has long been noted that concepts not only include knowledge about the perceptual
characteristics of a category, but also knowledge about actions that can be performed
with exemplars of the category. So, our concept of chairs not only includes
knowledge about their appearance, but also about sitting on them (Carver et al.,
1983; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). But how is this knowledge represented, and what role
does it play in our thinking about them? Standard theories of knowledge and
cognition typically assume that the perception of external objects and events
produces sensoric codes which are then transformed and abstracted in amodal codes.
The actual "hard work" of cognition, categorization, reasoning and the like, are
thought to operate on this level. Only after the cognitive system has come to a
conclusion, i.e. a plan of how to act, the result is transformed back into motoric codes
which then guide bodily movements and actions. Recently, some theorists have
challenged this view, arguing for a closer connection between perception and action.
As a first example, Barsalou (1999b), building on earlier thinkers like Hume and
Kant, argued that no amodal mental representations exist at all. In his view, our
mental representations are perceptual symbols. Perceptual symbols are described as
brain states that arise during the perception of an object and are then captured in
memory. Once captured, they can be reproduced later, leading to a perceptual
simulation. Furthermore, perceptual symbols extend beyond vision and include other
sensory modalities, such as proprioception and introspection. Barsalou (1999b) gives
a detailed account on how such systems can implement propositions and abstract
concepts, and what evidence exists for them (and for the existence of amodal
representations on the other hand). The important point here is that in such a
conceptual system, motoric codes play a prominent role in the perception and
categorization of objects and persons. According to this theory, thinking about a
concept means simulating its perceptual consequences, making visual characteristics
prominent and activating motoric responses typically associated with the concept.
Thus, when one has the task to recall or verify properties of an object (Barsalou, in
press), the concept is typically perceptually simulated, and the activation of
properties depends on the perceptual characteristics (e.g., size and occlusion).
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Likewise, typical motoric responses to an object in a specific situation should
become active. Since priming procedures often involve understanding of written
language, and since language can be viewed as preparation for situated action
(Barsalou, 1999a), there is good reason to assume that mental representations of
motor responses become active just from understanding written references to the
primed concept.
A similar theory of memory was proposed by Glenberg (1997). Building on Lakoff
and Johnson's work on cognitive linguistics (Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999),
he postulates that mental representations and memory are embodied: they arise from
and refer to bodily interactions with the world. Understanding a concept means
activating potential actions related to it. More specifically, understanding language
such as priming sentences means constructing a mental model which represents
agents and their actions. Each new sentence is then understood by "meshing" actions
suggested with the pattern of actions already established. Glenberg argues that long
term memory stores action patterns. Fulfilling the function of implicit, effortless
memory, stored action patterns are then meshed with interaction possibilities
afforded by the environment (Gibson, 1979). Meshing is constrained by possibilities
of the human body. In sum, Glenberg explains the human cognitive system as an
action-representing and action-planning device, in which increased action readiness
as in the cited priming studies indicate absolutely normal cognitive processes.
In social psychology, a similar proposal was brought forward by Carlston (1994). In
his Associated Systems Theory (AST), specialized ("low") levels of functioning in
the perceptual and behavioral domain feed into more general or abstract ("higher")
levels, similar to traditional theories of brain function. AST posits that this vertical
dimension exists in four primary mental systems: a visual/sensory system, an action
system, an affective system, and a verbal/semantic system. At more abstract levels,
these four system begin to overlap. If we consider only the first two systems, the
representation of a person is assumed to involve the visual appearance of the person,
habitual behavioral responses to the person, and behavioral observations of the
person. Most important for the present topic, the more abstract representations in
each of these domains are linked in such a way that the activation of a lower level
activates the respective more abstract representation, and vice versa. In AST, it is
conceivable that the perception of a person primes both the performance of a habitual
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response to the person and the mimicking of an observed action. While Carlston
developed AST primarily for the modeling of person perception, he acknowledges
that it can easily be generalized to social stereotypes.
Taken together, there is a strong tendency to assume that mentally represented
motoric codes are not only involved "late" in cognition, after some central executive
module which works in an abstract and amodal medium has decided what to do.
Instead, prominent theorists suggest that motoric codes are involved in the perception
and understanding of the environment, and that they are activated along with more
perceptual features even when no specific actions are planned. All this is apparently
in the service of situated action which needs to be adapted to the environment:
"Thinking is for doing" (Bargh et al., 1996; Clark, 1996; Fiske, 1992; James, 1890).
Activation of Motoric Codes: An Associationistic or an Ideomotor Process?
Theoretical accounts of the perception-behavior link (e.g. Bargh et al., 1996; Macrae
& Johnston, 1997) typically invoke a mixture of a spreading activation account and
an ideomotor account. To my knowledge, the automatic behavior literature has in the
past not clearly distinguished between these two accounts (e.g., Bargh et al., 1996;
Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). The two accounts differ in the assumptions about the
underlying mental representations, but basically lead to equivalent predictions for the
present purposes. The first account extends the prominent view of sensorimotor
theories by allowing "shortcuts" established by spreading activation between
perception/conception and action. The second account, building on the ideomotor
principle (Lotze, 1852; James, 1890), goes further and argues that action already
plays a role in perception, and follows naturally from conception. The following
section explains the two accounts in more detail.
Traditionally, overt behavior is seen as the outcome of several stages of cognitive
processing, which starts with perception (stimulus preprocessing followed by feature
extraction) and is only then followed by response choice and response production (cf.
Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, in press). Take as an example the
Affective Aggression Framework proposed by Anderson, Anderson and Deuser
(1996); in their model, the behavioral choice (and the actual behavior) is an outcome
of appraisals or even re-appraisals of the situation. Cognitive cues from the
environment (e.g., weapons) may influence the appraisal by increasing the
accessibility of hostile thoughts and aggression scripts, but they are not supposed to
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have any direct influence on behavior. A spreading activation account of the
perception-behavior link builds on these more traditional models which view action
as an outcome of a linear process, but allow "shortcuts" between the various stages.
The spreading activation accounts of behavior, which have been mainly developed
for the explanation of impulsive aggressive behavior (e.g., Berkowitz, 1984, 1993,
1997; Carver, 1997; Carver et al., 1983), postulate that the perception of a violent act
or a stimulus associated with violence (e.g., a weapon), and the subsequent activation
of the interpretive schema "aggression" leads to the activation of other aggressive
concepts, including behavioral scripts. This activation is thought to occur
"automatically and without much thinking" (Berkowitz, 1984, p. 410).2 The basic
idea therefore is that mental representations activated in the course of perception
(interpretive schemas) directly activate mental representations of motor responses
(behavioral scripts), bypassing a conscious stage of response choice. Thus, the only
difference to a traditional linear stage model is the automatic link between stimulus
extraction and response selection. This spreading activation account exemplifies a
renaissance of associationistic concepts in the social cognition literature (Berkowitz
& Devine, 1995).
A more radical explanation, which actually goes back to theorizing from the early
days of psychology, uses the idea of the ideomotor principle. It was first proposed by
Lotze (1852), and similar ideas have been championed by a number of influential
theorists of psychology, most notably James (1890; for notes on the history of this
concept, see also Bavelas, Black, Lemery, MacInnis, & Mullet, 1986; Macrae &
Johnston, 1997). Similar to the spreading activation account, the ideomotor principle
predicts that merely thinking about an action initiates the action to some degree.
Following his discussing of involuntary reflexes and involuntary facial expressions
of emotions, Lotze (1852, p. 293) wrote:
                                                
2 Berkowitz (1993) formulated it as follows: "Negative affect and/or external stimuli having
an aggressive meaning prime an aggressive inclination plus aggression-related feelings,
ideas, and memories" (p. 71). Anderson, Benjamin and Bartholow (1998) demonstrated that
indeed both weapon names and pictures of weapons increased the accessibility of violent
actions as measured by speeded pronunciation of verbs denoting violent actions (e.g.,
destroy, harm, torture).
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Mimicking movements are initiated by imaginations of movements, without a
noticeable decision of the will being involved. The spectator accompanies the
throwing of a billiard-ball, or the thrust of the swordsman, with slight
movements of his arm; the untaught narrator tells his story with many
gesticulations.... These results become the more marked the more we are
absorbed in thinking of the movements which suggest them; they grow fainter
exactly in proportion as a complex consciousness, under the domination of a
crowd of other representations, withstands the passing over of mental
contemplation into outward action.3
James (1890), in his chapter on ideomotor action, concluded: "We may then lay it
down for certain that every representation of a movement awakens in some degree
the actual movement which is its object" (p. 526). The difference to the spreading
activation account is the assumption that perceiving and acting rely on a common
mental representation, or a "common coding" (Prinz, 1990; Hommel et al., in press).
The respective theory developed by Prinz and colleagues posits that additionally to
the previously mentioned levels of sensoric and motoric codes, which may still be
connected by direct links that constitute overlearned stimulus-response-connections,
there exists another level on which external events and actions are represented in a
common medium. This common medium is the "language" of external (distal)
events, that is, actions are represented in the form of their distal sensory
consequences. Greenwald (1971, p. 484) gives a concise summary of the ideomotor
principle: "(a) Actions are represented in the central nervous system in the form of
images of their sensory consequences and (b) such feedback images serve the
function of initiating performance of their corresponding actions" (see also
Greenwald, 1970). This allows for an even more direct connection between
perception and action. Hommel et al. (in press) argued that this common coding of
perception action developed for "matching perception and action planning--on top of
the old system for mapping and response selection" (p. 82).
                                                
3 The first sentence was translated by myself; the translation of the remainder is taken from
James (1890, p. 525). It is interesting to note that James demoted the active nature of
imagination by translating the original passage "the more unrestrainedly we immerse
ourselves in the contemplation of movements" (dt. "je unbefangener wir uns in die
Anschauung der Bewegungen vertiefen") into the passive form "the more we are absorbed..."
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In such a system, the observation of an action involves the same codes that are also
used in performing that action. As a consequence, perceiving an action increases the
likelihood of and facilitates similar behavior at a later time. There is now
considerable evidence for both increased likelihood and facilitation of actions after
seeing them performed by another person. Chartrand and Bargh (1999) demonstrated
that mannerisms performed by an interaction partner are likely to be unconsciously
mimicked. They exposed their participants to confederates who either repeatedly
rubbed their face or shook their foot during a task performed together. The
participants mimicked this behavior without intention and awareness (try this with
your colleagues during your next meeting). Thus, observing a behavior increased the
likelihood of performing the same behavior (see also LaFrance, 1985; Chapter 4).
Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, and Rizzolatti (1995) demonstrated that the direct
observation of a movement facilitates imitating movements. They measured
electromyographic potentials while the participants observed the movements
performed by the experimenter. Muscles involved in the actions performed by the
experimenter were also activated in the observer. Furthermore, this was true both for
participants who after some trials actually had the task to imitate the observed
actions, and for participants who were never required to imitate (for further evidence
on mimicry, see Hommel et al., in press). This basic mimicry mechanism has been
proposed to underlie emotional or mood contagion (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & Rapson,
1993; Neumann & Strack, 2000b), speech perception (Fadiga & Gallese, 1997), and
the convergence in the physical appearance of spouses over the years (Zajonc,
Adelmann, Murphy, & Niedenthal, 1987). Finally, recent neurological investigations
found a possible candidate for a neurological substrate of this mimicry behavior. This
evidence suggests that in monkey brains, there are "mirror neurons" which fire at
both the performance of a specific action and the observation of the same action
performed by another monkey or human. These mirror neurons could be a
neurological basis for the common coding principle. Evidence from positron
emission tomography suggests that a similar region exists in the human brain (for
overviews, see Fadiga, Fogassi, Gallese, & Rizzolatti, 2000; Fadiga & Gallese,
1997). Interestingly, the direct observation of an action is not necessary for imitative
behavior when the dynamics of the action can be inferred from action outcomes.
Starch (1911) demonstrated that the inclination and size of handwriting is
unconsciously and unintentionally imitated when the handwritten text is copied.
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But note that in all these cases, an actually observed behavior and not an only
mentally activated concept was mimicked. Therefore, the results are not directly
relevant to the more general topic of this thesis, since its emphasis is rather on
semantic priming effects. So far, the ideomotor principle research concentrated
mainly on perceived actions performed by other persons.
The same is true of earlier research on behavioral contagion (Wheeler, 1966) and
social facilitation (Thorpe, 1956; Bandura & Walters, 1963): They are only indirectly
relevant to the present hypothesis, since the behavior under investigation was almost
always observed directly, and not activated indirectly through other means. Consider
first behavioral contagion: Wheeler (1966) defined it as a situation in which an initial
restraint against a behavior is reduced by observing a model performing the same
behavior. Importantly, for behavioral contagion it is necessary that the observer was
instigated to the behavior before observing the model. Social facilitation, in contrast,
was defined by Wheeler as a situation in which a person had neither restraints against
nor a tendency toward a behavior which is then observed in a model. While Wheeler
explains behavioral contagion by a reduction of fear, social fascilitation is explained
by a mix of overcoming of inertia, classical conditioning and "cognitive behavioral-
chaining." The latter mechanism is described similar to the ideomotor principle. In
all these cases, the behavior is the result of the immediate observation of a model.
In contrast to all these theories--ideomotor accounts, behavioral contagion, and social
fascilitation--, the spreading activation account concentrates on concepts activated
mainly by language. To use the ideomotor principle as an explanation for construct
priming effects on automatic behavior, it must be assumed that not only the
perception of others, but also the understanding of language (e.g., scrambled
sentence primes) invokes action representations. This is in fact precisely the
argument brought forward by Glenberg: "We understand language by creating
embodied conceptualizations of situations the language is describing." (1997, p. 12),
and it is compatible with recent formulations of the ideomotor principle (Hommel et
al., in press).
It is my contention that the ideomotor account promises more precise predictions
because it takes into account the actual situation of the individual (predicting situated
action). The spreading activation account is confronted with the problem that the
concept of spreading activation itself is much debated. Hardin and Rothman (1997)
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pointed out that "current evidence from the cognitive literature suggests that
activation does not spread very far, if at all" (cf. Glenberg, 1997).4 For the present
purposes, it can be summarized that current cognitive theories assert that the
activation of a construct can facilitate and increase the likelihood of behavior
associated with that construct. Associationistic models (e.g., Berkowitz, 1984) argue
that this occurs because of activation spreading from perceptual representations of
the concept to associated motoric representations. Ideomotor principle models (e.g.,
Hommel et al., in press) imply that the mental representations involved in the
perception process are also those used for action, and that their previous activation
facilitates the subsequent enactment. In both cases, the prediction not only states that
an effect on overt behavior occurs, but also specifies the direction of the effect. It is
predicted that the behavior is assimilated to the activated construct, that is, that
corresponding and not opposing behavior is performed.
Hierarchical Arrangement of Behavior Representations: From Complex to Simple
Already the early conceptions of "automatic behavior" assumed that not only simple
movements, but also quite complex behavior can be produced automatically. Lotze
(1852) wrote: "We do not think that this development of movements [by mimicry] is
restricted to trivial and negligible actions of ordinary life. Compound arrays of
movements which may even include a crime may make themselves happen in this
manner..." (p. 294f). Evidence discussed above implies that priming of a more
abstract concept such as "intelligence" can result in better performance in a
knowledge task. How is it possible that something that psychologists have
difficulties to define can be primed with effects on performance? A first clue is the
procedure used for the priming. Construct associations embedded in scrambled
sentences typically refer to low-level vivid behavioral examples of the primed
constructs. Thus, a rudeness prime in fact primes bothering, disturbing, intruding,
and interrupting (Bargh et al., 1996). As for the example of the intelligence prime
                                                
4 According to Glenberg (1997), priming effects between words of a text (i.e., that an earlier
word primes the understanding of a word following later) reflect the ease of constructing a
coherent mental model, or, in the words of Glenberg, "priming reflects ease of integration
(mesh) of concepts, not spread of activation along permanent links" (1997, p. 14). Glenberg
even proposes that the concept of "mesh" can replace "association": "The notion of mesh
can, like an association, be used to relate concepts, but the nature of the relation is deeper:
when patterns [of actions] mesh, they modify each other because they must conjoin in a way
that respects constraints of bodily action." (1997, p. 18).
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(Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998), the priming consisted of asking the
participants "to think about the concept of intelligence ... for 5 min and to list
synonyms and behaviors characteristic of this trait" (p. 872). It seems that in this
case, the participants themselves provided the link from the abstract prime to the
instantiating behavior. It is therefore debatable whether an abstract concept was
primed at all.
Nevertheless, it is worth to add that similar results from a mere (perhaps repeated)
priming of the word "intelligent" would not be unreasonable. First, Dijksterhuis and
van Knippenberg (1998) pointed out that more abstract concepts are associated with
lower level behavior in hierarchical structures, and that activating the top node of
such a structure could activate subordinated nodes: "The activation of the trait
intelligent ... may lead to the activation of a set of concrete behavioral
representations stored under it (e.g., to concentrate on a problem, to adopt an
analytical approach, to think systematically about possible solutions)" (p. 867). A
further hint is given by the previous discussion of Barsalou's (1999b) and Glenberg's
(1997) theories on the form of mental representations. How can we understand the
concept of intelligence at all if not by instantiating it in the form of associated
behaviors? In their theories, activating a concept such as intelligence means
activating associated perceptual and behavioral features which fit (mesh with) the
current situation. For instance, the abstract concept of "anger" is represented in terms
of the appraisal of an initiating event, the experience of affective states, and
behavioral responses (Barsalou, 1999b). Barsalou (1999a) noted that "whereas more
concrete concepts index well-specified objects, actions, and properties in situations,
abstract concepts index complex configurations of information distributed over
multiple modalities and over time" (p. 19 of the manuscript). Finally, research from
the stereotype domain indicates that merely priming the stereotype label (e.g.,
"Blacks") can activate the whole set of traits associated with the stereotyped group
(Lepore & Brown, 1997).
In sum, both the actual priming procedures and the theoretical arguments suggest that
abstract concepts are instantiated in the form of concrete behaviors. Either through
providing concrete behaviors in scrambled sentences primings, through self-
generated behavioral examples, or through situated instantiation, priming abstract
concepts leads to the activation of concrete behaviors.
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2.3 Moderators
If the thesis of automatic behavior is accepted, the immediate question is: But we do
not perform every action that we think of; oftentimes, we indulge in fantasies of what
we would like to do, but cannot. A first hint was given by James (1890), who
continued his quotation cited above with "[every representation of a movement]
awakens it in a maximum degree whenever it is not kept from so doing by an
antagonistic representation present simultaneously to the mind" (cf. Lotze, 1852).
Thus, contradicting representations held simultaneously may cancel each other out.
Furthermore, after reviewing evidence from developmental psychology, Greenwald
(1970, p. 88) concluded that "an initial direct link between image and action [in
childhood] is eventually brought successfully under inhibitory control.... Because ...
humans, starting at age 2, if not earlier, are capable of some degree of voluntary
inhibition of performance, ... it should not be expected that ... thought-of-action [does
inevitably lead to] performance of action."
Thus, the basic argument is (a) that contradicting mental representations can
"reverse-prime" and thus cancel automatic behavior, and that (b) those contradicting
mental representations can result both from other rather unattended sources such as
environmental stimuli, competing instructions, etc., and from more deliberate
thinking which sets alternative standards. Again, Lotze (1852, p. 295) already
brought forward a similar argument:
In an instant in which the sufficient reagent of other representations, the
sufficient vividness of a resistance-instigating emotion or the clarity of a
disagreeing mental contemplation are lacked, an action can follow from its
imagination, without being caused or accompanied by a decision of the acting
person.
Here, he added a third inhibitory mechanism, namely the negative emotional valence
of the imagined action; a modern version of this argument will be discussed below.
But first, I will review evidence on the other two moderators.
Conflicting Mental Representations
Macrae and Johnston (1997) presented evidence for the inhibition of automatic
behavior by both conflicting environmental cues and conflicting goals. Their result
that a helpfulness priming increased helpful behavior in the form of picking up
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dropped pencils was already cited in this chapter. Additionally, the experiment
included 2 conditions in which the dropped pencils were leaking and smeared with
ink. In this condition, the helping behavior decreased dramatically. In a second study,
all pens were normal, but half of the participants were informed that the session was
running behind schedule, and that they had to hurry. Similar to the sight of the
leaking pen, this information decreased helping although helpfulness was primed.
Almost equivalent were the results reported by Darley and Batson (1975), in which
the helpfulness "prime" (the Good Samaritan parable) was crossed with a second
factor, consisting of how much the participants were in a hurry. Of those who read
the parable, 80% helped when they were not hurried, 50% helped when they were
somewhat hurried, and only 25% helped when they had almost no time (but note that
the reliability of these results suffer from a very low N).
A comparable moderation of a behavioral prime was reported by Wilson and
Capitman (1982). They observed behavioral assimilation to a primed boy-meets-girl
script when the opportunity to do so was given immediately after reading the prime.
But an intermediate task or a waiting time, both taking about 5 min, cancelled the
priming effect out.5 In sum, it seems that primed behavior which is actually
performed under "perfect" conditions is inhibited either when (a) environmental
stimuli suggest negative consequences, and (b) when competing goals favor
alternative actions. Both determinants can apparently moderate between an automatic
behavioral assimilation to the primed concept and a null effect.
Valence of Activating Cue
A further moderator, which seems to be even more powerful because it can reverse
the priming effect, was suggested by Hertel and Fiedler (1998; see also Hertel &
Kerr, in press). Extrapolating from research showing that valence is used as a cue for
approach vs. avoidance behavior (for a recent overview, see Neumann & Strack,
2000a), they argued that assimilation should only be found for positively valued
concepts. Negatively valued concepts, on the other hand, should result in
performance of opposite behavior, that is, behavioral contrast. Accordingly, they
                                                
5 The priming material used by Wilson and Capitman could also be interpreted as a goal-
priming. However, the interference by a 5 min waiting time supports the notion that behavior
instead of a goal was primed, since goal primings tend to prevail longer and even to grow
until satisfied (Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996).
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primed either positive or negative connotations of either competition or of
cooperation, and measured behavior in a resource allocation task where money had
to be distributed between self and a stranger. This manipulation indeed had effects in
the expected direction, but only for participants who were somewhat undecided and
inconsistent in their decisions. The authors concluded that "provided subjects are not
committed to consistent strategies, the tendency to cooperate can be increased when
positive valence is attached to the semantic category of cooperation or when negative
valence is attached to the semantic category of competition" (p. 59f). Participants
who had a clear predisposition (in general one towards cooperation), priming had no
effect. Actually, this supports the hypothesis of the previous paragraph, namely that a
conflicting goal inhibits priming influences on behavior.
The Irony of Conscious Control
However, the strategy of holding a conflicting goal is not always a successful
strategy against priming influences. In his theory of ironic processes of mental
control, Wegner (1994) argued that a monitoring process checking for unwanted
behavior can actually produce the unwanted behavior if the individual is under
additional mental load. In one study, participants had to hold a pendulum with the
instruction not to let it move, and especially not in the direction of an axis drawn on a
sheet of paper underneath the pendulum. This instruction and the depicted axis can
be seen as a behavioral priming, but the participants have the conflicting goal not to
act accordingly. Half of the participants had the additional task of counting down
from 1000 by 7s, which put them under mental load. These participants indeed
moved the pendulum more in the forbidden axis than those who had no additional
task. A follow-up study with a more complex design (Wegner, Ansfield, & Pilloff,
1998) confirmed that the instruction not to move it in this axis produced movement
in this axis when additional load was given; when the participants were simply told
to hold the pendulum steady, load did not increase movement.
2.4 Interpretations: Side Effect or Functional Feature?
Before we proceed, it is necessary to discuss the importance of the reported
phenomenon. First of all, it must be clearly stated that it is not claimed that automatic
behavior explains the whole amount of behavioral variance, and I will not try to
determine how much variance it can explain (but see Bargh, 1997a, b). Consider the
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example of human aggression: While it seems that priming aggressive scripts can
result in more overt aggressive behavior, even an aggressive behavior influenced by
priming can be moderated by accompanying conscious deliberation which is not
controlled by the priming, e.g. how the behavior will be received. Moreover, as soon
as the connection between prime and action impulse receives attention, the link
presumably breaks. On the other hand, underestimating the power of external cues
would mean to overestimate the amount of conscious deliberation people invest in
planning their actions. Consider a quote from Bandura (1973, p. 137f):
Aggressive actions are not automatically and rigidly controlled by external
cues. This ... has a bearing on the controversy of whether the mere presence of
aggressively valenced cues, such as a gun, enhances expression of other forms
of aggression.... Stimulus prompts of this sort will facilitate aggression if
presented in ways that convey permissive or expectant reactions toward such
behavior, but not if they are introduced in a manner that makes the behavior
either personally or socially unacceptable.
In the light of recent research, Bandura's conclusion might be slightly modified:
Aggressive actions are not "automatically and rigidly controlled," but their likelihood
may be automatically increased.6 But Bandura's critique reveals an important point
about today's research on automatic behavior. So far, in order to demonstrate these
effects, researchers have carefully created situations in which the primed behavior
was an adaptive reaction to the environment (cf. Bargh, 1997a). How behavioral
priming determines behavior if this is not the case still remains to be answered, but
initial findings (Macrae & Johnston, 1998) suggest that the impact of the priming is
dramatically decreased.
Finally, what has been largely ignored so far is an explanation of how such a direct
link between perception and action in the field of social behavior can be functional
and adaptive in the sense that it supports everyday functioning. If automatic behavior
is not a bizarre side-effect of cognitive structures developed for other purposes, then
it must be demonstrated and explained how automatic behavior makes sense in
                                                
6 Of course, a proponent of automatic processes could question whether the perception of
stimulus prompts as conveying permissive or expectant reactions is necessarily conscious
and whether it might be influenced by primed constructs!
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everyday life. It seems to me that current theoretical formulation cannot account for
that. Consider an experiment discussed by Berkowitz (1997, originally published by
Geen & Berkowitz, 1966). Male participants were provoked by a confederate before
they saw a boxing fight scene. The provocateur had either the same name as the loser
of the boxing fight, the same name as the victor, or a name not mentioned in the film.
To participants in a control condition, a car race film was shown instead of the
boxing film. In a subsequent task, the participants had the possibility to punish the
confederate with shocks, supposedly as an evaluation of his task performance.
Berkowitz reported that "the aggressive [boxing] movie led to a significantly greater
number of shocks delivered to the provocateur target than did the neutral film only
when that person had the same name as the victim of the observed aggression"
(1997, p. 90), and interpreted this finding as supporting his spreading activation
account of aggressive behavior. Although a boxing film should have primed
aggressive behavior irrespective of the names, this was not the case. It seems that
behavioral priming is tailored to the situation in ways purely associationistic models
can hardly account for.
One final note seems in place before we proceed to additional manipulations of trait
construct accessibility. It is interesting to note that all effects reported here are
postconscious effects of perception on behavior. That is, the primes were always
processed consciously, and unfolded their effect after the conscious processing. In
contrast, preconscious priming effects result from subliminally presented primes. The
only published study I am aware of that tested such an effect was reported by
Neuberg (1988). He primed competitiveness with subliminally presented words
before the participants played a prisoner's dilemma game. Interestingly, the first
move of the participants was not affected by the prime, only the second move, which
was a reaction to the alleged interaction partner. Thus, the subliminally presented
primes influenced the perception of the partner, and only indirectly the behavior. It is
indeed curious that to date no study reported a direct effect of subliminal trait primes
on action.7
                                                
7 However, in a recent talk Ap Dijksterhuis (2001) reported that subliminal priming of the
word "relax" was found to decrease the heart rate of participants. This can be considered an
automatic behavior effect after subliminal construct priming.
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2.5 Summary
In this chapter, a number of studies were cited showing that behavior can be
influenced by previous (verbal) activation of a construct. When the construct
provided a potential reaction to a situation, action according to the construct was
more likely to be shown than when the construct was not primed. These effects were
extinguished when environmental cues decreased the functionality of the behavior,
and when conflicting goals rendered conflicting concepts accessible. Furthermore, a
negative valence of the priming event seems to be able to reverse the effect. Reviews
of recent theories of human memory and the literature on the perception-behavior
link suggested that this effect is due to close, if not common, representations of
perception and action codes.
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3 STEREOTYPES, ACCESSIBILITY, AND AUTOMATIC BEHAVIOR
helped, assistance, aided, supported, provided,
encouraging, facilitated, promoted, fostered,
furthered
Helpfulness primes, Macrae and Johnston (1998)
It is not an easy task to define what a stereotype is. In general, the emphasis is on
"cognitive components ... of category-based reactions--that is, reactions to people
from groups perceived to differ significantly from one's own" (Fiske, 1998, p. 357).
Thus, stereotyping is distinguished from prejudice which is the affective component,
and from discrimination which is the behavioral component of category-based
reactions. The notion of stereotypes is related to the more general term in cognitive
psychology, that of concepts, which are seen as knowledge structure about
categories, the actual physical exemplars of a concept. Conceptualizing categories
serves three fundamental tasks: comprehension, prediction and action (Barsalou,
1992). Similarly, stereotypes are employed to comprehend similarities and
differences between persons (category members) in the environment, to predict their
future actions, and to plan interactions with them. Importantly, while Fiske (1998)
emphasized that stereotypes are about other groups, others have argued that we also
hold stereotypes about our own groups, that is, self-stereotypes (Turner, Hogg,
Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987).
3.1 Stereotypes as a Source of Accessibility
How could a stereotype affect automatic behavior? One way could be that behavioral
representations are activated by strong and automatic links to traits represented in a
stereotype. Although there is still much debate about how exactly stereotypes are
represented mentally (Smith, 1998), one prominent view is that they "consist, in part,
of constellations of interrelated trait concepts" (Bargh et al., 1996) or a "well-learned
set of associations" (Devine, 1989, p. 6). Importantly, many researchers have argued
that a stereotype is automatically activated in the presence of an exemplar of or
symbolic cue to the group (Bargh, 1997b; Devine, 1989). That the activation of a
stereotype can indeed be automatic rests on evidence from studies in which the
priming was delivered subliminally, that is, for a time period too short for conscious
processing. There is now good evidence that a trait associated with a certain
stereotype (e.g., hostile) is activated if the respective label of that stereotype and
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other related traits are activated (e.g., Blacks + lazy, Devine, 1989), or if the
respective label of that stereotype is activated (e.g., Blacks) and the person has a
stereotype which strongly associates the trait with the stereotype (Lepore & Brown,
1997). Note, however, that there is still a strong controversy about the boundary
conditions of this effect, and whether it occurs for conscious perception of members
of the stereotyped group (Devine, 1999; Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Bargh, 1999).
If a stereotype automatically activates traits related to the stereotype, the question is
whether the same behavioral effects as observed for direct trait priming (reported in
the previous chapter) can be observed for stereotype priming. That is, can a trait be
primed indirectly, leading to the automatic performance of the respective behavior?
In their seminal 1996 paper, Bargh et al. developed this thesis and presented
supportive evidence, which is now backed up by numerous studies. The evidence
will be presented in the next sections; the studies will be sorted by whether social
behavior or behavior which is not part of social interactions was primed (for an
overview, see Table 2 of the Appendix). Before the studies are reported, however, it
is necessary to point out that in each and every study, care was taken to assure that
the participants were not aware of the link between priming and the subsequent
measure of behavior. In general, the two tasks were presented as different studies
combined for convenience. In some cases, the priming was actually performed
subliminally. If the participants would perceive the two tasks as related to each other,
it would not be clear how exactly the results should be interpreted: They could either
mean conscious imitation, or compliance with an experimental demand. The priming
procedures used can best be contrasted from non-priming procedures with an
example. Zuckier and Pepitone (1984) were interested in the effect of social
stereotypes or roles on the so-called base rate fallacy, the tendency to ignore
additional information in judgments of probabilities. More specifically, they wanted
to investigate whether participants with a scientific approach use base rates more
appropriately than individuals with a clinical or person-oriented approach. To
manipulate these roles, they explicitly instructed their participants to adopt a
scientific (or clinical) thinking style while working on the task. Thus, this kind of
study reveals whether individuals can intentionally imitate a certain stereotyped
group, and whether a certain behavior is associated with its stereotype, but not
whether the activation of knowledge associated with the stereotyped group has the
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same effects irrespective of conscious intentions. (And yes, imitating scientists can
indeed reduce the base rate fallacy.)
3.2 Evidence For Behaviora l Assimilation After Stereotype Activation
Automatic Behavior Not Related to Social Interactions
One of the most impressing pieces of evidence is surely the effect of an elderly
stereotype prime on walking speed presented by Bargh et al. (1996). After working
on scrambled sentences which included words related to the elderly stereotype (e.g,
worried, Florida, old, lonely), but not synonyms of slow, the participants were
observed on their way out of the laboratory. On average, it took them 1 s more for
the 10 m way to the elevator, compared with another group of subjects who had
scrambled sentences without references to the elderly: The participants mimicked the
slow behavior typically ascribed to elderly people. Bargh et al. (1996) replicated this
result in a second study. However, Dijksterhuis, Spears, et al. (1998) could not
replicate this result when an additional judgmental task was introduced between
scrambled sentences priming and behavior measurement. Thus, it seems that the
behavioral priming effect is wiped out by an activation of other mental
representations (compare the section on moderators in Chapter 2 for similar findings
with non-social primings).
Effects of elderly priming on behavioral speed were also found by Dijksterhuis,
Spears and Lépinasse (in press). They presented photos of 5 elderly persons or
photos of 5 young persons, and measured the speed in a subsequent lexical decision
task (LDT), in which participants had to decide whether a string presented on the
screen was a correct word or not (the words were unrelated to the stereotype of the
elderly; thus, pure behavioral speed was measured). Participants who saw photos of
elderly persons reacted more slowly in the LDT. A similar procedure was used by
Kawakami, Young and Dovidio (in press). In three studies, in the elderly priming
conditions the participants had the task to categorize 32 persons presented on photos
into either young or old (16 of the persons were clearly elderly). More specifically,
for each person the participants answered the question "old?" by pressing YES or
NO. The control conditions varied: no task at all (Study 1), finding a white dot on the
picture instead of categorizing into young and elderly (Study 2), or categorizing into
male and female (Study 3). After the priming task, the speed in a LDT was
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measured; neutral target words served as a measurement of behavioral assimilation,
while elderly stereotype-related words served as a measurement of stereotype
activation (see below, section on mediators). In each study, a significant behavioral
assimilation to the elderly stereotype, expressed through slower reactions on neutral
words, was found.
Another effect of an elderly prime was reported by Dijksterhuis, Aarts, Bargh, and
van Knippenberg (2000). Participants had to perform a LDT. For half of the
participants the target words were preceded by subliminally presented elderly primes
(e.g., old, gray, bingo). For participants who had a lot of contact with the elderly in
their daily life, this had the effect that they remembered less of the presented target
words. The authors interpreted this as an automatic assimilation to the stereotypic
elderly trait forgetfulness (see also Dijksterhuis et al., in press, Study 2, and
Dijksterhuis, Bargh & Miedema, 2000, for similar results). Interestingly, the effect
seems mainly to be due to impaired recall, not impaired encoding, since making
participants aware of a possible influence after the encoding extinguishes the effect
(Dijksterhuis, Bargh, et al., 2000; see below).
An exception in the row of findings of elderly priming are the results reported by
Levy (1996). In her first study, the participants were themselves elderly. They were
not primed with the elderly stereotype in general, but with subsets: either positive
aspects related to wisdom, or negative aspects related to senility. The priming
consisted of subliminally flashing related words on a computer screen, outside of
awareness. Before and after the priming, memory performance was assessed. Results
indicate an assimilation in the direction of the primes, and also increased
accessibility of these concepts when judging other elderly persons. Interestingly, in a
second study young participants were subjected to the identical priming procedure,
but they did not show the same assimilation. If anything, they exhibited a slight
contrast on two of the memory indices. I will come back to this study in the final
section of this chapter.
While the elderly stereotype is probably the best-researched stereotype concerning its
effects on automatic behavior, it is by far not the only one. In a series of studies,
Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1998) and Dijksterhuis, Spears, et al. (1998)
investigated the impact of stereotype priming on intellectual performance.
Intellectual performance was measured by the number of correct answers in a Trivial
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Pursuit-like knowledge test. The stereotype priming consisted of the task of thinking
for 5 minutes about the stereotype. For the stereotype of professors, "participants
were asked ... to imagine a typical professor ... for 5 min and to list the behaviors,
lifestyle, and appearance attributes of this typical professor" (Dijksterhuis and van
Knippenberg, 1998). Results indicated that those primed with professors
outperformed those not primed or primed with secretaries (Study 1), and that the
priming of soccer hooligans can decrease intellectual performance (Study 3).
Furthermore, it was shown that the duration of the priming is important; no effects
were found with the priming lasting 2 min, while there was a strong effect after 9
min. Similar effects on intellectual performance were found by Dijksterhuis and van
Knippenberg (1999, Study 2), Dijksterhuis, Spears, et al. (1998, Study 1), and Musch
and Klauer (2001).
Other stereotypes have also been demonstrated to elicit automatic behavior. Macrae,
Bodenhausen, Milne, Castelli, Schloerscheidt and Greco (1998) subjected their
participants to a reading task, in which they simply had to read 20 words written on a
sheet of paper. The test had either no title, the title "Shimuhuru Word Reading Test,"
or the title "Schumacher Word Reading Test." The last title was supposed to activate
the stereotypically fast formula 1 driver Michael Schumacher, and indeed: the
participants read the 20 words faster in this condition than in the other two
conditions.
Automatic Social Behavior
Of course all these behaviors could be part of social interactions, but they are not
clearly social behaviors, such as aggression and conformity. Interestingly, these two
domains of social behavior can apparently also be influenced by stereotype priming.
In the USA, Blacks are in general stereotyped as hostile, and the activation of the
stereotype can lead to the interpretation of ambiguous behavior as hostile (Devine,
1989). Bargh et al. (1996) and Chen and Bargh (1997) showed that subliminal
priming with faces of Black Americans can lead to increased expression of anger and
aggression after a frustration (a computer failure in Bargh et al., 1996, and a difficult
task in Chen and Bargh, 1997). Importantly, these participants expressed their anger
towards White interaction partners.
Punks are frequently stereotyped as anarchistic. Pendry and Carrick (2001) showed
their participants either a photo and some additional information about a young punk,
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or about a bank accountant. This served as the stereotype priming. In a subsequent
and allegedly unrelated task, the participants were brought in conflict with the
opinion of four confederates in an Asch paradigm. Those primed with a bank
accountant conformed more with the confederates, while those primed with the punk
stayed truer to their (objectively correct) opinion.
3.3 Evidence on Moderators
Given these impressing findings, one immediate question is: What determines
whether these effects actually occur? What properties of the person or the situation
can moderate automatic behavior? The next sections review the moderators that have
been reported in the literature to date.
Strength of Association Between Stereotype and Trait
The explanation underlying effects of stereotype priming is that the stereotype
activates its associated traits, which themselves influence behavior. Thus, one can
hypothesize that if a certain trait is not part of a stereotype for some persons, then
these persons would not show behavioral effects of stereotype activation. One reason
for the lack of stereotypic knowledge could be infrequent contact with the
stereotyped group. Along this reasoning, Dijksterhuis, Aarts, et al. (2000) confirmed
in 2 studies that less contact with the elderly led to less behavioral assimilation in
terms of poor memory performance. Only participants primed with the elderly
stereotype and familiar with the association to forgetfulness showed performance
impairment. Furthermore, in the second study they found that contact indeed
strengthened the association of the elderly with forgetfulness, and that this
associative strength mediated the effect of contact on actual memory impairment.
Thus, for traits mainly learned through contact with the stereotyped group, contact
can increase associative strength and behavioral assimilation. In other words, contact
with the stereotyped group is a personality variable that moderates behavioral
assimilation. Furthermore, on a more general level one can summarize: Whether a
behavioral effect occurs, is moderated by the individual associating a trait (or a
behavior) with a stereotype. Thus, association of a behavior with a stereotype is also
a moderating personality variable.
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Duration of Prime
It was already mentioned that the duration of the priming has a moderating role on
behavioral assimilation. Imagining a stereotypic professor or a stereotypic hooligan
for only 2 minutes does not produce a behavioral effect as compared to a no prime
control group. At least 5 min, but better 9 min of stereotype activation seem to lead
to more reliable effects in these cases. However, the fact that subliminal priming with
faces (Bargh et al., 1996, Chen & Bargh, 1997) can also have effects, shows that
general verdicts on this issue are difficult.
At this point, a remark on the priming procedures is appropriate. Some of the
theoretical arguments and procedure descriptions may be read as if priming is a
rather passive process, which involves not much thinking by the participants. After
some disappointing null results in my own research, I think however that this is a
fallacy. Solving 15 scrambled sentences or thinking 5 minutes about a stereotype and
writing down associations involves a lot of thinking, and activates very complex and
vivid pictures, although in the scrambled sentences procedures participants are in
general not aware of the underlying theme. That a few subliminal primes, be it faces
(Bargh et al., 1995; Chen & Bargh, 1997) or words (Dijksterhuis, Aarts, et al., 2000;
Dijksterhuis, Bargh, et al., 2000) can also result in measurable automatic behavior
should not be extrapolated to the realm of postconscious priming effects. I strongly
suspect, although I am not aware of relevant research, that priming the identical
words with the awareness of the participants would not lead to the same effects.
Since some of the studies later reported in this thesis found null-effects attributable to
this fallacy, I will come back to this topic.
Awareness of Prime Influence
For effects of priming on judgment tasks, awareness of a possible influence of the
priming event on the judgment is a well-known moderator (e.g., Wegener & Petty,
1995). Similarly, making participants aware of a possible influence of priming on
behavior can lead to the extinction of the priming effect, as Dijksterhuis, Bargh, et al.
(2000) demonstrated. They showed that memory impairment as a result of elderly
priming decreased when participants were made aware of the link between prime and
behavior. Importantly, this effect could not be attributed to a mere increase of
motivation, since in the second study participants did not improve when they were
not primed but nevertheless told that they were influenced by an elderly stereotype.
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Accuracy Motivation
Stereotype activation in the course of impression formation can be interpreted as a
tendency to focus on abstract, general knowledge, ignoring the details of the specific
persons. Thus, a motivation to be accurate can counteract the activation (and
application) of stereotypes. Dijksterhuis et al. (in press, Study 3) found that when
participants were urged to be as accurate as possible during the perception of several
elderly persons (the stereotype activation procedure), no assimilation occurred.
Self-awareness
What role does consciousness play in automatic behavior? Can it stop and inhibit
automatic effects, as Baumeister and Sommer (1997) suggested in response to a
target chapter by John Bargh? In principle, there seem to be a strong and a weak
version of this hypothesis. The strong version would imply that directing the
awareness on the self leads to conscious self-regulation which overrides priming
effects; this could be inferred from objective self-awareness theory (Duval &
Wicklund, 1972; for a recent review, see Fejfar & Hoyle, 2000). The weaker version
would imply that private self-awareness works as a distraction, focusing the attention
on a different domain of stimuli and decreasing the impact of a priming event. Two
experiments by Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (2000) focus on this latter version.
They operationalized the impact of intervening consciousness in the form of private
self-awareness, manipulated by the presence of a mirror in which the participant saw
themselves (Duval & Wicklund, 1973). Since self-awareness is merely
conceptualized as a distraction, the authors' term "self-focus" seems more appropriate
then private self-awareness. The reasoning is that heightened self-focus activates
alternative behavioral options even if the cue is not competing "in the sense that its
behavioral consequences have to be opposite to that of the stereotype. All that is
needed is one cue with an activation level that is higher than that of the stereotype,
because a dominating cue will inhibit the activation of all others." (Dijksterhuis and
van Knippenberg, 2000, p. 60). Increasing self-focus was manipulated by
confronting the participants with a mirror during both phases, stereotype activation
and behavioral measurement. In two studies, the effect of this moderator was tested
with respect to a politician priming of long-windedness and a professor vs. hooligan
priming of intellectual performance. In both studies, the prime had an effect when
self-focus was low, i.e. politicians priming led to longer essays written by the
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participants in a subsequent task, and professor priming led to better performance in
a knowledge task. However, when the presence of a mirror led to a high self-focus,
the priming effects were simply extinguished, and there were no differences between
the priming conditions.
This finding is especially intriguing since there is one other priming study that has
found contradicting evidence. Baldwin and Holmes (1987) activated for their female
participants either their representation of two college friends or of two older
members of their family. Baldwin and Holmes conceptualized this manipulation as a
priming of private audiences, which activates respective aspects of the self-concept.
So, the activation of two college friends activates a more relaxed, modern part of the
self-concept including norms and attitudes, while the activation of two elderly
members of the family activates more traditional-minded parts of the self-concept.
The priming of these private audiences consisted of a guided visualization of these
persons for several minutes. After the priming procedure, the participants had to
evaluate a sexually permissive story. It was assumed that the college friends differed
in their attitudes towards this kind of stories from older family members. While the
participants read the story, half of them were made self-aware by a mirror placed in
the cubicle. What can be expected as a result? It was just explained that Dijksterhuis
and van Knippenberg (2000) assumed that self-focus dominates any kind of priming.
Thus, they would probably predict that a possible effect of the private audience
priming should be extinguished. Baldwin and Holmes, however, argued that the self-
awareness manipulation would increase the audience manipulation since it facilitates
the activation of this self-other schema.
Indeed, the sexually permissive story was liked more by those who thought about
friends from campus than by those who thought about elderly family members.
However, this effect was significant only for those who were made highly self-
aware. Thus, these results completely contradict Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg
(2000). Apparently, the moderating role of self-focus differs between primes of
unrelated social categories and self-relevant private audiences. This idea will be
followed up in the next chapter.
Activation of Salient Exemplar
The evidence reviewed so far showed that priming a stereotype leads to behavioral
assimilation by increasing the accessibility of stereotype-related behavioral
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representations. The strategies to activate a stereotype focused on the rather "high
level" representation of the stereotype, and mostly abstracted from single exemplars
of the category. However, additional to the general representation of a category per
se, activating a stereotype can also mean activating one single exemplar of this
category. A number of studies investigated whether it makes a difference if the
abstract category or a particular exemplar is brought to the participant's mind.
The central argument underlying these studies builds on work by Stapel and
colleagues (e.g., Stapel & Winkielman, 1998). They argue that a single exemplar can
serve as a comparison standard, which is not expected from a broader social
category: "Distinct information constitutes a separate entity with clear object
boundaries and, therefore, is more likely to be used as a comparison standard than is
indistinct, abstract information...." (ibid., p. 637). More specifically, it is assumed
that activating a distinct single exemplar leads to a comparison between self and this
exemplar, and that in this comparison process concepts opposite of the standard
become accessible. Thus, in contrast to the aforementioned extinguishing effect of
self-focus per se, which makes other mental representations accessible, a comparison
is hypothesized to result in increased accessibility of stereotype-opposite behavioral
representations and thereby in behavioral contrast.
This model was first formulated by Dijksterhuis, Spears, et al. (1998), and was
further scrutinized by Dijksterhuis et al. (in press). Importantly, they see the
stereotype priming process and the reverse-priming comparison process as operating
in parallel:
In order to explain behavioral contrast, our model proposes two parallel
processes whereby both the stereotype and the exemplar of that stereotypic
category are activated and exert opposing effects. Activation of the stereotype
should, other things being equal, evoke assimilation in behavior as well as
judgment with respect to the stereotype. The salience of an exemplar judged
against this interpretative background should elicit contrast against the
stereotype, which can outweigh the assimilation effect. (p. 5 in the manuscript)
Thus, it is not the case that exemplar activation is the "opposite" of stereotype
activation. Rather, while stereotype activation is expected to lead only to
assimilation, exemplar activation is additionally expected to lead to an active
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comparison process in which the self is conceptualized in terms opposite to the
exemplar.
What evidence supports this model? In a first study using the trivial pursuit
dependent measure, Dijksterhuis, Spears, et al. (1998) compared the effect of
priming a category--professors vs. supermodels--with the effect of priming single
exemplars--Albert Einstein vs. Claudia Schiffer. Indeed, while participants primed
with professors performed better than those primed with supermodels, participants
primed with Claudia Schiffer outperformed those primed with Albert Einstein. Thus,
exemplar priming resulted in behavior opposite to that typical for the exemplar. The
priming consisted of thinking about the category or exemplar for 5 min and listing
typical features. In a similar vein, the second study of Dijksterhuis, Spears, et al.
(1998) compared priming the stereotype of the elderly (with scrambled sentences, cf.
Bargh et al., 1996) with priming the stereotype plus activating a single exemplar, in
this case the Dutch Queen Mother. Indeed, participants walked faster in the latter
condition, indicating a contrast instead of assimilation.
Similarly, Dijksterhuis et al. (in press) provided evidence that the assimilative effect
of elderly priming on speed in a LDT can be counteracted by a single exemplar.
Since these studies will serve as the basis of some studies to be presented in the
empirical part of this thesis, they will be described here in more detail. In the most
relevant Study 1, Dijksterhuis et al. asked their participants to form impressions of
persons displayed on the computer screen. The persons were either young or elderly,
and they were accompanied by additional information, altogether 20 sentences.
These 20 sentences were either distributed over 5 elderly (or young) female persons
in the category condition, or all were displayed as belonging to only 1 elderly (or
young) female person. The reasoning was that in the 5 exemplars condition, "the
representation ... should be more abstracted and thus more stereotypical than the
representation of the single individual" (p. 9 of the manuscript). In the 1 exemplar
condition, the impression formation was expected to result in a rather distinct
impression, which could serve as the standard of a spontaneous comparison. The
results showed that indeed the assimilation process, which was significant in the 5
person condition, was extinguished in the 1 person condition; the contrast, however,
failed to reach significance. In the second study, these 2 conditions (single exemplar,
either young or old) were repeated, and this time a significant contrast was found, i.e.
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shorter reaction times after impression formation of an elderly person. A second
factor manipulated whether the participants were additionally put under cognitive
load, with the reasoning that additional cognitive load would undermine the
constructing of a distinct impression, resulting again in a mere abstract stereotype
activation. Indeed, in this condition no contrast, but an assimilation was found, i.e.
longer reaction times after impression formation of an elderly person.
However, the evidence on whether contrast necessarily follows from the perception
of a single salient exemplar is not as clear as it might seem from these studies. First
of all, other studies have used exemplars as primes and found assimilation. Macrae et
al. (1998, see above) titled their reading test "Schumacher Reading Test" and found
increased reading speed. The participants of Pendry and Carrick (2001) read about a
single typical punk or bank accountant on the basis of a photo and alleged
biographical information. Although this procedure resembles that used by
Dijksterhuis et al. (in press), they found assimilation. In the mimicry study by
Chartrand and Bargh (1999), participants faced a single other person and still
mimicked her. Furthermore, the stereotype priming procedure used by Dijksterhuis
and van Knippenberg (1998) asked the participants to imagine "a typical professor ...
and to list attributes of this typical professor"; it seems possible that at least some
participants indeed thought about one and only one typical professor they knew,
which would also be the activation of a single exemplar. Finally, while the
assumption that exemplar-opposing attributes become associated with the self (see
below, section on mediators) was confirmed by Dijksterhuis, Spears, et al. (1998,
Study 3), evidence by Mussweiler and Strack (2000b) suggests this is not always the
case. They found on the contrary that after comparing themselves with Nicki Lauda
or Bill Clinton on the dimension of physical abilities, exemplar-consistent attributes
were associated with the self (see also next chapter).
Thus, this evidence needs a balanced summary. First, there is evidence that a single
exemplar can lead to a spontaneous comparison process. In this process, exemplar-
contrary knowledge becomes associated with the self (cf. Dijksterhuis, Spears, et al.,
1998, Study 3). Furthermore, behavioral contrast occurs instead of assimilation. This
is an important finding, since this is the only moderator so far that cannot only
extinguish automatic behavioral assimilation but actually reverse it. Second, the
necessary and sufficient conditions when a single exemplar leads to a comparison are
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still unknown. While Dijksterhuis and colleagues argue that a distinct exemplar alone
is sufficient, other studies seem to suggest that the extremity of the exemplar might
play a role: Albert Einstein and arguably also Claudia Schiffer may be extreme
examples of their categories. When, as in Study 1 by Dijksterhuis et al. (in press) the
extremity is controlled, contrast findings may no longer be discernable (for a similar
argument, see Mussweiler & Strack, 2000a).
3.4 Evidence on Mediators
Stereotype Activation
In the introduction to this chapter, it was mentioned that the current model by Bargh
et al. (1996) explains behavioral priming from stereotype activation as mediated by
trait activation. In short, the idea is that the professor stereotype activates the trait
intelligent, which itself activates behavioral presentations, e.g. efficient problem
solving strategies. Kawakami et al. (in press) took a closer look at this thesis,
reasoning that such a mediation should not be necessary theoretically, if one assumes
that stereotypic associations include "not only personality trait concepts, but also
physical characteristics, expectations, objects, and attitudes" (p. 9 in the manuscript).
To use the example, professors could directly be represented as using efficient
problem solving strategies. They concluded that in contrast to the mediated process
assumed by Bargh et al., "category priming may activate a behavior automatically
and directly" (ibid.). This reasoning is compatible with the arguments brought
forward by Carlston (1994, see also above). He argued that for both person and
stereotype representation, personality traits should be distinguished from behavioral
observations made about the target.
To investigate a possible mediation empirically, Kawakami et al. primed the category
of the elderly, and measured both behavioral assimilation and stereotype activation
by using different target words (either neutral or traits) in a LDT. Thus, slower
reactions overall would indicate behavioral assimilation, faster reactions to
stereotypic traits would indicate stereotype activation, and a mediation analysis can
regress the behavioral assimilation on the stereotype activation. In three studies using
different control groups, they consistently found (a) behavioral assimilation and (b)
stereotype activation, but no clear indication of mediation. Only in one of the studies,
behavioral assimilation was partially mediated by trait activation. Furthermore, when
46
the activation of the specific trait slow was looked at, no mediation was found.
Kawakami et al. concluded that "automatic activation of stereotypic traits is not a
necessary mediator for automatic social behavior" (ibid., p. 35 of the manuscript).
Changes in the Self-concept
It was already mentioned in the section on comparison induction by salient
exemplars, that there is some evidence on the assumed mediator of contrast effects.
In brief, Dijksterhuis, Spears, et al. (1998) assumed that the comparison with a
salient exemplar (e.g., Einstein) leads to a comparison process in which exemplar-
opposing traits (e.g., dumb) become more accessible. More specifically, they assume
that these traits become associated with the self-concept. This hypothesis was tested
by first priming participants with Albert Einstein or professors, and then assessing
the association of traits related to intelligence or stupidity with the self-concept in a
LDT. This was achieved by using a subliminal sequential priming procedure with
self-concept primes ("I") before the traits (for similar measures, see Bargh &
Chartrand, 2000). The results showed, apart from very fast answers on intelligence in
all conditions, a facilitation of stupidity traits by self-concept primes only in the
Albert Einstein priming condition. Thus, while both professor and Einstein priming
made intelligence traits more accessible, only the Einstein priming associated the
self-concept with stupidity. As important as this finding is, we must note however
that it was not followed by a measure of intelligent behavior. Thus, it can only be
concluded that Einstein priming both decreases intellectual performance and results
in a self-concept change, but not that the self-concept change actually leads to the
poor performance. Considering the previously reported findings by Kawakami et al.,
it could well be that the behavioral effect is not mediated by the knowledge
activation as measured in the sequential priming.
3.5 Summary, Interpretation and Puzzling Predictions
In just a few years, an impressive amount of evidence on automatic behavioral
effects of stereotypes has been collected. The bottom line of these studies is:
Activation of a stereotype can lead to the automatic and unintended mimicking of
behavior typical for the stereotyped group. The stereotype activation procedures are
divers, ranging from thinking about typical members of the stereotyped groups
without further material, forming an impression about typical members on the basis
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of photos, solving word puzzles related to various aspects of the stereotype,
categorizing individuals as members of the stereotyped group, to subliminally
flashed faces and stereotype-related words. Likewise, the dependent measures range
from basic bodily behavior (walking and typing speed) to indices of cognitive
performance (knowledge and memory tasks) to social behavior (conformity). Some
boundary conditions both with respect to the person and the situation are also clear:
It is necessary to really engage in thinking about the stereotype (at least when the
priming is part of a conscious processing), and the link between stereotype and
behavior or trait must be cognitively available (cf. Higgins, 1996) from previous
learning episodes. The priming effect breaks down when the stereotype activation is
interrupted by accuracy motivation in person perception, when self-awareness directs
attention to other representations, or when the primed individuals become aware of
the priming effect, have correct naive theories on its direction and are motivated to
counteract it.
It is less clear whether the stereotype activation directly primes behavioral
representations (i.e., elderly persons walk slow), or activates them only indirectly via
mediating trait constructs (i.e., elderly persons are slow, which implies slow walking
speed). Furthermore, there is contradicting evidence on the reversal of the priming
effect by presentation of salient exemplars. While Dijksterhuis and colleagues argued
that such a presentation results in the induction of a comparison and a subsequent
contrast, other studies not concerned with this issue found behavioral assimilation to
activated exemplars of a stereotyped category.
This issue is especially important since all cited studies except one (Levy, 1996)
have one irritating feature: The participants in these studies were always students,
and they were not members of the category activated by the prime, but still they
assimilated. Thus, Caucasian students assimilated to Blacks, young students
assimilated to the elderly stereotype, students assimilated to Punks, etc. Only Levy
(1996) argued and found that young participants should not assimilate to the
stereotype of a group of which they are not a member. In her view, such primes
activate a self-stereotype, and only this should have assimilative effects. However,
the remainder of the evidence seems to suggest that her findings with young
participants could be an exception. Indeed, if one compares the studies of
Dijksterhuis, Aarts, et al. (2000) and Levy (1996), it is remarkable that both used
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young participants, primed them subliminally with elderly stereotype words, and
measured memory performance. However, Dijksterhuis and colleagues found
assimilation, while Levy found no assimilation, and on two indicators slight contrast.
One clue to the apparent contradiction are the primes used in the two studies. While
Dijksterhuis, Aarts, et al.'s primes seem to be of rather neutral valence (e.g., old,
grey, conservative), Levy's primes were rather negative in the senility condition (e.g.,
alzheimer's, senile, dementia, diseased), or not strongly related to actual memory
performance (e.g., guidance, wise, alert). Thus, it may be that in Levy's studies, the
concepts were more chronically accessible and applicable for the elderly participants,
while the younger participants were either repelled by the negative valence (cf.
Hertel & Fiedler, 1998), or not affected by the faint associations to memory
performance.
In sum, the current evidence on automatic behavior suggests that we assimilate to
every stereotype knowledge activated in an abstract manner, irrespective of whether
the stereotyped group is our ingroup, an irrelevant group, or an outgroup. So, what is
the message of these studies? They basically deny that automatic effects of social
environmental cues are moderated by the structure of the social environment.
Humans are conceptualized as "mackerels with moderators" (Dijksterhuis, Bargh, et
al., 2000), who assimilate to all social concepts primed by the environment unless
these primes are extinguished by conscious attention or a prominent single exemplar.
What is lacking from this analysis is a functional background. Why would our
automatic behavior not follow such important rules as to mimic only those who are
close to the own person, and not those who are different? The implicit assumption is
that our "reptilian weenie wrapped in a neocortical bun," how Dijksterhuis, Bargh, et
al., citing Gilbert (1989), call the older modules of our brain, cannot distinguish
between us and them (or simply defaults to us). Furthermore, it is implied that the
motivation to establish group differences, which is so well-known from everyday
life, is not supported by automatic processing. Only a rather interpersonal contrast
from a distinct exemplar of the other group seems possible.
The body of empirical evidence cited in this chapter is without any doubt impressive
and interesting. However, these implications reveal a shortcoming of the present
research: It largely ignores a functional and pragmatic perspective. From such a
perspective, it would be necessary to ask how automatic behavior is tuned to the
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structure of the social environment, to categorizations of people into us and them. It
seems that this analysis is also true of the precise operationalizations employed in
these studies. The conditions under which all these studies were conducted--making
a stereotype accessible without inducing a salient distinction between us and them--
probably excluded social structure from the experiment, and perhaps favored
assimilation to stereotypes of strangers. The next chapter will scrutinize this idea,
and propose a model that tries (a) to explain the contradicting findings on contrast
after exemplar activation and (b) to predict when a stereotype activation results in
assimilation and when in contrast.
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4 HOW SOCIAL COMPARISON AFFECTS
CONSTRUCT ACCESSIBILITY
challenge, confront, counter, defy, deviate, differ,
different, disagree, disobey, disrespect, ignore,
individual, independent, oppose, opposite, rebel,
refute, reject, unique
Nonconformity primes, Epley and Gilovich
(1999)
Virtually all studies presented in the previous chapter reported assimilation effects.
That is, the participants mimicked behavior typical for a group they did not belong
to. This sounds puzzling, and from the perspective of intergroup theories it indeed is,
as the following review confirms.
4.1 Intercategory Accentuat ion
The presence of at least two clearly identifiable social categories is a defining feature
of intergroup behavior (Brewer & Brown, 1998). In classic theories of intergroup
relation, perception and accentuation of differences between categories has always
been a central topic. Allport (1954) saw these processes as the basis for prejudice
between groups. Similarly, Campbell (1956) argued that stereotyping of a group does
not only result in the diminishing of differences within the group, but also leads to
the exaggeration of differences between groups:
One important aspect of the general syndrome of social stereotyping is
enhancement of contrast or the exaggeration of relative differences between
social groups. Thus if on intelligence tests in New York City schools Jewish
students test slightly higher than white Christian students, and Negro students
slightly lower, these small differences are exaggerated in social stereotypes
about the students into the judgments that Negroes are 'dumb' and Jews are
'smart.' (p. 350; cited after McGarty, 1999, p. 25)
One important contribution to the understanding of these phenomena in social
stereotyping came from work on judgments of physical stimuli. In a classic study,
Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) showed that the judgement of the length of lines varied
depending on their classification. When the lines were classified such that the
classification was correlated with the judged dimension length, the differences
between the lines at the boundary of the categories were overestimated, compared to
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judgments in the absence of a classification or to the "true" differences. In the words
of Tajfel, there was "a significant increase of the apparent differences between the
stimuli at the point of transition from one class to another" (Tajfel, 1981, p. 103).
Applied to the example of Campbell, this would mean that a perceiver of the
intelligence tests would perceive the difference between the best Black student and
the worst Jewish student to be higher than it actually is (assuming that the best Black
student is actually worse than the worst Jewish student).8
This reasoning was applied to the domain of social stereotypes and remained a
central topic in theories on intergroup relations. Tajfel (1981) wrote: "When a
classification is correlated with a continuous dimension, there will be a tendency to
exaggerate the differences on that dimension between items which fall into distinct
classes, and to minimize these differences within each of the classes" (p. 133). He
added that the stereotypes about groups are of course much more complex than
stereotypes about lines. First, social classifications are frequently correlated with
valued dimensions, which creates additional motivations to hold on to stereotypes
which indicate a superiority of the own group. Furthermore, a "reality check" of
social stereotypes is not as easy to carry out as with physical stimuli, and the self-
fulfilling nature of stereotypes may reverse the causal direction between difference
and perception, for instance when hostile behavior towards a person stereotyped as
aggressive leads to more aggressive behavior.
Two theories of intergroup behavior incorporating these assumptions are Social
Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and Self-Categorization Theory (SCT,
Turner et al., 1987). I will focus here on SCT. In general, the two sides of the same
coin--interclass differentiation and intra-class assimilation--are conceptualized
together, although the theoretical and empirical focus has often been on the latter (cf.
Brewer & Brown, 1998).
Intra-class Assimilation and Self-stereotyping
SCT has applied the assumption of intra-class assimilation to two major phenomena
(among others): perceptions of homogeneity, and depersonalization of the self.
Concerning the first phenomenon, it has been shown that a salient social
                                                
8 However, note that according to McGarthy (1999, p. 73), there were apparently numerous
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categorization not only leads to increased perception of homogeneity in another
group (outgroup homogeneity), but also to increased perception of homogeneity in
the own group (Simon, 1992; Haslam, Oakes, Turner, & McGarty, 1996).
Concerning the second phenomenon, depersonalization is seen as a special case of
intra-class assimilation within the ingroup. It is argued that a discounting of
differences within the group leads to an increased application of the ingroup
stereotype to the self. In this process, the stereotype becomes a self-stereotype, and
the self is depersonalized. Individuals who perceive themselves as members of a
group "come to perceive themselves more as the interchangeable exemplars of a
social category than as unique personalities defined by their individual differences"
(Turner et al, 1987, p. 50). This process is assumed to underlie major group
phenomena, including group cohesiveness, emotional contagion and empathy,
collective action, shared norms and social influence. Recent evidence by Smith and
colleagues (Coats, Smith, Claypool, & Banner, 2000; Smith, Coats, & Walling,
1999; Smith & Henry, 1996) suggests that such a coupling between self and ingroup
may be rooted at a very basic level. Evidence from reaction times of self-descriptions
showed that confirming an attribute for the self (e.g., I am intelligent) is facilitated
when this attribute is also stereotypical for the ingroup. Importantly, this effect was
relatively automatic, that is, the participants were not instructed to keep their ingroup
in mind while answering the task.
Inter-class Differentiation Between Social Groups
There is plenty of evidence from explicit measures that the differences between
ingroups (and the depersonalized self) and outgroups are accentuated. On evaluative
dimensions, members of a distinct ingroup assimilate their self-evaluations to
ingroup members and contrast it from outgroup members (Brewer and Gardner,
1996). Further evidence on perceptual and cognitive accentuation of between-
category difference was reviewed by Krueger (1992). He found both that true
differences were exaggerated, and that illusory differences were perceived although
in reality there were none. Haslam and Turner (1992) reported that the perceived
similarity of self and an outgroup member depended on whether the context (the
                                                
failed attempts to replicate the results of Tajfel and Wilkes (1963).
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frame of reference) suggested that the in- and the outgroup formed an entity or not.
High dissimilarity was perceived only when the differences between in- and
outgroup were higher than those to the rest of the frame of reference. In other words,
the perception of the other person was assimilated towards the own position when
perceiver and target person shared the same category membership, but the perception
was contrasted away from the own position when the target person belonged to a
different social category. These results can be predicted from SCT's meta-contrast
principle (cf. Campbell, 1958). According to this principle, the perception of a
category is inferred from its prototype. The prototype is the exemplar of a category
which differs the least from the other exemplars of the category and at the same time
differs the most from the exemplars of the outgroup. It can be demonstrated that by
introducing an extreme outgroup, the prototype of the ingroup shifts. This shift is
assumed to underlie intergroup accentuation, since it determines the
conceptualization of the remaining ingroup exemplars (McGarty, 1999; Oakes,
Haslam, & Turner, 1994; for review of further results on accentuation, see Spears,
Jetten, & Scheepers, in press; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994; Wilder &
Cooper, 1981; Wilder & Thompson, 1988).
While these effects take place in perception and conception, differentiation can also
happen on a behavioral level. Tajfel and colleagues (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, &
Flament, 1971) assumed that a "'generic' outgroup attitude ... foster[s] or reinforce[s]
a tendency to behave differentially towards outgroups and ingroups even when such
a behaviour has no 'utilitarian' value to the individual or to his group" (p. 151). They
concluded from their seminal study using the minimal group paradigm that an ad hoc
intergroup categorization activates such a 'generic' social norm, leading to a
deliberate strategy of creating difference between the groups even if this difference
conflicted with gaining absolute profit for the ingroup. In such a minimal group
paradigm, special conditions are created in which an artificial and initially
meaningless categorization is imposed on the participants. For this special setting,
Cadinu and Rothbart (1996) argued that an oppositeness-heuristic governs the
perception and judgement of an outgroup and leads to the accentuation of ingroup-
outgroup differences.
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Difference in Intergroup Theories
In sum, differences between categories are a pivotal point in theories of intergroup
relations. Social categorizations are assumed to (initially) depend on the perception
of differences between the groups of people (Oakes et al., 1994). When
categorizations become active and applied to the social environment, they are
expected to govern further perception and conception, leading to emphasized or even
exaggerated differences between the (social) self and the outgroup (stereotype). As a
result of social categorization into opposing groups, group members should rely on
their ingroup stereotype for the formation of attitudes and behavioral norms. In the
end, difference between groups is assumed to be created (a) as a mere result of
categorization, and (b) to achieve positively valued distinctiveness (Tajfel & Turner,
1979; Brewer, 1991) and (c) to anchor one's judgement and behavior in the
consensus of those who are similar, and not those who are different (social reality
testing, Turner, 1991).
Admittedly, the central role ascribed to between-category differences has caused a
complex picture: sometimes differences have a causal role, sometimes they are seen
as outcomes (for an attempt to integrate these processes, see Spears et al., in press).
Furthermore, as McGarty (1999) observed, the research on accentuation effects is
patchy, and "the evidence for the categorization effects that were originally outlined
by Tajfel and Wilkes (1963) is far less clear than one would expect for phenomena
that are believed to be so pervasive" (p. 79). It does not help that intergroup theories
like SCT rarely specify the exact processes behind the accentuation. That is, how
exactly does the accentuation in a stereotyped self-concept come about? Is this
process a rather cognitive process which changes the accessibility of certain parts of
the self-concept? Is this process accompanied by deliberate and strategic cognitions,
or does it just happen, without an intention? The same goes for accentuation of
differences between groups. Is there a motivation to increase the differences, and if
not, then how does it work?
However, the point that so many scientists believe in inter-category accentuation is
important here since it suggests that it is a plausible view, and that naive perceivers
will often adapt the same point of view. In the model following below the hypothesis
adopted by a perceiver plays a pivotal role, and based on the theories cited above it
seems safe to conclude that perceivers will often assume that they differ from
55
outgroups. However: it is obvious that the findings of automatic assimilation to
stereotypes, which were reviewed in the previous chapter, contradict this general
assumption. One has to ask: Are strategies of intergroup differentiation restricted to
the domain of conscious thought? Does differentiation from them depend on
deliberation and intention? If this would be the case, and intercategory accentuation
would be limited to conscious judgement and behavior, the predictive power of
intergroup theories like SCT would be severely limited.
The clue to this puzzle may be a decisive difference in the procedures between
studies on stereotype assimilation and studies on intergroup relations: While
experimental procedures in intergroup research often go to great lengths to introduce
a dichotomous ingroup-outgroup situation (e.g., Hogg & Turner, 1989), the priming
studies do not invoke an actual dichotomy between the self and outgroup. Thus, the
stereotype content may become active without activating an ingroup-outgroup
distinction at the same time. This reasoning suggests that the engagement in social
comparison may be a moderator between assimilation and contrast, and resistance
against assimilation may prove not to be so futile after all.
4.2 Social Comparison and Knowledge Accessibility
The following chapter will introduce a model that ties together several points
discussed so far. First, I will discuss a theory that tries to specify how the difference
resulting from a comparison process can be explained on a cognitive level. Next, I
will propose how the contradicting results on behavioral contrast after exemplar
presentation, discussed in the previous chapter, can be explained with this
mechanism. Bringing both perspectives together, I will then apply the model to the
comparison of self to an outgroup, and argue that the same mechanism should also
lead to automatic behavioral contrast after the perception of an outgroup. Finally,
some additional studies will be discussed that lend initial support to this hypothesis.
The Selective Accessibility Model
The starting point is the selective accessibility model by Mussweiler and Strack
(2000a). Consider first the so-called anchor effect (Tversky & Kahnemann, 1974), a
very robust phenomenon in the domain of judgmental errors. When you are asked by
a friend whether his used car is worth more or less than, say, 3000 DM, you will very
likely give a smaller estimate than if he would have asked you whether it is worth
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more or less than 8000 DM (Mussweiler, Strack, & Pfeiffer, 2000). Why? Because
one typically adopts a "positive test strategy," and retrieves evidence from memory
to assess whether the anchor (e.g., the price of 3000 DM) might be true. The given
value serves as a comparison anchor, and the thinking uses typically this anchor as
the starting point. The judgement process starts with the assumption that the car is
indeed worth only 3000 DM, and if the anchor is not set too low, you will very likely
find at least some evidence for this, e.g. a troubling noise sometimes heard in the car.
By thinking about this evidence, it becomes more accessible, and will finally be part
of your final judgment. In the words of Mussweiler et al. (2000), you selectively
increase "the accessibility of anchor-consistent semantic knowledge about the target"
(p. 1143). If you would have started from a higher estimate, you would first have
thought about evidence that the car is really that expensive, and thus evidence of this
kind would have become more accessible, resulting in a higher estimate.
Thus, the selective accessibility model combines two assumptions: First, the anchor
serves as the starting point of thinking, and one typically uses a positive test strategy
assessing whether the anchor is true. Second, during this testing, anchor-consistent
knowledge becomes more accessible.9 This knowledge then influences the outcome,
similar to a semantic priming effect. Importantly, this effect even works when the
initial anchor is finally rejected (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999). The same reasoning
can be applied to a comparison in the social domain (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000b).
If you compare another person and yourself, you will in many cases first think about
similarities between this person and yourself. Thus, evidence that you and this person
are similar (standard-consistent knowledge about the self) becomes accessible, which
can determine the comparison outcome.
Whether the anchor is initially accepted or whether it is rejected right away is called
the initial hypothesis. In the cases just described, the initial hypothesis is that the
given anchor is true, and that the car is indeed worth only 3000 DM, or assuming that
you and the other person are similar. Accepting an initial similarity hypothesis may
in many cases be simply an outcome of understanding the proposition. By
                                                
9 Social comparison as understood here is a conscious process, even if it may be relatively
spontaneous and efficient (Gilbert, Giesler & Morris, 1995). Jaynes (1976) has described
selectivity or excerption as a central feature of consciousness. In principle, it is an analog of
visual attention being directed at external objects (cf. Barsalou, 1999b).
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understanding a proposition, its truth is acknowledged, mentally represented, and in
many cases not checked or rejected (Gilbert, 1991). It is by this process that
similarity becomes in many cases the default for the initial hypothesis. Only recently,
Mussweiler and Strack (1999, 2000a) have extended their reasoning to cases in
which the initial hypothesis does not assume similarity between the two compared
objects, but difference. So far, three determinants of a difference hypothesis have
been tested: (1) adopting the strategy of thinking about the opposite, (2) a
manipulation of the comparison direction, and (3) a mindset of looking for
differences.
In a study with real car-dealers, Mussweiler et al. (2000) were able to show that the
anchoring effect for the price of car, as described above, could be reduced (although
not completely extinguished) when the dealers were asked for reasons why the
anchor value might be inappropriate. Thus, they were asked to generate anchor-
inconsistent knowledge, or to consider the opposite of the anchor. Another approach
was taken by Mussweiler (2001). He built on previous findings indicating that the
direction of comparison determines the initial similarity assessment (Tversky, 1977).
Typically, one feels that others are more similar to oneself than one is similar to
others. Mussweiler reasoned that this initial similarity assessment could influence the
comparison process by determining the initial hypothesis--similarity for a
comparison of others to self, but difference for a comparison of self to others. Indeed,
he found assimilation in self-descriptions to a comparison target (the anchor) in the
first case, but contrast in the second case (for a more elaborate discussion and an own
study on this topic, see Study 4).
Finally, it seems that one can also prime a mindset of looking for either similarities
or differences. Mindset primings activate motivations or goals "by having the
participant first engage in that goal or intentionally use the mental procedure in
question" (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000, p. 265). Thus, mindsets are "short-term habits,"
activated by recent engagement in this sort of behavior. To activate a similarity- or
difference-searching mindset, Mussweiler (in press) first gave his participants two
pictures with the task to either list differences or similarities between the two
pictures. In a second and allegedly unrelated study, they had to compare themselves
to a person described in a short text. The participants either assimilated (similarity-
mindset) or contrasted (difference-mindset) their self-evaluation to or from the
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comparison target, presumably because the mindset influenced their initial
hypothesis and the retrieval of evidence.
Another factor which was investigated in a recent research program by Galinsky and
Moskowitz (2000; Galinsky, Moskowitz, & Skurnik, 2000) might be added to this
list. They assert that surprising outcomes, negative events and counterfactual
scenarios (e.g., the plane that you just missed explodes after takeoff) can induce a
mental simulation mindset. Such a mindset increases the probability that one thinks
about alternative and converse realities when exposed to a proposition. In this
research program, thinking about counterfactual scenarios has been shown to induce
such a simulation mindset and to influence several cognitive phenomena, with the
common denominator that a concept was evaluated in the light of its opposite. It
seems possible that a mental simulation mindset can lead to a spontaneous
consideration of an anchor's opposite.
In sum, the selective accessibility model argues that the initial hypothesis of a
comparison process determines its judgmental outcomes due to changes in the
accessibility of knowledge about the anchor and the target. Determinants of the
initial hypothesis will also influence the comparison outcome. The assumed
mediator, selective accessibility, affords a combination of the selective accessibility
model and the research on automatic behavior: Social comparisons, according to the
model, selectively increase knowledge structures, presumably also of representations
of behavior. Since automatic behavior is assumed to depend on the accessibility of
behavioral representations, it could be determined by such processes. Mussweiler
and Strack (2000a) also drew this conclusion. They argued that applying insights
from automatic behavior research "to the realm of social comparison suggests that
comparing oneself with a given standard may automatically trigger behavior that is
consistent with the knowledge that has been rendered easily accessible during the
comparison process." (p. 263).
When the influences of social comparison on accessibility of knowledge and finally
automatic behavior are discussed in this thesis, one point is important to note: The
social comparison process is assumed to be conscious, whereas the effect on
behavior is assumed to be unconscious. When the social comparison renders
knowledge accessible, any automatic behavior following it can be understood as a
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priming effect, with the only difference that the initial stimulus is not an
environmental stimulus, but a mental process.
Selective Accessibility and the Exemplar-induced Contrast
In the previous chapter, I discussed the conflicting evidence of automatic behavioral
contrast after presentation of a single exemplar. Contrast was found when an extreme
exemplar (e.g., Einstein, Dijksterhuis, Spears, et al., 1998) was presented, or when a
single exemplar was presented for a long time with an impression formation
instruction (Dijksterhuis et al., in press). No contrast was found when the exemplar
was presented rather casually (Macrae et al., 1998), when it was presented for a
longer time without the instruction to form an impression (Pendry & Carrick, 2001),
or when the person was merely co-present, without direct interaction (Chartrand &
Bargh, 1999).
From the perspective of the selective accessibility model, behavioral contrast
depends on both the activation of a dissimilarity hypothesis, and testing of this
hypothesis. It seems reasonable to assume that both variables of the perceiver (e.g., a
goal) and variables of the target (e.g., extremity) can determine whether a
dissimilarity hypothesis is tested. Concerning the research presented by Dijksterhuis,
Spears, et al. (1998), one therefore has to ask what caused the dissimilarity
hypothesis presumably tested by the participants, if not the distinctive exemplar
status. One possibility is that the extremity of the exemplar targets (Albert Einstein,
Claudia Schiffer, the Dutch Queen Mother, aged 89) led to the initial dissimilarity
hypothesis (cf. Mussweiler & Strack, 2000a; see also Herr, 1986). A direct
comparison of the results presented by Dijksterhuis, Spears, et al. (1998, Study 3)
and Mussweiler and Strack (2000b, Study 1) is very instructive on this issue. In the
first case, participants described Albert Einstein, which presumably activated an
implicit comparison. A subsequent sequential priming measure (Bargh & Chartrand,
2000) showed associations between self-concept and stupidity-related words (i.e., a
standard-inconsistent trait, for a more detailed description, see the previous chapter).
In Mussweiler and Strack's study, participants compared themselves either to Bill
Clinton or to Nicki Lauda concerning their physical fitness, and exactly the same
measurement technique showed associatons between self-concept and standard-
consistent traits (i.e., unathletic after comparison to Clinton and athletic after
comparison to Lauda). Thus, while thinking about Einstein's intelligence led to an
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association of the self with Einstein-inconsistent traits, thinking about Clinton's
fitness led to an association of the self with Clinton-consistent traits. The difference
between Einstein in the domain of intelligence and Clinton in the domain of fitness is
clear: Einstein is far more extreme.
This reasoning is extremely important for the present argument, because it provides a
plausible alternative to the prediction of Dijksterhuis and colleagues that a single
exemplar leads to comparison and contrast. I shall therefore summarize the
argument: First, we saw that the perception of a single exemplar does not inevitably
lead to contrast. Second, on the basis of the selective accessibility model I argued
that neither exemplar status nor comparison per se leads to contrast, but the testing of
a dissimilarity hypothesis. Third, at least for the contrast results after
Einstein/Schiffer-exemplar priming there is a valid alternative explanation, namely
that not the exemplar status, but the extremity caused the dissimilarity hypothesis.
Therefore, the assumption that exemplar status is a necessary and sufficient cause for
contrast should be dropped. Instead, factors that moderate between a similarity and a
dissimilarity hypothesis should be investigated. If it is one of similarity (or if no
comparison at all is engaged in, see below), standard-consistent knowledge becomes
more accessible. If it is one of dissimilarity, standard-inconsistent knowledge
becomes more accessible, and behavioral contrast should occur.
This hypothesis has far-reaching implications: When after the perception of
exemplars both assimilation and contrast can ensue, the same can be expected after
the perception of social groups. More specifically, it suggests that comparisons with
social groups can also result in an automatic behavioral contrast if they are started
with a dissimilarity hypothesis. The following section explores this hypothesis, and
discusses possible moderators of the initial comparison hypothesis.
Selective Accessibility as a Result of Intergroup Comparison
The review of intergroup research presented above suggests the following
conclusion: it is a fundamental assumption that individuals expect to differ from
outgroups, and perceive themselves as different from outgroups. Perception and
judgment of the relation between self and an outgroup seem to follow an
oppositeness-heuristic (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996). If thinking about an outgroup in
processes like perception and understanding focuses on differences, the same can be
expected for social comparisons: When perceivers compare themselves to the
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stereotype (or an exemplar) of a group that is categorized as different, it can also be
expected that the comparison focuses on differences between themselves and the
stereotype. Thus, we can assume that the comparison to an outgroup is started with
an initial hypothesis of dissimilarity if the distinction between (social) self (and
ingroup) on the one hand and outgroup on the other hand is salient, that is, if there is
an activated ingroup-outgroup categorization.10 Under these conditions we can
expect that the comparison process mainly consists of searching for evidence that the
self differs from the outgroup stereotype. If this is true, knowledge that is
inconsistent with the stereotype of the outgroup should become more accessible
during the comparison process, and result in automatic behavioral contrast.
Dijksterhuis et al. (in press) actually acknowledged this possibility in a footnote, but
argued that "an individual exemplar is much more likely to act as a comparison
standard than is a group of individuals . . . . Group comparisons are only likely if
there is a clear intergroup comparison context where the individual is defined at the
group level, and where there is some antagonistic relation between the groups."
Thus, the present reasoning is in accord with the general idea of Dijksterhuis et al.'s
model (see also more recent evidence below).
A complementary second process may also contribute to this contrast. Mussweiler
and Bodenhausen (in press) argue that the comparison to an outgroup is primarily
based on categorical knowledge about the outgroup. They furthermore argue that a
comparison based on categorical knowledge of an outgroup also activates categorical
knowledge of the self. In other words, the comparison standard is conceptualized in
terms of its category, from which the self is excluded. This leads to an increased
accessibility of the negation of the comparison standard's category--that is, the
ingroup stereotype.
Finally, we can speculate about a third complementary process. Ingroup-outgroup
categorizations are an important part of our everyday life. A major part of our social
environment is structured not by interpersonal relations and bonds, but by
membership in groups. We often have to deal with outgroups in terms of real
intergroup conflicts (e.g., regional social identities or nations, competing companies,
                                                
10 The term salient is used here as denoting activated and influencing the conceptualization.
This usage is borrowed from self-categorization theory, and it differs from other meanings
such as "perceptually prominent" (Higgins, 1996).
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opposing political parties, rival soccer teams). The frequent thinking about ingroup-
outgroup differentiation might lead to a general schema or the availability of a
mindset (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000) of expecting and looking for differences between
groups. Such a mindset might be activated by the simple activation of a social
categorization in ingroup and outgroup, and then directly imply a dissimilarity
hypothesis. One result of Brewer and Gardner (1996) points in this direction. They
primed the concepts we or they with a short prose passage in which the agents were
referred to with we or they. Subsequently, in an allegedly unrelated study,
participants had to judge whether a number of ambiguous statements were similar to
their own attitude. The we prime facilitated similarity judgments, while the they
prime facilitated dissimilarity judgements. In a similar manner, the perception of an
outgroup status could work as a prime of perceiving and assuming dissimilarities.
This could be described as priming a mindset of looking for differences.
Taken together, all these arguments converge on the hypothesis that social
comparison with a group categorized as an outgroup can be expected to lead to
increased accessibility of the outgroup stereotype's opposite. Since the starting point
of the present argument was the perception of a group in which the perceiver is not a
member, I shall summarize the predictions referring to such a situation. When a
social group is perceived, the results in terms of knowledge activation depend on the
presence of a salient ingroup-outgroup categorization. If the perceived group is
categorized as an outgroup, several results can be expected. First of all, a subsequent
comparison of the self to the outgroup stereotype should search for differences
between the self and the outgroup. These comparisons can be spontaneous (Gilbert,
Giesler, & Morris, 1995), or externally triggered, for instance by an instruction to
compare. Second, the categorization as an outgroup may lead to the activation of an
opposing ingroup (Wilder & Shapiro, 1984) and its stereotype (Mussweiler &
Bodenhausen, in press). Third, all subsequent thinking about the outgroup might
follow a general we-they schema which expects similarities with the ingroup and
differences from the outgroup (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). In sum, stereotype-
inconsistent knowledge should become activated as a consequence of a salient
categorization of the stereotyped group as an outgroup, by means of difference-
testing social comparisons, activation of an opposing ingroup stereotype, and a
mindset of looking for differences. In these processes, outgroup-inconsistent
knowledge should become (a) more accessible by itself, and (b) associated with the
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self-concept. This increased accessibility can be expected to include behavioral
representations, which should result in behavioral contrast.
So, why did non of the studies on stereotype priming report findings of contrast? I
think simply because none of them did activate a salient ingroup-outgroup
categorization. The groups used in this research--professors, soccer fans,
supermodels, punks, bank accountants, elderly people--do probably not
spontaneously activate a salient ingroup-outgroup distinction. This is so because
there was no history of an antagonistic relationship between the groups. This idea is
supported by a study of Wilder and Shapiro (1984, Exp. 1), who looked at the
spontaneous activation of an ingroup in the presence of a symbolic cue to an
outgroup. In their study, they asked their students to answer a "Who am I" test, while
in the same room the experimenters placed one of three cues: either a banner of a
rival university baseball team (a relevant outgroup with a history of conflict), a
banner of a professional baseball team (an irrelevant outgroup), or a banner of the
ingroup (a university). The test indicated a salient ingroup both when the ingroup
was cued and when the relevant outgroup was cued, but not when an irrelevant
outgroup was cued. Thus, an antagonistic ingroup-outgroup relation seems necessary
for a spontaneous (difference-testing) comparison to arise. If this argument is
accepted, the immediate question is: But why did the White participants in the study
by Bargh et al. (1996) assimilate to the Black's stereotype after being flashed with
Black faces? Isn't it fair to assume that they would activate an antagonistic relation? I
can only speculate at this point: Perhaps a comparison needs conscious perception,
or, in the words of Neumann and Strack (2000b), a noetic awareness of the activated
category. That is, a comparison might depend on a propositional construal and a
conscious categorization.
The reasoning that an antagonistic relationship and a noetic awareness of the
outgroup category are possible antecedents of a difference-testing comparison is
compatible with proposals from Gilbert et al. (1995). They wrote: "Contextual
stimuli are most likely to become the objects of comparison when (a) they have been
recently encountered, (b) they are explicitly judged, and (c) their values are
especially extreme." (p. 234). Thus, social categories are likely to become
comparison objects for the self when there was a history of comparisons, when an
explicit judgement is made, and when the stereotype is extreme on a particular
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dimension. These principles also fit nicely into the salience model developed by
SCT, which tries to predict when exactly a particular categorization is applied to the
social environment (e.g., students vs. professors), and not another social
categorization (e.g., men vs. women), or even a social categorization at another level
of inclusiveness (e.g., we are all scientists). Determinants assumed by SCT are
perceiver readiness (similar to accessibility, and related to recent encounters and
history of comparisons), and structural fit, which is, amongst others, determined by
extremity. However, at this point of my theoretical argument I will not go into
further detail at this point, but rather regard a salient ingroup-outgroup distinction as
the decisive factor, whatever its reasons might be. Instead, I will first illustrate the
plausibility of the present hypothesis with some empirical data collected by others.
Evidence For a Moderation of Automatic Behavior
by Ingroup-Outgroup Distinctions
There is indeed empirical evidence supporting the hypothesis that a salient outgroup
elicits automatic behavioral contrast. First, in an ingenious experiment, Wilder and
Shapiro (1984, Exp. 2) showed that an outgroup prime leads to behavior consistent
with the complementary ingroup stereotype, resulting in a contrast effect. Using a
rather complicated procedure, they first introduced an ingroup and an outgroup with
opposing behavioral norms. These groups were artificial and received color names
(e.g., "blue group" as the name of the outgroup). In a subsequent task, they tested
which of the norms determined the behavior. To do so, they activated the stereotype
of the outgroup with an unobtrusive priming: The instructions were printed on paper
which had the same color as the outgroup's name (i.e., the paper was blue). Wilder
and Shapiro found that the participants primed with an outgroup cue assimilated to
the associated ingroup norm, not the outgroup norm. Note that this result is
completely opposite of the previously reported findings by Bargh et al. (1996) and
Dijksterhuis and colleagues. From their results, one would have expected behavior
according to the primed outgroup stereotype (the blue group). But this was not the
case; instead the process is similar to an indirect or mediated priming, in which the
outgroup prime activates an ingroup presentation which then guides behavior. Wilder
and Shapiro concluded that "subjects were not simply influenced by the past
behavior of the salient out-group. Rather, subjects were influenced by the past
actions of the in-group associated with the salient out-group." (1984, p. 347). What
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limits the possible conclusions from this study is that both ingroup and outgroup
were made salient shortly before the effect was measured, which may be a necessary
condition.
There is another supporting piece of evidence from a study on mirroring of body
posture, which provides another example of unconscious effects of the perception-
behavior link (see also Chapter 2; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). In a study on postural
mirroring between two cooperating or competing dyads, LaFrance (1985) found that
members of competitive outgroups were less mirrored than ingroup members. This
supports the idea that unconscious behavioral regulation is moderated by intergroup
relations.
Recently, in a project that developed in parallel to, and independently from this
present thesis, Spears, et al. (2001) came to very similar conclusions. They also
argued that the comparison with an outgroup should elicit behavioral contrast, and
supported these assumptions in two studies. In a first study, they used a coloring task
in which the participants had to color figures printed with black lines. The decisive
measure was how much the participants overshot the black lines when they colored
the figures, which can be interpreted as messy. After a pretest to establish an
individual baseline for each participant, a scrambled sentence prime had to be solved
which allegedly described either daily situations from members of the ingroup
(psychology students) or from those of the outgroup (economics students). Both
groups were coupled with the trait neatness. Thus, either the ingroup or the outgroup
was stereotyped as neat by the scrambled sentences. Next, participants again had to
color some figures. It turned out that while the ingroup stereotyping had no effect
(probably due to a ceiling effect), participants primed with a neat outgroup became
messier in their coloring--a contrast effect. In a second study, Spears, et al. provided
evidence that contrast is a result of comparison by first showing assimilation, then
inducing a comparison, which finally resulted in contrast. Participants were first
primed either with a description of business people rushing from one meeting to
another, or with a description of relaxed tourists travelling across Europe. After this
priming, participants had to fill out an exit questionnaire. The time taken to complete
it was the first measure. After this questionnaire, the participants received another
questionnaire which consisted of a measure of identification with their ingroup, the
University of Amsterdam psychology students. Participants were instructed to wait
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and left alone, but the experimenter did not show up again. How long the participants
waited was the second measure. Thus, both times served as indicators how much the
participants assimilated or contrasted to a rushing or relaxed group. Indeed, while
those exposed to business people rushed through their exit questionnaire (i.e., they
were faster than those primed with tourists), they waited longer than the others for
the experimenter after being reminded that they were in fact psychology students.
Importantly, in both studies the participants were not aware that the priming
manipulation or their comparison process influenced their behavior. Thus, the two
studies provide evidence that a reminder of the outgroup status of a comparison
target, either during the stereotype activation or after the stereotype activation, can
lead to contrast in automatic behavior. I will come back to these studies in the
general discussion.
A Model of Moderation of Automatic Behavior by Social Comparison
In the previous sections, I have discussed theoretical arguments and some initial
empirical evidence that automatic social behavior after stereotype activation can be
moderated by ingroup-outgroup categorizations. In the following, I specify a model
of Automatic Behavioral Contrast (ABC model) summarizing these arguments.
(1) It is assumed that the activation of a social category's stereotype activates mental
representations of behavior typically ascribed to the stereotyped category. By
priming mental representations involved in the execution of these actions,
stereotype activation can lead to an increased likelihood of spontaneous
execution of this behavior, or facilitation of the execution of this behavior when
it is a potential reaction to an environmental event (Bargh et al., 1996;
Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 1998).
(2) It is assumed that the activation of a social category's stereotype can also lead to a
social comparison of the self to this category. Such a comparison can be
spontaneous, when the distinction between ingroup and the social category is
chronically accessible (Wilder & Shapiro, 1984), or when the category's
stereotype is extreme (Herr, 1986). It can also be a result of additional
environmental features, such as a reminder of an opposing ingroup (Spears et al.,
2001), or an explicit instruction to compare (Mussweiler, 2001).
67
(3) It is assumed that the comparison process renders additional knowledge
accessible, including behavioral representations. This knowledge activation has
the same consequences as knowledge made accessible by the stereotype
activation in (1). Thus, the comparison process functions as a priming event.
Knowledge activated by the stereotype activation and knowledge activated by the
comparison process can add up or cancel each other out. The two processes work
in parallel.
(4) It is assumed that an initial similarity assessment determines whether the
comparison process searches for evidence that self and activated stereotype are
different or similar. Thus, the comparison may either test for difference or for
similarity (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000a). This initial similarity assessment is
hypothesized to depend on the following variables:
a) A salient ingroup-outgroup distinction that categorizes the perceived group as
an outgroup is hypothesized to induce a test for difference.
b) Possible antecedents of a salient ingroup-outgroup distinction are, among
others, antagonistic relations (Wilder & Shapiro, 1984) and extremity of the
outgroup's stereotype (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000a).
(Other causes of a test for difference are possible, but will not be discussed here.)
c) Importantly, the membership in the activated category (i.e., an ingroup) is
hypothesized to lead to a test for similarity.
(5) Modifying the assumptions of Dijksterhuis, Spears, et al. (1998), it is
hypothesized that the activation of an exemplar will only lead to behavioral
contrast when a test for difference is initiated, and that exemplar status alone is
not a sufficient cause for such a test for difference. It is hypothesized that
additional causes can be that the exemplar is categorized as an outgroup member
(see 4a) or that the exemplar is extreme on the comparison dimension (see 4b).
Furthermore, when the exemplar is a member of a shared category, a test for
similarity is hypothesized (4c), if an additional ingroup-outgroup context is
salient.
These hypotheses can be summarized as a two-stage model, in which an exit can
occur after the first stage and in which the second stage is moderated. The activation
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of a stereotype leads to increased accessibility of associated behavioral
representations and thereby to assimilation in automatic behavior. This activation is
the first stage of the model. As the second stage of the model, the perceiver can
engage in a social comparison to the activated stereotype. Whether this comparison
renders stereotype-consistent or inconsistent knowledge accessible, is moderated by
the initial hypothesis tested in the comparison. Ingroup-outgroup categorization and
extremity are expected to determine the initial hypothesis. (In fact, extremity is a
cause of a salient ingroup-outgroup categorization.)
Note that I do not assume that the self-concept is involved in every stereotype
activation. In contrast to this assumption, one could speculate whether the two-stage
model is in fact only one stage, and that a similarity test or assimilation is the default.
However, this assumption would have difficulties integrating the effects of non-
social environmental primings (i.e, do we test for similarity of the self to all objects
encountered?). Furthermore, the two-stage model has the advantage that it can
explain parallel effects of assimilation and contrast which may cancel each other out
(for a similar argument, see Dijksterhuis, Spears, et al., 1998). Therefore, a two-stage
model in which the self-concept is involved only in the second stage is preferred.
There is one further speculation which I do not propose as a special hypothesis, but
which is interesting enough to keep in mind while looking at the empirical evidence
reported in the next chapters. While in the first stage knowledge becomes accessible
as an effect of environmental events, in the second stage knowledge becomes
accessible in association with the self. Thus, only knowledge from the second stage
becomes associated with the self. Remember the contradicting results on the effects
of self-focus reported in the section on moderators in Chapter 3: While Dijksterhuis
and van Knippenberg (2000) found that increased self-focus extinguished priming
effects of stereotype activation, Baldwin and Holmes (1987) found that effects of a
significant other priming were increased by self-focus. The term significant other
already denotes that the referring knowledge is significant to the self. Apparently,
self-focus does not override priming events of this kind. I think that only knowledge
activated in the first stage is overridden by a self-focus, but that the association with
the self allows self-focus to increase priming effects of knowledge activated in the
second phase, because self-focus increases the activation of self-relevant knowledge.
Thus, knowledge made accessible by stereotype activation and knowledge activated
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by a comparison process may have similar effects; the effect of moderators on the
two kinds of accessible knowledge however could be different.
4.3 Overview of the Present  Research
The following experiments will test the hypotheses stated in the ABC model. The
studies mainly differ in two regards: firstly, in the activated stereotype, and secondly
in the procedures used to induce a salient ingroup-outgroup distinction. The first four
studies investigate the behavioral effects of the elderly stereotype in settings with a
salient social categorization. Studies 1 and 2 employ an artificial ingroup-outgroup
distinction to categorize elderly persons as outgroup members. Study 3 will use a
comparison instruction, without an additional artificial categorization. Study 4 will
follow up on this procedure, manipulating the direction of comparison. Study 5 then
turns to the professor stereotype, and investigates its behavioral effects on different
groups of participants. Finally, Study 6 investigates hypothesis (5) stated above. It
will test whether the contrast from a distinctive exemplar can be extinguished by its
membership in an artificial ingroup.
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5 CONTRAST FROM MINIMAL GROUPS
5.1 Study 1: Automatic Con trast From Exemplars of Artificial Outgroups
The theoretical model developed in the previous chapter hypothesizes that under
certain conditions, a social comparison with a stereotyped group renders concepts
accessible that are inconsistent with the stereotype of that group. More specifically,
increased accessibility of stereotype-inconsistent concepts is predicted if the
stereotyped group is categorized as an outgroup. Take as an example the stereotype
of the elderly: a social comparison of the self to an outgroup that consists of elderly
people should render elderly-inconsistent behavior accessible. The results cited in the
first chapters of this thesis provided convincing evidence that highly accessible
behavioral representations will lead to a facilitation of the respective behavior.
Therefore, one can expect that if stereotype-inconsistent representations become
accessible during the comparison process, stereotype-inconsistent behavior will
follow automatically. This should result in a behavioral contrast: The behavior of
individuals who compare themselves to the stereotype of an (out)group is predicted
to differ automatically from the stereotype, while the behavior of those who do not
compare themselves is predicted to assimilate automatically to the stereotype.
Applied to the example, it follows that if elderly-inconsistent behavior becomes
accessible during the comparison, behavior after the comparison will not assimilate
to the stereotype of the elderly, but that it will be contrasted in the opposite direction.
Study 1 was conducted as an initial test of this hypothesis. The main purpose of
Study 1 was to show that automatic behavioral contrast can be observed at all, before
the moderating mechanism is studied in more detail. Study 1 consists of two
experiments, 1a and 1b, which were identical in their design and materials, and
differed only in the setting in which they were conducted. The paradigm of the
studies extended the method developed by Dijksterhuis et al. (in press). In their
studies, participants had to form an impression of 5 persons, who were either young
or elderly. This constituted the priming. Afterwards, behavioral assimilation was
measured in the form of behavioral speed in a lexical decision task (LDT), with
words unrelated to the stereotype. In the studies to be reported shortly, the same
method was applied.
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However, in line with the argument presented above, in the present studies the 5
persons were categorized as outgroup members. This was achieved by introducing a
social categorization which was new to the participants and in fact artificial, similar
to a minimal group paradigm (Tajfel et al., 1971). Numerous studies have shown that
this paradigm creates a salient and situationally meaningful ingroup-outgroup
distinction, sufficient for activating differential responses to ingroup and outgroup
members (Brewer & Brown, 1998). In the studies reported here, the participants were
allegedly tested for their "perception style" and then assigned to one of the two
groups. After this categorization, 5 persons were presented as part of an impression
formation task. These 5 persons were either young or elderly. The 5 persons were
introduced as members of the (artificial) outgroup. Importantly, in the condition
where the members were elderly, the participants did not perceive the group of
elderly people as an outgroup on the basis of them being elderly. Instead, the
outgroup status was created first, and the presented persons served as exemplars of
the outgroup and therefore as a basis for stereotype induction. The advantage of
using this procedure was that no previously existing stereotype or chronic salience of
a social categorization could collide with the manipulation.
The two studies reported here test these conditions in a one-factorial design, with one
half of the participants perceiving elderly outgroup members and the other half
perceiving young outgroup members. The purpose if these studies is to investigate
whether behavioral contrast can be observed empirically. The two studies are
identical in their design, and their results will be combined meta-analytically. (In
Study 2, the same materials will be used, but with the addition of a second factor,
namely whether the 5 persons are again categorized as outgroup members, or
whether they are not categorized at all.) The central prediction is that categorizing
exemplars as outgroup members results in behavioral contrast, that is, faster reactions
after the perception of elderly outgroup exemplars than after the perception of young
outgroup exemplars.
Additionally, ingroup identification, measures of the intergroup context, and
stereotyping of in- and outgroup were assessed. It is expected that age or
categorization of persons do not have an effect on ingroup identification. The
measures of intergroup context were taken to check the power of the artificial
categorization to create a salient ingroup-outgroup distinction. With respect to
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stereotyping, it is expected that the age of the exemplars has a direct impact on the
stereotype of the outgroup, and that it has a weak effect on the ingroup stereotype by
way of explicit contrast. The study also explores whether the outgroup stereotype
mediates the behavioral contrast.
Method
Overview and Design
Studies 1a and 1b applied a one-factorial design, varying whether 5 elderly or 5
young outgroup members were presented to the participants. In the beginning,
participants were categorized in a minimal-group way. Following this assignment to
an ingroup, five ostensible members of the outgroup were presented. Participants
then completed a lexical decision task measuring their mean reaction time, which
was presented as an unrelated filler task. Finally, stereotypes of ingroup and
outgroup were assessed.
Participants in Study 1a
Study 1a was run in the laboratory. 25 students of economics took part in the study.
They were paid DM 10 (about US$ 5) for their participation. One participant failed
to recall the group membership of the exemplars correctly, and one participant
doubted the existence of the group distinction. Both were excluded from the sample.
Furthermore, preliminary analyses indicated that one participant had excessively
long reaction times (i.e., a mean reaction time which was over 3 SDs above the mean
of the sample, and 3 of the 10 reaction times longer than the mean reaction time of
the sample). He was also excluded from all further analyses.11 Of the 22 remaining
participants, 12 were female (one missing value). Except one, all were aged between
17 and 25, one was older than 25, but younger than 30 (one missing value).
Estimated mean age was 20.7. The two conditions did not differ significantly
regarding mean age and distribution of gender. None of the participants suspected an
influence of the exemplars' age on performance in the LDT.
                                                
11 It has to be noted that this participant was in the condition with elderly outgroup members.
His inclusion in the analyses decreases the significance level of the reported effect to a
marginal effect.
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Participants in Study 1b
Study 1b was run as an Internet study. Participants worked on their own computers;
advertisements were placed in appropriate newsgroups and distributed on the local
campus. As an incentive, participants could take part in a lottery, where 1 out of 20
won 20 DM. Forty-two native speakers of German took part in the study. Four
participants were excluded due to the following reasons: Three participants failed to
recall their own or the exemplars' group membership correctly. One further
participant indicated that he was distracted by a telephone call during the reaction
time task. 18 of the remaining 38 participants were female (one missing value);
63.1% were aged between 15 and 30, 34.2% were aged between 31 and 45 (one
missing value). Estimated mean age was 27.2. The two conditions did not differ
significantly regarding mean age and distribution of gender. None of the participants
suspected an influence of the exemplars' age on performance in the LDT.
Materials and Procedure
The experiment was introduced as a study on perception. In the laboratory Study 1a,
participants were run in groups from 3 to 5. In the Internet Study 1b, participants
took part from their individual computers. As in all studies presented in this thesis,
the experimental procedure was programmed in JavaScript, and data were collected
using software from Müller and Funke (1998).
The minimal group categorization followed the procedures applied by Otten,
Mummendey and Buhl (1998). Participants were told that in general, people could be
divided in two groups following their different perception styles. The two perception
styles were called figure-based perception and ground-based perception, and
ostensibly differed in the order in which people organized their perception of the
environment. Previous research has shown no indication that this artificial
categorization is associated with age in any way (Otten, 2000). As a test of their
perception style, participants were shown 12 ambiguous pictures and perceptual
illusions (e.g., drawings by Escher), for which they had to decide which of two
possible interpretations was primary for them. Allegedly based on their answers, all
participants were then assigned to the ground-based perception group.
The next part of the experiment was introduced as an impression formation task.
Participants were told that they would be presented 5 members of the outgroup with
a figure-based perception style, with the instruction to form impressions of them.
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Color photos of 5 persons and additional information in the form of 4 short
statements about each person were shown (see Figure 2). Pictures and statements
were presented in the form of a slide show on the computer, with each statement
remaining on the screen for 4 s, and thus each picture remaining on the screen for
16 s. Pictures and statements differed depending on the two conditions. The pictures
were selected in a pretest with an independent sample (N=26), where the 5 elderly
persons were judged to be significantly slower than 4 of the young persons,
t(25)=6.23, p<.001. (One more picture of a young man was added afterwards.) The
statements described preferences and everyday actions (e.g., likes to party for young
persons and likes to go for a walk for elderly persons). Within each set, combinations
of pictures and statements were randomized for each participant.
Figure 2. Photos of elderly and young target persons used in Studies 1 and 2.
The following lexical decision task was presented as a filler task. 10 words and 10
pronounceable non-words were presented on the screen, and participants were
instructed to decide as fast as possible whether a word or a non-word appeared by
pressing either Y or N. The first stimulus served as a practice trial and was always
the same non-word. The order of the remaining stimuli was randomized for each
participant. The words were completely unrelated to the stereotype of the elderly or
young persons. The stimuli remained on the screen until an answer was given, and
the inter-trial interval was 1500 ms.
To assess the stereotypes of ingroup and outgroup, participants then rated each group
on 12 adjectives. These were selected in a pretest, where an independent sample of
22 participants rated 20 preselected adjectives on a scale from very typical for the
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elderly to very typical for young people. For 12 adjectives, the mean ratings differed
significantly from the midpoint of the scale, ts(22)>2.61, ps<.017. Five adjectives
were typical for young people: spontaneous, flexible, open-minded, unworried,
emotional. Seven more adjectives were typical for the elderly: calm, slow,
ruminative, stingy, serious, experienced, forgetful.12 Participants first rated the
ingroup and then the outgroup on these 12 adjectives, with scales from does not
apply at all (1) to applies very much (5).
Finally, a number of complementary variables were assessed. The integrity of the
manipulation was checked by asking which groups the participants themselves and
the exemplars were in. Awareness of possible influences of the outgroup members'
presentation on the reaction times was assessed by an open question: Participants
were asked what they thought the true purpose of experiment actually was, and
whether they saw any connection between the person presentation and the reaction
time task. Ingroup identification was measured with 4 items (e.g., My perception
style fits my experiences and I identify with the members of the group "ground").
Additionally, the participants answered 3 graphical items of the perception of the
intergroup context, the Overlap of Self, Ingroup and Outgroup scale (OSIO, Schubert
& Otten, 2000). These items are adaptations of the Inclusion of Other in Self scale
(Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). The two items for overlap of self and ingroup and
overlap of self and outgroup depict two circles, a small circle for the self and a larger
circle of the group. On the 7 pictures forming each item, the two circles are
increasingly closer together, with maximal distance on the first picture (1) and total
inclusion of self in the group in the last picture (7). The item for overlap of ingroup
and outgroup depicts two circles of equal size, which approach each other from
maximal distance to almost total overlap (see Figure 3).
                                                
12 In German: spontan, flexibel, aufgeschlossen, sorglos, emotional, ruhig, langsam,
nachdenklich, sparsam, ernsthaft, erfahren, vergesslich.
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Figure 3. Self-group overlap item, used for assessment of self-ingroup and self-
outgroup overlap.
Finally, mother tongue, gender, and age were assessed. For the assessment of age,
participants were offered categories instead of a direct question.13 Participants had to
select their age from categories, beginning with younger than 15, and then counting
upward in 5-year steps (i.e., between 15 and 20, etc.). The mean age of the sample
was estimated from these values by multiplying the number of participants in each
category with the midpoint of each category, divided by the total number of
participants. After the experiment, participants were debriefed by a written
explanation of the experiment's hypotheses and manipulations.
Results in Study 1a
Ingroup Identification and Overlap
Identification was measured with an internal consistency of Alpha=.85; it did not
differ between the two conditions, t<1. A comparison of self-ingroup overlap and
self-outgroup overlap served as an indicator whether a salient intergroup situation
was established. In a 2 (self-ingroup vs. self-outgroup) x 2 (exemplar age)
MANOVA with repeated measures on the first factor, the repeated measures factor
showed the only significant effect, F(1,20)=12.49, p=.002. Self-ingroup overlap,
                                                
13 This reason for not asking the exact age was that study 1b was run on the Internet, where
those questions are often declined.
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M=4.82, SD=1.56, was higher than self-outgroup overlap, M=3.41, SD=1.44. The
second main effect and the interaction were not significant, Fs<1. Likewise,
exemplar age had no effect on the perceived overlap between ingroup and outgroup,
t<1.
Reaction Times
Following Dijksterhuis et al. (in press), only reactions to words were analyzed.
Reaction times of 2 wrong answers were deleted. Furthermore, 3 reaction times
which were 3 SDs longer than the mean were deleted. The two conditions did not
differ with respect to the number of wrong answers, or prolonged reaction times.
Altogether, 5 out of 220 (2.27%) reaction times were discarded. For each participant,
a mean reaction time score was computed and log-transformed due to a skewed
distribution (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000).14 For ease of interpretation, untransformed
means are reported in Table 1. As expected, participants were faster after the
presentation of elderly outgroup members, M=676.17, than after the presentation of
young outgroup members, M=755.21, t(20)=1.82, p=0.042 (one-tailed), d=0.78.
Stereotypes
The adjective ratings were combined into ratings of the ingroup's and the outgroup's
"elderliness." The 12 adjectives, with typically young adjectives reverse scored, were
internally consistent with Alpha=.67 for the ingroup and Alpha=.88 for the outgroup
stereotype. Taking the means, two scores were computed that indicated how
"typically elderly" ingroup and outgroup were described (see Table 2). The two
scores correlated marginally negatively with r=-.41, p=.058. A 2 (ingroup vs.
outgroup) x 2 (exemplar age) MANOVA with repeated measures on the first factor
showed no significant effects, Fs<1 for the within-subjects factor and the interaction,
and F(1,20)=1.49, p=.237 for the condition main effect. A simple effects analysis
confirmed that the exemplar age had no generalizing effect on the stereotype of the
outgroup, p=.636. In a regression of the reaction time on the stereotype scores,
neither stereotype predicted the mean reaction time, ps>.5.
                                                
14 In all analyses presented for Studies 1 and 2, untransformed means yielded virtually
identical results.
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Results in Study 1b
Ingroup Identification and Overlap
The four identification items had an internal consistency of Alpha=.73. The two
conditions did not differ with respect to ingroup identification, t<1. Like in Study 1a,
a 2 (self-ingroup vs. self-outgroup overlap) x 2 (exemplar age) MANOVA confirmed
that self-ingroup overlap, M=4.73, SD=1.35, was significantly higher than self-
outgroup overlap, M=3.42, SD=1.37, F(1,35)=27.39, p<.001, with no other effect
approaching significance, Fs<1 (lower dfs because of one missing value for self-
outgroup overlap). Likewise, ingroup-outgroup overlap did not differ between the
conditions, t<1.
Reaction Times
Only reactions to words were analyzed. Reaction times of wrong answers (N=5)
were deleted. Furthermore, 4 reactions times 3 SDs longer than the mean were
deleted. The two conditions did not differ with respect to the number of wrong
answers, or prolonged reaction times. Altogether, 9 out 380 (2.37%) reaction times
were discarded. For each participant, a mean reaction time score was computed and
log-transformed due to a skewed distribution. For ease of interpretation,
untransformed means are reported in Table 1. As expected, reaction times were
longer in the condition with young outgroup exemplars, M=665.12, than in the
condition with elderly outgroup exemplars, M=628.53, but the difference was not
significant, t(36)=1.16, p=.136 (one-tailed), d=0.399.
Stereotypes
The stereotype scales had internal consistencies of Alpha=.70 for the ingroup
stereotype and Alpha=.91 for the outgroup. Two scores were computed that indicated
how "typically elderly" ingroup and outgroup were described by averaging the
ratings, with typically young attributes reverse-scored, resulting in a range from 1 to
5. The two scores correlated negatively with r=-.67, p<.001. A 2 (ingroup vs.
outgroup) x 2 (exemplar age) MANOVA with the repeated measures on the first
factor showed a marginally significant main effect of the within-subjects factor,
F(1,36)=2.86, p=.099, a significant main effect of the exemplar age, F(1,36)=10.57,
p=.003, and a significant interaction, F(1,36)=9.13, p=.005 (see Table 2). Simple
effects analyses showed that elderly outgroup exemplars were generalized to the
whole outgroup and made its stereotype more typically elderly, compared to the
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condition with young outgroup members, p<.001. In contrast and as expected, the
ingroup was stereotyped as less typically elderly when elderly outgroup members
were perceived; however, this difference was only marginally significant, p= 0.063
(both tests one-tailed). Neither ingroup nor outgroup stereotype significantly
correlated with the mean reaction time, r=.28, p=.20, and r=.14, p=.51, respectively.
Table 1. Reaction Times Depending on Age of Outgroup Exemplars, Study 1a
and 1b
Study 1a Study 1b
Exemplar Age M SD M SD
Young exemplars 755.21 113.17 665.12 100.86
Elderly exemplars 676.17 84.17 628.53 86.94
Table 2. Stereotyping of Ingroup and Outgroup in Studies 1a and 1b
Study 1a Study 1b
Exemplar Age Target M SD M SD
Young exemplars ingroup 2.97 .40 3.18 .43
outgroup 3.13 .74 2.41 .54
Elderly exemplars ingroup 2.79 .51 2.95 .46
outgroup 3.01 .48 3.16 .64
Note. Higher scores indicate that stereotypes are closer to the elderly stereotype.
Meta-analysis Combining Studies 1a and 1b
In both pilot studies, on a descriptive level reaction times were shorter when
participants perceived elderly outgroup exemplars. However, the effect was only
significant in the first pilot study. Since both studies applied identical materials and
procedures, one way of combining the results is a meta-analysis across both samples.
Thus, the effects sizes of exemplar age on reaction time found in Study 1a and 1b
were combined meta-analytically. The mean effect size d equaled 0.51, and was
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significant with Z=1.89, p=0.015 (one-tailed),15 indicating faster reactions after
perception of elderly outgroup exemplars.
Discussion
The results of Study 1a confirm that the categorization of persons as outgroup
members can elicit a behavioral contrast from their perceived characteristics.
Although the participants perceived 5 persons within a procedure almost identical to
that of Dijksterhuis et al. (in press), they subsequently showed the opposite of the
stereotypic slowness of elderly persons; that is, they reacted faster after the
perception of elderly outgroup members than after the perception of young outgroup
members. Furthermore, participants were not aware that the perception of the
outgroup members changed their behavior in the subsequent reaction time task. The
reaction times in Study 1b showed the same pattern, that is, faster reactions after
perception of an elderly outgroup. However, in Study 1b this difference was not
significant. In order to get a reliable judgement of the combined evidence of both
experiments, their reaction time results were combined meta-analytically. This meta-
analyses indicated a significant combined effect across the total sample of 60
participants. Contradicting previous arguments and results from Dijksterhuis et al. (in
press), it was found that the perception of 5 persons of similar age did not result in an
assimilation to their abstract stereotype, but in an automatic behavioral contrast, due
to these 5 persons being categorized as members of an outgroup.
In both studies, the data on ingroup identification and overlaps of self, ingroup, and
outgroup showed that the two conditions did not differ with respect to degree of
ingroup identification, or perceived overlap. The only significant effect on these
measures was the finding that perceived overlap of self and ingroup was higher than
perceived overlap of self and outgroup. This is the hallmark of a significant ingroup-
outgroup differentiation, which presumably led to the automatic behavioral contrast.
Note that this ingroup-outgroup differentiation occurred for an artificial social
categorization, created on the basis of an alleged perception style which was
                                                
15 It is possible to estimate the reliability of the reaction time measure by computing an
internal consistency for the ten reaction times combined in the mean scores. These Alphas
equaled 0.78 for Study 1a and 0.77 for Study 1b. When the meta-analysis was corrected for
this estimated reliability of the reaction time score, the combined effect size increased to
d=0.58, Z=2.12, p=0.008 (one-tailed).
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completely new to the participants. The participants received very scarce information
about the categories; in fact, the outgroup exemplars served as the main source of
information. Thus, the minimal nature of the artificial categorization was probably an
important factor for the contrast outcome, since it presumably led the participants to
focus strongly on the limited information available to them.
Concerning the stereotypes of ingroup and outgroup, it was expected that especially
the stereotype of the outgroup, but also the stereotype of the ingroup would be
influenced by the age of the presented outgroup exemplars. The findings concerning
the stereotypes are rather puzzling. In Study 1a, there was apparently no significant
induction of an outgroup stereotype from the presented outgroup exemplars. In Study
1b, the pattern was as predicted, with a strong induction of the outgroup stereotype
from its exemplars, and a weak effect in the opposite direction on the ingroup
stereotype. More specifically, it was found that after the perception of elderly
outgroup exemplars the whole category was stereotyped as if all category members
would be of a similar age. On the other hand, it seems that for the ingroup, the
opposite was assumed, such that it became stereotypically younger in the presence of
an elderly outgroup. However, this process seems to be rather independent from the
behavioral contrast effect, which was stronger in Study 1a, both concerning
significance level and effect size. It may be that the participants in the laboratory
situation in Study 1a were less willing to induce the outgroup stereotype from the
exemplars on the explicit measures since they were aware of their co-participants,
who were of their own age. Participants on the Internet, however, had no access to
knowledge of other participants other then themselves and the presented exemplars,
and may have therefore relied more on the information given. At the same time,
more heterogeneous environments across the participants of the Internet study may
have caused error variance in the reaction time data of Study 1b, which may have led
to the weaker effect.
The combined results from both studies provide clear evidence that behavior can be
automatically contrasted from an outgroup. Although the participants saw several
members of a group, they did not assimilate their behavior to the group when it was
an outgroup. The social categorization was made salient before the exemplars were
perceived, and presumably triggered a spontaneous comparison process during the
perception of the exemplars.
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It should be noted that these two studies have (at least) two shortcomings. First of all,
it is not clear which cell of the design drove the effect. The wording of the discussion
focused on the elderly outgroup members. Due to the lack of a baseline, it could also
be that not much happened in the elderly cells, while the contrast in fact took place in
the condition with young outgroup exemplars (leading to longer reaction times).
However, this would not change the main point, that outgroup contrast was observed.
The second shortcoming is that the contrast cannot be attributed only to the social
categorization, since the design did not vary this factor. It could have been that our
presented exemplars were so extreme or distinct that they created a contrast by
themselves, and that the outgroup status did not matter. Therefore, in the following
Study 2 the outgroup categorization itself was varied.
5.2 Study 2: Moderation by Comparison
The combined evidence of the two experiments in Study 1 suggested that the
participants contrasted from the group of persons that was categorized as an
outgroup. One question remains: Did they contrast from this group because it was
categorized as an outgroup? Or were there additional factors that lead to the contrast,
instead or perhaps in addition to the outgroup categorization? The best way to tackle
this question is to test both contrast and assimilation conditions in one experiment.
This was done in Study 2.
The design of Study 2 used the materials and extended the conditions of the Study 1
experiments by adding a second between-subjects factor. Thus, the first factor again
varied whether pictures of 5 young or 5 elderly persons were presented. In addition,
the second factor varied whether the 5 persons were categorized as outgroup
members (outgroup condition, equivalent to Study 1), or whether they were not
categorized at all (control condition). Thus, Study 2 tested for both behavioral
assimilation and contrast in one design. The central prediction was that
uncategorized persons would elicit assimilation, replicating the conditions of
Dijksterhuis et al. (in press), while outgroup members would elicit behavioral
contrast (replicating Study 1). Overall, an interaction effect is predicted.
Additionally, ingroup identification and measures of the intergroup context tested
whether a salient intergroup context was established, and explicit measures again
assessed stereotypes of ingroup and outgroup.
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Method
Overview and Design
The study applied a 2 (exemplar age: young vs. elderly) x 2 (categorization of
exemplars: outgroup vs. uncategorized) between-subjects design. The first factor
followed exactly the procedures of Study 1. The second factor varied whether the
exemplars were categorized as outgroup members as in the pilot study, or left
uncategorized. The overall procedure of the study followed exactly that of Study 1.
The study was, like Study 1b, conducted on the Internet.
Participants
Altogether, 107 native speakers of German took part in the experiment on the
Internet. Fifteen participants were excluded due to the following reasons: 10
participants failed to recall their group membership correctly, or failed to recall the
exemplars' group membership correctly in the categorized exemplars condition. One
participant was excluded because of 7 errors in the 10 lexical decisions for words.
Four participants indicated knowledge of artificiality of the groups through expertise
in social psychology (i.e., two them wrote that they identified a minimal group
paradigm). None of the remaining 92 participants suspected that the age of the
exemplars influenced their reaction time. Fifty-one participants were female, five did
not indicate their gender. 67.4% reported that their age was between 15 and 30, the
remaining participants were aged between 31 and 65 (4 missing values). The
estimated mean age was 27.7. The conditions did not differ regarding age or gender
distribution.
Materials and Procedure
Materials and procedure followed that of Study 1, with two important differences. In
the uncategorized exemplars condition, the exemplar presentation was simply
introduced by the instruction that participants should form an impression of the
following persons. No reference to the minimal groups was made at this point.
Furthermore, in the categorized exemplars condition, stereotypes of ingroup and
outgroup were assessed as before on the same 12 adjectives. In the uncategorized
exemplars condition, however, participants were asked to rate the group of 5
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exemplars on the same adjectives. Ingroup or outgroup stereotypes were not assessed
in the uncategorized condition.16
Results
Ingroup Identification and Overlap
A 2 x 2 ANOVA showed no effects on ingroup identification, which had an Alpha of
.79 (exemplar age: F<1, exemplar categorization: F(1,88)=1.61, p=.208; interaction:
F<1). The only significant effect emerging from a 2 (exemplar age) x 2 (exemplar
categorization) x 2 (self-ingroup overlap vs. self-outgroup overlap) MANOVA with
repeated measures on the last factor was a main effect of the repeated measures
factor, F(1,84)=44.67, p<.001. Self-ingroup overlap, M=4.38, SD=1.71, was higher
than self-outgroup overlap, M=2.86, SD=1.30 (lower dfs because of 4 missing values
for self-outgroup overlap). No significant effect was found in a 2x2 ANOVA of
ingroup-outgroup overlap, although this score was higher when young exemplars
were presented, F(1,88)=2.28, p=.135, irrespective of the categorization, both other
Fs<1.
Reaction Times
Only reactions to words were analyzed. Reaction times of wrong answers (N=15)
were deleted. The conditions did not differ with respect to the number of wrong
answers. Furthermore, all reaction times 3 SDs longer than the mean (N=18) were
deleted. They were also distributed equally across the conditions. Altogether, 33 out
of 920 reaction times (3.6%) were discarded. The remaining reaction times were
combined in one mean reaction time for each participant. Since the distribution was
skewed, a log transformation was applied on the data. For ease of interpretation,
nontransformed means are reported in Table 3.
Reaction times were analyzed in a 2 (categorization of exemplars) x 2 (age of
exemplars) ANOVA. Neither the main effect of categorization of exemplars,
F(1,88)=1.32, p=.253, nor the effect of exemplar age, F<1, was significant. Simple
effects analyses showed a significant contrast effect in the condition with categorized
exemplars, F(1,88)=2.85, p=.048 (one-tailed), that is, reaction times were shorter
                                                
16 It would have been desirable to assess the stereotypes of ingroup and outgroup in this
condition as well. We opted for their omission, however, since we wanted to keep the
procedure as short as possible, which is important for Internet experiments.
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after exposure to elderly outgroup exemplars than after exposure to young outgroup
exemplars. In the condition with uncategorized exemplars, a marginally significant
assimilation effect was found, F(1,88)=2.31, p=.066 (one-tailed). Most importantly,
this resulted in a reliable interaction, F(1,88)=5.15, p=.026 (two-tailed).
Table 3. Reaction Times Depending on Age and Categorization of Exemplars,
Study 2
Outgroup Exemplars Uncategorized Exemplars
Exemplar Age M SD M SD
Young Exemplars 722.32 156.76 629.19 114.38
Elderly Exemplars 655.42 122.85 683.76 121.75
Stereotypes
In the categorized exemplars condition, both ingroup and outgroup stereotype were
assessed. Values are missing for one participant's stereotypes of both groups and one
participant's stereotype of the outgroup. The items for the ingroup and outgroup
stereotypes showed satisfying internal consistencies, Alpha=.70 and Alpha=.84,
respectively. The two scores correlated negatively with r=-.56, p<.001. The only
significant effect in the 2 (ingroup vs. outgroup) x 2 (exemplar age) MANOVA with
repeated measures on the first factor was a main effect of exemplar age,
F(1,43)=5.17, p=.028. The main effect of the within-subjects factor was marginally
significant, F(1,43)=3.88, p=.055, and the expected interaction was not substantial,
F<1. Simple analyses showed that exemplar age had no effect on neither the ingroup
stereotype, nor the outgroup stereotype, ps>.20 (see Table 4). Similarly, neither score
predicted the mean reaction time, r=-.17, p=.349, and r=.09, p=.640, for ingroup and
outgroup stereotype, respectively.
In the uncategorized exemplars condition, the impression of the 5 exemplars was
assessed. The 12 items had an Alpha of .78. Exemplar age had a significant effect on
this impression, t(43)=5.89, p<.001. The elderly exemplars were described according
to the stereotype of the elderly. The correlation between the exemplar expression in
terms of the elderly stereotype and the mean reaction time was marginally
significant, r=.27, p=.071. Thus, the more elderly the exemplars were perceived, the
more slowly the participants answered in the LDT.
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Table 4. Stereotypes of Ingroup, Outgroup, and Exemplars in Study 2
Exemplar Age Exemplar Categorization Target M SD
Young Exemplars Outgroup Members ingroup 3.89 .40
outgroup 3.57 .54
Uncategorized exemplars 3.59 .44
Elderly Exemplars Outgroup Members ingroup 4.02 .63
outgroup 3.78 .60
Uncategorized exemplars 4.34 .41
Note. Higher scores indicate that stereotypes are closer to the elderly stereotype.
Discussion
Study 2 tested whether the categorization of a group of persons as an outgroup, in
comparison with a condition in which the persons were not categorized, would
moderate between contrast and assimilation. Thus, an interaction between the age of
the persons and their categorization was expected, such that assimilation was
expected when they were not categorized, while contrast was expected when they
were categorized as an outgroup. This predicted interaction pattern was found.
Results showed that reaction times were significantly shorter after exposure to
elderly outgroup exemplars than after exposure to young outgroup exemplars. Thus,
in this condition the results from Study 1 were replicated. In the condition with
uncategorized exemplars, a marginally significant assimilation effect was found. The
latter condition is a replication of Dijksterhuis et al. (in press), who found the same
effect after the perception of 5 elderly uncategorized persons. Thus, the observed
interaction pattern nicely shows the power of a salient outgroup categorization: It
reverses the assimilation which occurs in the absence of an ingroup-outgroup
context. An interesting feature of the used procedure is that it did not explicitly
instruct the participants to compare. Thus, we can assume that the participants
engaged spontaneously in the comparison (Gilbert et al., 1995), and thought about
differences between this outgroup and themselves (and their ingroup). While this
comparison was presumably conscious and accompanied by a propositional construal
of the outgroup ("they are elderly/very young"), the following effect on behavior was
unconscious and automatic: participants were not aware that the perception of the
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outgroup members changed their behavior in the subsequent reaction time task.
Thinking about differences resulted in automatic behavioral differentiation.
A closer inspection of the average reaction times reveals that the interaction seems to
be largely driven by a difference in the young exemplars cells. I can only speculate
why this might be so. Several reasons are possible. First, it might simply be easier to
get slower then to get faster, leaving not enough room for contrast in the elderly
outgroup condition. Second, perhaps the perception of outgroup exemplars of
roughly equal age led to an increased elaboration of possible differences, since the
initial outgroup status is suggestive of them and the hitherto meaningless artificial
categorization has to be filled with meaning. Elderly persons might indicate
difference after a superficial elaboration, without strong activation of differences
behind the mere perceptual level. A third possible explanation is that the outgroup
manipulation has a slight main effect which shifts the reaction times in total,
although it is unclear why this should be so. In any case, the decisive point is that the
interaction was significant, showing that the behavioral consequence was moderated
by the categorization.
In both studies, indices of identification and perceived overlap confirmed that the
conditions were equivalent regarding ingroup identification, and that the minimal
group paradigm created a salient group membership for the participants. It seems that
that this salient outgroup status of the 5 persons changed the comparison process and
resulted in increased accessibility of inconsistent behavioral presentations.
In line with the puzzling finding from the Study 1 experiments, the results on
stereotypes show that behavioral contrast and explicit stereotyping do not go hand in
hand. In the uncategorized condition, the 5 participants were clearly stereotyped as
expected. However, when these 5 were members of the outgroup, they had no
significant effect on its stereotype (as in Study 1a, and in contrast to Study 1b), and
the effect on the ingroup stereotype was negligible. Again, it seems that deliberate
considerations either prevented a straightforward induction of the outgroup
stereotype from the outgroup exemplars, or led to a comparable stereotyping of the
ingroup. As in Study 1, group stereotypes did not predict the behavioral effects.
However, it is very interesting that the impression of the 5-person group in the
uncategorized exemplars condition marginally predicted the behavioral effect. Of
course, this effect has to be interpreted cautiously due to the low significance; the
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direction of causality is open to interpretation, and one cannot speak of a mediation
effect. The most reasonable interpretation seems to be that a more extreme
representation led to a stronger behavioral effect. To my knowledge, this is the first
finding in which a process variable correlated with a behavioral priming effect. The
next study will report a similar effect, although in a very different paradigm. While
the previous studies found automatic behavioral contrast from artificial outgroups,
the next three studies will investigate behavioral contrast in more natural comparison
situations.
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6 CONTRAST FROM NATURAL CATEGORIES
6.1 Study 3: There Is More Than One Way to Slow Down
In the previous two studies, automatic behavioral contrast was found after the
spontaneous comparison with members of an artificial outgroup. More precisely, the
artificial outgroup was stereotyped by showing either very young and energetic
persons, or elderly persons. The contrast however was not created by a difference
from young or elderly persons per se, but because of their membership in an artificial
outgroup.
One of the purposes of the current study was to extend the scope of this finding by
investigating it in more natural comparison contexts. Therefore, the study used the
category of the elderly directly, instead of embedding its stereotype in an artificial
categorization. If an effect can be found in such a setting, it would be more plausible
that the same can occur in real encounters with members of an outgroup. In a broader
sense, the major goal was to compare a condition with a mere stereotype-priming on
the one hand, with a condition involving a comparison on the background of a salient
ingroup-outgroup distinction on the other hand.
Two further issues were addressed by the design: In Studies 1 and 2, one problem
was that no baseline was included in the studies, and it was therefore impossible to
determine whether the participants in the outgroup conditions showed a truly
reversed priming effect, or whether the assimilation effect after stereotype priming
was merely extinguished. Therefore, a baseline condition was added in Study 3.
Finally, in the previous studies the ingroup-outgroup stereotype measures showed
inconsistent effects. Therefore, in Study 3 the actual self-stereotype of the own
person was assessed.
Method
Design and Overview
The study had a one-factorial design with 3 experimental conditions: priming of the
elderly stereotype, priming of a comparison between self and the elderly, and a
control condition. The priming took place in the first phase of the study, and was
immediately followed by a behavioral measure in the form of an LDT with words
unrelated to the stereotype. After the behavioral measure, the self-concept in terms of
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stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent words was assessed. The
experiment was conducted on the Internet, and advertised mainly on the local
campus.
Participants
Forty-eight native speakers of German aged under 31 took part in the experiment: 17
in the elderly prime condition, 16 in the comparison prime condition, and 15 in the
control condition. Mean age was 21.33; 29 were female, 17 were male (missing data
for 2 cases). For 1 out of 20 participants, 20 DM in the form of a amazon.de gift
voucher were awarded. To take part in this lottery, participants had to provide an
email address. Care was taken to guarantee anonymity. Participants who did not
speak German as their mother tongue, or who participated for the second time, were
excluded from the data set. None of the participants was suspicious that the
presentation of other people influenced the reaction time.
Materials and Procedure
Introduction. Since the experiment was conducted on the Internet, we used an
elaborate introduction. It emphasized the value of the experiment for learning more
about human perception and understanding. It described the experiment as
"researching social perception and how one perceives and classifies persons and
objects. For instance, how do we detect whether somebody is happy or sad? Why are
we sometimes sure to now the profession of a total stranger? Why do we almost
always recognize faces, but often forget names?"
Priming. In the elderly prime condition, the purpose of the priming task was
described as researching how one detects the age of a person. The participants were
instructed to judge the age of 16 persons, 8 male and 8 female. The persons were
depicted on black-and-white photos taken from Kawakami et al. (in press).17
Underneath each photo a scale was displayed, ranging from "30-40," "40-50," etc.
until ">90." The age of each person had to be judged on this scale by clicking on an
answer. Most of the persons seemed happy, three displayed neutral emotions, and
one looked rather unhappy (four examples are displayed in Figure 4).
                                                
17 I thank Kerry Kawakami for kindly providing these pictures.
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Figure 4. Four of the sixteen stimulus persons used in Studies 3 and 4.
The comparison prime showed the same pictures of 16 elderly persons, but invited
the participants to compare themselves to these persons. The introduction of the task
emphasized that persons of different ages grow up differently, make different
experiences over their lifetime, and are often treated differently. The task was
described as studying how one perceives members of a different age group.
Underneath each of the 16 photos was a scale ranging from 1 (exactly my age group)
to 7 (not my age group at all), on which the participants had to categorize the target
persons. So, a point which will become important in the discussion was that both in
the scale anchors and in the instruction, the comparison's reference point was the self
("Compare these persons to yourself and your age").
In the control condition, the first part of the study was allegedly on how one
perceives the value of everyday objects. For this purpose, the participants saw 16
pictures of fountain and ball pens. They had to judge the value of each pen on a scale
ranging from 1 (very cheap) to 7 (very expensive), which was displayed underneath
the pen.
Lexical decision task. Immediately following the priming task, the participants
performed the LDT. They were instructed to press "A" when the appearing stimulus
was not a regular German word, and ENTER when a correct German word appeared.
16 German words and 16 pronounceable non-words were displayed in random order,
preceded by 4 practice trials. The stimuli remained on the screen until an answer was
given. The next word appeared always after 2 s. There was no additional break after
the practice trials.
Self-description. Following the LDT, 22 adjectives were shown in random order. The
participants had to indicate whether or not each adjective applied to themselves. The
adjectives were displayed one by one, each with a scale ranging from 1 (does never
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apply to me) to 6 (does always apply to me). Half of the 22 adjectives had a positive
valence, the other half was negative. 8 were typical for the elderly (positive: wise,
experienced, calm, meticulous; negative: lonely, draconian, bourgeois, stingy), and 8
were typical for the young (positive: flexible, spontaneous, relaxed, creative;
negative: arrogant, hectic, chaotic, careless),18 plus 6 filler adjectives not related to
the stereotypes. The associations with the stereotypes were pretested on a different
sample.
Additional data and debriefing. At the end of the study, participants indicated gender
and age, mother tongue, whether they participated in this experiment for the first
time, and whether they had the impression that anything about the experiment and
the first task might have influenced their reaction times in the LDT. After the data
were transmitted over the Internet, the final page of the study debriefed the
participants, explained in detail the procedure and the hypothesis of the experiment,
and gave the participants their mean reaction time in the LDT.
Results
Reaction Times
Eight wrong answers were excluded. The remaining answers had a mean reaction
time of 686.83 ms (SD= 258.82 ms). This led to the exclusion of additional 10
reaction times which were 3 SDs above the mean. Altogether, 18 (2.34%) RTs were
excluded. The remaining reaction times were combined into a single score and
normalized by taking the natural logarithm. Untransformed values are presented in
Table 5. A one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of condition,
F(2,45)=4.27, p=.020. Contrary to the predictions, however, the comparison prime
led to the longest reaction times, even longer than the elderly prime. The control
group exhibited the shortest reaction times. Pairwise comparisons showed that the
difference between control group and comparison prime was significant, p=.006,
while the difference between elderly prime and comparison approached significance,
p=.069. There was no significant difference between control group and elderly
prime, p=.140 (one-tailed).
                                                
18 In German: weise, erfahren, ruhig, sorgfältig, einsam, streng, spießig, geizig, flexibel,
spontan, locker, kreativ, arrogant, hektisch, chaotisch, leichtsinnig.
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Additional analyses revealed that these unexpected results were qualified by the
participants' gender. As displayed in Table 5, there were less men than women. (Note
that information on gender is missing for 2 participants.) Although a chi-square test
did not indicate an unequal distribution across the cells, it is noteworthy that only 4
men were in the comparison condition. When gender was added as a second factor to
the analyses of reaction time, the priming still had a significant effect, F(2,40)=6.57,
p=.003. Additionally, the interaction approached significance, F(2,40)=2.33, p=.111.
A separate analysis without the control condition revealed a significant interaction,
F(1,28)=4.25, p=.049, which qualified a significant main effect of the priming,
F(1,28)=6.77, p=.015. Table 5 and Figure 5 show the respective reaction times.
While there was only a small difference between elderly and comparison priming for
female participants, there was bigger difference for male participants. In the control
conditions, men and women were almost equally fast. (Simple effects analyses were
not conducted because of the low cell count.)
Table 5. Reaction Times Depending on Priming and Gender in Study 3
Sample Separated by Gender
Total Sample female male
Condition N M SD N M SD N M SD
Elderly
Stereotype
17 658.91 107.97 10 682.47 119.63 7 625.25 85.84
Comparison 16 719.35 107.67 11 696.62 64.76 4 811.13 162.16
Control 15 621.01 68.48 8 622.5 76.67 6 616.06 69.3
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Figure 5. Reaction times depending on priming and gender in Study 3.
Judgement Times During Priming
One could wonder whether the speed during the priming judgment task could have
influenced the reaction times, e.g. by setting a habitual reaction time. The judgment
times for the 16 pictures were combined into a single score and transformed by
taking the logarithm. The three conditions differed regarding their general judgement
times, F(2,45)=3.2, p=.048. Judgments in the comparison conditions (M=3427 ms,
SD=1566 ms) were reliably faster than in the control condition (M=4567 ms,
SD=1191 ms), p=.022, and also faster than those in the elderly condition (M=4616
ms, SD=2379 ms), p=.054. Interestingly, the LDT reaction times in the elderly
condition correlated positively with the judgment times, r=.49, p=.044. In the control
condition, the correlation was not significantly different from zero, r=.34, p=.21, but
in the comparison condition the correlation was negative, though also not significant,
r=-.31, p=.242.
Judgment Extremity During Priming
In the elderly condition, the mean of the targets' judged age was 63.4 years. In the
comparison condition, the targets were judged on average 6.5 on the scale from 1
(exactly my age group) to 7 (not my age group at all), so almost at the endpoint of
the scale and far away from the midpoint of the scale, t(15)=15.4, p<.001. In the
control condition, the average judgments of the pens' monetary value were close to
the midpoint, M=4.05. To look more closely at the relation between judgment and
reaction time, the judgments in the priming task were combined into a single score
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(reflecting the extremity of the judgment, either with regard to age of targets or to
difference from self). These scores were entered together with the mean judgment
time into linear regression models as predictors of reaction time in the LDT. The
regression equation explained a significant amount of variance only in the elderly
condition, F(2,14)=5.36, p=.019, but not for the other two conditions, Fs<1.1. In the
elderly condition, both judgment extremity (age of targets), β=.45, p=.047, and
judgment speed, β=.58, p=.014, predicted reaction times. Thus, a slower judgement
process and a rating of the targets as elderly resulted in slower reaction times
afterwards. The two predictors did not correlate significantly, r=-.19, p=.46.
Self-stereotyping
The 16 stereotype-related attributes were combined into 4 scores and analyzed in a 3
(priming) x 2 (valence) x 2 (stereotype) ANOVA with the last two factors as
repeated measures. The only effects were a main effect of valence, F(1,45)=68.45,
p<.001, and of stereotype, F(1,45)=5.63, p=.022. These effects indicated that positive
attributes were seen as more applicable to the self than negative attributes, and that
young attributes were seen as more applicable than elderly attributes. There was no
interaction between the two factors, F<1. Furthermore, no effects of the priming
emerged from the analyses, all Fs<1.
Next, the correlations between reaction times and the self-descriptions were
analyzed, which revealed some surprising results (see Table 6). While in the control
condition, there were no significant correlations, all ps>.37, in both the elderly and
the outgroup condition, there was a significant negative correlation between reaction
time and applicability of negative elderly attributes to the self: The less negative
elderly attributes were seen as applicable to the self, the longer the reaction time.
Furthermore, in the comparison condition, there was a significant positive correlation
between positive young attributes for the self and reaction time. To explore these
results further, the correlations between reaction time and the individual attributes'
applicability were checked. There was only one significant correlation: In the
comparison condition, characterizing the self as relaxed correlated with reaction
time, r=.68, p=.004. In the control condition, this correlation was negative yet
insignificant, r=-.42, p=.122, as it was in the elderly condition, r=-.11, p=.671.
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Table 6. Correlations Between Reaction Time and Applicability of Attributes
to the Self
Attributes
Condition
Elderly
Positive
Elderly
Negative
Young
Positive
Young
Negative
r -.446 -.516* -.219 .013Elderly
Stereotype p .073 .034 .397 .961
r .214 -.638* .570* -.278Comparison
p .426 .008 .021 .298
Note. * p<.05. There were no significant correlations in the control condition.
In the light of this result, it became interesting how the attribute relaxed had been
applied to the self. A 3 (condition) x 2 (gender) ANOVA revealed no main effects,
F<1.5, but a significant interaction, F(2,40)=3.72, p=.033. This interaction was even
stronger when the control condition was excluded, F(1,28)=6.57, p=.016. The pattern
was comparable to the moderation of reaction times by gender: While for female
participants there was not much difference between the conditions, male participants
felt not relaxed after the elderly priming, but very relaxed after the comparison (see
Table 7). Note that the midpoint of the scale was 3.5.
Table 7. Rated Applicability of Relaxed to Self
Gender
female male
Condition M SD M SD
Elderly Stereotype 4.20 1.03 3.43 .98
Comparison 3.91 .54 4.75 .50
Control 4.00 .76 4.33 .82
Note. Scale ranges from 1 to 6.
Discussion
Longer reaction times in a lexical decision task were introduced by Dijksterhuis et al.
(in press) as a behavioral indicator of assimilation to the elderly. They are used as a
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more convenient and simple assessment than measuring the walking speed, which
Bargh et al. (1996) did. The fundamental assumption of the present study was, as in
the previous Studies 1 and 2, that a contrast from the group of the elderly would
result in shorter reaction times. The results of the present study, however, challenge
this assumption.
The study assigned the participants to 1 of 3 conditions: A mere stereotype priming,
where the age of elderly people had to be judged, a condition in which a comparison
between self and the elderly should be activated by the categorization of elderly
people as different from the own age group, or a control condition. The surprising
result was that significantly longer reaction times (i.e., slower behavior) were found
after the participants categorized elderly people as members of a different age group.
That is, in the condition in which the comparison was expected to lead to shorter
reaction times, the participants actually got slower. The reaction times were reliably
shorter when the participants merely judged the age of the elderly persons, or when
they judged the monetary value of 16 pens in the control condition. Contrary to
expectations, there was no difference between the control condition and the mere
stereotype priming condition. A simple assimilation after stereotype activation could
thus not be replicated. Importantly, the slower behavior in the comparison condition
was especially pronounced for male participants: Male participants in the control
condition were the slowest in the LDT. A weakness of the study is that there were
only 4 male participants in the control condition.
In the different conditions, the reaction times in the LDT correlated with different
variables. Only in the elderly priming (age judgement) condition, both the speed
during judgment and extremity of the age judgement predicted behavior: The more
slowly and the older the elderly persons were judged, the slower were the reaction
times afterwards. This result did not appear in the other two other conditions. This
result is in fact very interesting. The lack of a correlation between judgement speed
and reaction time in the other two conditions suggests that the speed during
judgement in the elderly priming task is not just a covariate. Instead, it seems that the
longer the participants looked at the elderly, and the older the elderly seemed to be,
the stronger the effect. So, the two indices can be interpreted as indicators of priming
strength. Another possible interpretation is that the speed during judgment was
already influenced by the elderly pictures, and that therefore this speed and the speed
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in the subsequent reaction time task were correlated. However, note that speed
during judgement and judgment extremity did not correlate; so there is no additional
data to back this post-hoc hypothesis. However, the finding that extremity of judged
age and subsequent reaction times correlated gives some clues why the overall
assimilation effect was not significant. Apparently, an automatic behavioral effect
determined the reaction times, but the manipulation was not strong enough to result
in a total assimilation effect across all participants.
In the comparison condition, describing the self as relaxed correlated surprisingly
highly with the reaction time (r=0.69): The more relaxed one considered oneself to
be, the slower the behavior exhibited. Additional analyses revealed that especially
the male participants judged themselves as relaxed in the comparison condition, as
compared to the elderly priming condition, and the female participants. Neither in the
control condition nor in the elderly priming condition, was there any relation
between seeing the self as relaxed and the reaction times. Therefore, it does not seem
that those who performed slowly in the LDT and therefore considered themselves to
be slow, judged the self as relaxed afterwards. Rather, the opposite causal direction
seems to be the case. During the comparison, especially the (few) male participants
came to see the self as relaxed, and answered more slowly in the following LDT.
In the light of this result, I think that the longer reaction times in the comparison
condition could in fact be interpreted as a behavioral contrast. It seems that a contrast
from elderly persons (i.e., increased accessibility of counterstereotypic attributes and
their application to the self) does not necessarily imply shorter reaction times. That
is, contrasting from the elderly might on the one hand imply faster reactions than the
stereotypically slow elderly, but it can also result in the characterization of the self as
more relaxed than the stereotypically rigid and meticulous elderly. The few male
participants in our comparison condition seem to have done exactly this. Of course,
this makes reaction times as behavioral indicators after social comparisons tricky,
due to their ambiguity; unless they are accompanied by assessments of self-
stereotypes!
One could also wonder whether the same is true for increased reaction times or even
slower walking speed after an elderly priming. However, this seems unlikely. First of
all, in the present elderly priming condition, there was no accentuated self-
description as relaxed--it seems to depend on the comparison. In contrast, LDT
99
reaction times were predicted by the extremity of the age judgment, which can be
seen as a crude indicator of the activated stereotype's extremity. Furthermore, at least
for the walking speed studies carried out by Bargh et al. (1996), this interpretation
seems unlikely since a comparison probably depends on the propositional
categorization (see Chapter 4). This was not given since the stereotype was primed
by scrambled sentences, and the participants were unaware of the relation of the
priming to the stereotype.
I hasten to add that the interpretation offered here--that the increased reaction times
in the comparison condition could be interpreted as a behavioral contrast--is very
speculative. There were only 4 male participants in the comparison condition, which
is surely not enough to build a strong argument on. I also do not think that this result
threatens the interpretation of Studies 1 and 2. The stereotyping results there,
although not directly using the adjective relaxed, did not indicate a consistent
accentuation of the young self-stereotype. Furthermore, it seems likely that the
different effects were in part driven by the different stimuli used in Study 3. The
Study 3 target persons seem more formal and rigid than the Study 1 and 2 stimuli
persons. This may have tipped the balance into another dimension of comparison.
A further critical point of the comparison condition used in this study is the exact
comparison instruction. As noted in the materials section, it used the self as the
reference point. That is, the participants were instructed to compare the elderly to
themselves. Only after the experiment I realized that previous theorizing and
research has argued and shown that the direction of comparison actually determines
the process and result of the comparison. Thus, the assimilation effect found in the
comparison direction could also have other results than those I just speculated about.
The next study was designed to shed more light on this issue.
6.2 Study 4: Moderation by Comparison Direction
In the ABC model presented in Chapter 4, it is a central assumption that the
perception of a group that is categorized as an outgroup leads to a behavioral
contrast, since the perception of outgroups follows an oppositeness-heuristic (Cadinu
& Rothbart, 1996). The reasoning underlying this assumption is that the
oppositeness-heuristic leads to a difference-testing process, which renders
stereotype-inconsistent knowledge accessible. Therefore, if one wants to look at the
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individual steps of the assumed process, two important steps can be identified: First,
that outgroup-status leads to a test of difference, and second that a test of difference
leads to behavioral contrast.
The goal of Study 4 was to provide more direct evidence for the second step, that is,
for the importance of the initial hypothesis tested in the comparison. Thus, in Study 4
less attention will be paid to outgroup status per se, but rather to an alternative
manipulation that also creates a test for difference. However, the results of this study
will show that in the end, difference testing and outgroup status are related. In order
to check the importance of the initial hypothesis more directly, I took advantage of a
manipulation that has recently been shown to determine the initial hypothesis on
which the comparison is based: the direction of the comparison.
Classic studies have repeatedly demonstrated that perceived similarity of the self to
another person depends on whether the target person is compared to the self
(other→self) or whether the self is compared to the target person (self→other, Codol,
1984, 1990; Holyoak & Gordon, 1983). The perceived similarity between other and
self is higher when others are compared to the self than when the self is compared to
others: We feel that others are similar to us, but we do not feel that we are similar to
others. One explanation for this effect is based on the higher complexity of the self
(Tversky, 1977). When the self is the starting point of the comparison, its unique
features gain more weight than when the other is the starting point of the comparison.
This leads to different assessments of similarity.
Extending this reasoning beyond similarity assessments, Mussweiler (2001) showed
that based on the similarity assessment (and partially mediated by it), the subsequent
comparison process renders either self-conceptions consistent with the target
(other→self) or self-conceptions inconsistent with the target (self→other) more
applicable. We feel that another person is similar to us, and after thinking about it for
a while, we also assimilate our self-concept to the other. However, since we do not
feel that we are similar to another person, after thinking about it, the self-concept is
contrasted from the other. Since this self-concept change is presumably a
consequence of differing accessibility of parts of the self-concept, and since
automatic behavior is also a consequence of accessible behavior representations, we
can hypothesize that varying the focus of comparison has similar effects on
automatic behavior. When an other→self comparison renders other-consistent
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behavioral representations more accessible, it is predicted that behavior will be
assimilated to the other-stereotype. When however a self→other comparison renders
target-inconsistent behavior more accessible, behavioral contrast is expected, just
like after the perception of outgroup members. Study 4 tests these predictions.
Furthermore, possible changes in the self-concept are investigated.
In sum, Study 4 tests whether the direction of a comparison, which is known to
determine initial similarity assessments, moderates automatic behavioral effects. The
focus is thus on the second step of the process assumed in the ABC model, namely
automatic behavior as a result of behavioral representations which were rendered
accessible in a social comparison.
Method
Design and Overview
The experiment had a one-factorial between-subjects design with three conditions, to
which the participants were randomly assigned: a control condition, and two
comparison conditions. In one of the comparison conditions, the focus of comparison
was other→self, whereas in the second comparison condition the focus was
self→other.
The experiment was conducted on the Internet and advertised at the local university
campus. One out of 20 participants won a 20 DM book voucher in a lottery. For
taking part in the lottery, participants had to submit their email address after the
experiment; anonymity was assured. Participants were made aware of the fact that
they participated in a scientific study and that their data were collected. The purpose
of the study was described as investigating perception, with several unrelated
experimental tests. The first task was allegedly on how one perceives traits in photos,
and the second on how words are recognized. In fact, the first task served as the
priming, and the second task measured the average reaction time of the participants
in a LDT. Following the second task, participants rated themselves on 22 adjectives,
guessed what the purpose of the experiment was and what might have influenced
their reaction time, and entered their demographic data. After the data were
transmitted, the last pages debriefed the participants about manipulations and
hypotheses.
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Participants
Altogether, 96 native speakers of German younger than 31 took part in the
experiment. Two of them indicated that they confused the buttons for yes and no
answers, and three wrote that they were disturbed during the reaction time task by
other people. One of these 3 additionally indicated that the presentation of elderly
people might have influenced his reaction time; none of the remaining participants
was suspicious about a possible influence on reaction times. These 5 participants
(3.47%) were excluded from all further analyses. The remaining 91 had a mean age
of 21.4; 52 were female. 24 were assigned to the control condition, 33 to the
other→self comparison, and 34 to the self→other comparison.
Materials and Procedure
Priming. In the two comparison conditions, the participants were shown 16 pictures
of elderly persons (8 male, 8 female, taken from Kawakami et al., in press), in
random order. Each picture was accompanied by an additional piece of information
about that person; all of these were typical for the elderly stereotype (e.g., likes to see
talk shows, prefers to stay at home, goes to bed early in the evening, likes to play
with the grandchildren; note that in the previous Study 3, such information was not
given). The pictures were displayed together with the phrases on the screen until the
participants clicked on a "Next" link. On the next screen, they had to answer a
question about the picture (see below), before the next picture appeared. For each
target person, participants were asked to compare self and person. The direction of
the comparison was manipulated between conditions in the introduction, in the
presentation of the pictures and in the item for each picture. In the other→self
comparison condition, it was said that comparisons of other persons to the self were
investigated. Above each picture, participants were told to "compare this person to
yourself," and below each picture it was said: "Please think about it: Is this person
rather similar to you or rather different from you?." The item on the page after each
picture read: "When I compare this person to myself, this person is..." and was
anchored by "very different" (1) and "very similar" (7). In the self→other
comparison condition, the task was described as investigating how one compares the
self to other persons. Above each picture, participants were instructed to "compare
yourself to this person," and below they read "Please think about it: Are you rather
similar to or rather different from this person?" On the next page, they answered the
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item "When I compare myself to this person, then I am rather...," anchored by "very
different from this person" (1) and "very similar to this person" (7). Note that in none
of the conditions the 16 persons were called a group. Instead, all instructions used the
term person.
The alleged purpose of the first task in the control condition was to investigate how
one estimates the value of everyday objects. Participants were shown photos of
different fountain and ballpoint-pens: 16 pens of varying value in random order, each
accompanied by a short phrase like "is produced in Hong Kong, is very ergonomic, is
made from metal, blots sometimes." The monetary value of each pen had to be rated
on the page following the pen, on an item ranging from "very cheap" to "very
expensive."
Reaction time task. The task was described as investigating how correct words are
recognized. Altogether, 16 words and 16 pronounceable non-words were displayed
in random order, preceded by 4 practice trials (2 words, 2 non-words). Participants
had to press "a" for a nonword and Enter for a word. Words remained on the screen
until an answer was given. The following word appeared after a break which
randomly varied between 1000 and 1500 ms.
Self-description. Following the LDT, the same 22 adjectives as in Study 3 were
shown in random order. The participants had to indicate whether or not each
adjective applied to themselves. The adjectives were displayed one by one, each with
a scale ranging from 1 (does never apply to me) to 6 (does always apply to me). Half
of the 22 adjectives had a positive valence, the other half was negative. 8 were
typical for the elderly (positive: wise, experienced, calm, meticulous; negative:
lonely, draconian, bourgeois, stingy), and 8 were typical for the young (positive:
flexible, spontaneous, relaxed, creative; negative: arrogant, hectic, chaotic, careless),
plus 6 filler adjectives not related to the stereotypes. The associations with the
stereotypes were pretested on a different sample.
Entitativity and additional variables. A one-item measure assessed whether the 16
persons were seen as single persons independent from one another (1), or whether
they were seen as similar members of one group (7). Finally, age, gender and mother
tongue were assessed, and the participants were asked whether they had participated
for the first time.
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Results
Reaction Times
In total, 1456 reaction times were collected. Of these, 19 answers were wrong, and
excluded. Furthermore, all reaction times longer than 3 SDs above the mean (N=22)
were deleted. Altogether, 41 (2.81%) reaction times were excluded. For each
participant, the reaction times were averaged and log transformed for the analyses.
Untransformed means are reported for ease of interpretation.
It was predicted that, compared to the control group baseline, an other→self
comparison would result in longer reaction times and a self→other comparison
would result in shorter reaction times. Table 8 and Figure 6 shows that the means
matched this pattern. The prediction was tested by arranging the conditions in this
order and testing for a linear contrast. The overall ANOVA effect approached
significance, F(2,88)=2.37, p=.099. The linear contrast was significant, p=.033.
Pairwise comparisons showed that the two comparison conditions differed
significantly from each other, p=0.017. The differences of the control condition to
both self→other and other→self comparison failed to reach significance, p=0.135
and p=0.197, respectively (pairwise comparisons one-tailed).
Table 8. Reaction Times in Study 4, Depending on Focus of Comparison
Condition M SD
comparison other→self 714.57 100.61
control group 692.32 93.01
comparison self→other 664.79 83.53
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Figure 6. Reaction Times in Study 4, Depending on Focus of Comparison.
Comparison Results
For both comparison conditions, the 16 ratings during the priming phase were
averaged and compared to the midpoint of the scale. Both in the other→self,
M=2.88, SD=.67, and in the self→other condition, M=2.70, SD=.71, the ratings were
significantly lower than the midpoint of the scale (4), t(32)=9.61, p<.001 and
t(33)=10.55, p<.001, respectively. The 16 elderly were clearly perceived as rather
different from the self, independently of the condition. Although the different items
make these ratings not directly comparable, the two conditions seem to lead to
equivalent perceived differences between self and the exemplars. The ratings did not
correlate with the average reaction time in the LDT, both ps>.40.
Self-descriptions
The 16 stereotype-related attributes were combined to 4 scores, separated by valence
and stereotype. These scores were submitted to a 3 (condition) x 2 (stereotype: young
vs. elderly) x 2 (valence: positive vs. negative) MANOVA with repeated measures
on the last two factors. The main effects of valence, F(1,88)=130.03, p<.001, and of
stereotype, F(1,88)=16.69, p<.001, were significant. Positive attributes were seen as
more applicable to the self than negative attributes, and young attributes were seen as
more applicable than elderly attributes. There was no main effect of condition, F<1.
The stereotype x condition interaction fell short of significance, F(2,88)=2.94,
p=.058; the other two-way interaction was negligible, F<1, while the three-way
interaction did not reach significance, F(2,88)=1.44, p=.243. A further exploration of
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the marginal two-way interaction (see Table 9) showed that the condition had a slight
effect on stereotypically young attributes, F(2,88)=3.03, p=.053, but not on
stereotypically elderly attributes, F<1. Pairwise comparisons (LSD) showed a
significant difference between the control condition and each of the two comparison
conditions, p=.047 for the difference to other→self comparison and p=.022 for the
difference to self→other condition. The two comparison conditions did not differ
from each other, p=.74. Stereotypically young attributes were seen as more self-
describing in the control condition (M=3.69, SD=.42) than after other→self
comparison (M=3.45, SD=.53) and after self→other comparison (M=3.44, SD=.43).
In addition to the four self-concept scores, two additional indices were computed by
averaging all stereotypically elderly and all stereotypically young attributes. Separate
analyses for each condition showed not a single significant correlation with the LDT
reaction time in any of the conditions, all ps>.23.
Table 9. Self-descriptiveness of Young and Elderly Attributes, Study 4
(Collapsed Over Valence)
Stereotype
Elderly Young
Condition M SD M SD
control 3.26 0.55 3.69 0.42
other→self 3.4 0.51 3.45 0.53
self→other 3.42 0.42 3.44 0.43
Since the attribute relaxed showed interesting effects and correlations in Study 3, it
was again scrutinized in this study. Its application to the self did not differ between
conditions, F<1. The analysis was repeated with gender as a between-subjects factor;
again, there were not significant effects, all Fs<1. There were also no correlations to
reaction time in any of the conditions, |rs|<.21, ps>.24.
Entitativity
In the two comparison conditions, participants were asked how much the 16 persons
were seen as a group. In the self→other comparison condition, entitativity was
judged marginally higher, M=5.26, SD=1.76, than in the other→self comparison
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condition, M=4.36, SD=2.21, t(61.19)=1.84, p=.070. Tests for difference from the
scale midpoint revealed that this was only the case in the self→other condition,
t(33)=4.18, p<.001; the other difference was not significant, t<1. Thus, in the
condition where the participants showed behavioral contrast, they also tended to
perceive the stimulus persons more as a group. To check whether entitativity
mediated the behavioral effect, it was entered as a covariate in a one-way ANCOVA,
with condition (self→other vs. other→self) as a factor and reaction time as
dependent variable. Entitativity was not a significant covariate, F<1, and the effect of
the manipulation was still significant, F(1,64)=3.85, p=.027 (one-tailed).
Discussion
The present study manipulated a subtle and yet important feature of a social
comparison: its direction. It was argued that a comparison of the self to elderly
persons would lead to behavioral contrast due to enhanced accessibility of
difference-indicating features, while a comparison of elderly persons to the self
would lead to behavioral assimilation, due to enhanced accessibility of similarity-
indicating features (Mussweiler, 2001; Tversky, 1977). The results matched these
predictions: Participants who compared themselves to elderly persons reacted faster
in a subsequent lexical decision task than participants who compared elderly persons
to themselves. The reaction times of a control group fell in between these two
conditions, resulting in a significant linear contrast. This result is especially
impressing since in both comparison conditions, the participants decided on average
that the 16 elderly persons were rather different from the self. However, while the
conclusions were similar, the processes leading to these conclusions were apparently
different between the two foci of comparison, leading to different behavioral effects.
However, it has to be noted that while the two comparison conditions differed
significantly from each other, they did not differ significantly from the control
condition in between, probably due to the lower number of participants in this
condition. Therefore, a cautious interpretation of the results is that a comparison of
self to other leads to less behavioral assimilation than a comparison of other to self.
In contrast to the results of Mussweiler (2001), no significant effects on the self-
description of the participants were found. Apart from a trend to describe the self less
in terms of young attributes in both comparison conditions, which seems to be a
general effect of seeing elderly persons, there were no effects of the condition. One
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could have expected that the self-descriptions would parallel the behavioral effects,
resulting in a "younger" self-description after the self→other comparison.
Considering the extensive procedure used by Mussweiler, however, the null-effect is
less surprising. In his study, participants received extensive written information
about the stand of the comparison target on one specific comparison dimension, they
elaborated on their comparison by writing down their thoughts, the self-concept
change was tested with rather objectively anchored items, and directly after the
comparison. In contrast, the comparison procedure here was merely a test on general
similarity or dissimilarity, answered on a single rating item, and the self-concept test
was conducted on attribute rating scales only after the lexical decision task. Either of
these difference could alone be responsible for the perishing of an effect. Still, the
difference is interesting. It could be the case that an accessibility manipulation can
change actual behavior more easily than it can change deliberate self-descriptions.
The effect on the entitativity measure gives us a clue as to what happened during the
comparison. When comparing self to other, the target persons were seen more as a
homogenous (out)group. Apparently, the dissimilarity testing led to a general
contrast self vs. the others, while the similarity testing process led to a slightly
stronger individuation of the 16 persons.
Relation to Study 3
The results of this study also give additional clues on the puzzling results found in
the previously presented Study 3. There, the participants in the comparison condition
reacted more slowly than those in the control and the mere stereotype priming
condition. In the discussion of Study 3, I indicated that one reason for this
unexpected result could have been a behavioral contrast from the presented elderly in
the direction of relaxed and "cool" behavior, resulting in slower reactions. Data on
the self-descriptions indicated that this was especially likely for the few male
participants. Two points are relevant here: First of all, in the present study this
phenomenon was not observed again; self-ratings on the attribute "relaxed" did not
differ between conditions and did not correlate with reaction time. Thus, it seems
safe to conclude that the present behavioral effects in terms of faster behavior can be
interpreted as a contrast, and slower reactions in terms of assimilation. I think that
the likely reason for the difference between Studies 3 and 4 were the information
given in addition to the photos in Study 4. As the examples in the materials section
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showed, they were chosen such that the elderly stereotype as slow, calm and aged
was emphasized. Although the photos used in Studies 3 and 4 were identical, the
activated knowledge was presumably different, and suggested a different dimension
for contrast.
Second, the present study showed that an other→self comparison tends to result in
assimilation. Therefore, this kind of assimilation might have been responsible at least
partly for the longer reaction times in the comparison condition of Study 3. With the
present data, it is unfortunately impossible to determine what exactly led to the
longer reaction times in the comparison condition of Study 3: increased assimilation
of elderly-consistent behavior as a result of the comparison direction, automatic
contrast in the direction of cool and relaxed behavior, or both.
6.3 Study 5: Who Assimilates to Professors?
In the following section, I want to describe briefly a further study that revealed
interesting evidence on assimilation or lack thereof after the perception of a natural
(out)group. Its results fit well in the discussion at this point, but it was originally
conducted before the other studies, and designed to test another hypothesis which is
of no further relevance here. I will therefore describe the study in less detail, and
only point to the most relevant results.
The study investigated the impact of a professor priming on intellectual performance.
Recall that previous research (see Chapter 3) found that activation of the professor
stereotype resulted in improved performance in a general knowledge task, which was
basically modeled after a Trivial Pursuit game. Recall also that this behavioral task
showed contrast effects when the participants had to think about an extreme
exemplar of professors, Albert Einstein. Thus, a knowledge task seems also suitable
for a test of contrast effects as a result of social comparison of the self to an
outgroup. A fitting intergroup situation in this domain is the relation between
students and professors. While students may be characterized as smart in comparison
with many other social categories, a comparison to professors stereotypes them as
"relatively stupid." More specifically, when students compare themselves with
professors, given that they search for difference between the two categories, they
should increase the accessibility of stupidity-related aspects of their self-concepts. As
a result, they should then perform worse in a general knowledge task.
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The following study used the priming procedure that was applied by Dijksterhuis and
van Knippenberg (1998). Participants were instructed to imagine a typical professor,
and to list attributes of professors. This condition was compared to a condition in
which the participants had to imagine a typical student. Additionally, each
stereotype--professors and students--was also primed in a more situated manner,
namely in contact with the respective other group. That is, in two further conditions
participants had to imagine either professors in contact with students, or students in
contact with professors. Furthermore, the profession of the participants (students vs.
non-students) served as a quasi-experimental between-subjects factor. Thus, the
study had a 2 (stereotype: professor vs. student) x 2 (stereotype only vs. its relation to
its outgroup) x 2 (participants' profession) design plus a baseline control group. The
question which is most relevant for the present discussion is: Did the students
participating in the study assimilate to the stereotype of professors, and did they do
so even when the professors stereotype was presented in contact with their own
ingroup?
Method
Design and Procedure
The experiment consisted of a priming phase, a performance measure, and the
assessment of additional variables. In the priming phase, the participants were asked
to imagine either typical professors or typical students. This was the first between-
subjects factor, termed stereotype. This factor was crossed by a second factor,
manipulating whether the focal stereotype had to be imagined alone (only professors,
only students), or whether it had to be imagined in contact with its respective
outgroup (students or professors, respectively). Thus, the two contact conditions
differed in the perspective induced by the priming manipulation. In the professors in
contact with students condition (professors→students), the intergroup situation was
primed from the professors point of view, while in the students in contact with
professors condition (students→professors), the intergroup situation was primed
from the students point of view. As a fifth condition, a control group was established.
In this control group, participants had to imagine a typical tree instead of a social
category. Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions.
The experiment was conducted on the Internet and introduced as a study on "mental
imagery." First, the participants were asked to imagine typical exemplars of the
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category of professors (or students or trees), and to type into the computer what came
to their mind. Only in the contact conditions, the respective outgroup was mentioned
and added to the imagination task. Afterwards, they were asked 4 questions on the
vividness of their imagery. Next, participants were given 40 multiple choice
questions of a general knowledge task. Debriefings were sent by email.
Participants
To assure a high quality of the data, the following criteria led to the exclusion of
participants: Participants were excluded when they answered less then 20 questions,
when they took part for the second time (as indicated by doubling email-addresses
and the self-report on a specific item), or when they worked less then 3 min on the
priming task. Participants were asked for age, gender and profession. The profession
variable served as a third quasi-experimental between-subjects factor; participants
were categorized in students or non-students. Nine participants who did not report
their profession were categorized as non-students (note that this is a conservative
procedure, since some students may have been assigned to the non-students category,
which decreases possible differences between the two groups). None of the non-
students was a professor. After the exclusion, 98 students and 86 non-students
remained in the final sample, distributed almost equally across the conditions.
Materials
Priming task. The participants were informed that the task investigated thoughts
about typical students (professors, trees). For instance, in the students→professors
condition, they were instructed: "Please imagine typical students in situations in
which they have contact with professors." In the professors condition, they were
asked "Please imagine typical professors." The instruction continued with "Please
describe what you imagine. Use your imagination to think of typical situations and
traits. Write down typical behaviors, traits and appearances. Please type in
spontaneously whatever comes to mind."
Knowledge Test. Forty questions were taken from the game Trivial Pursuit. The
questions were formulated as multiple-choice items, with four possible answers for
each question, of which only one was correct. The incorrect and the correct answers
were chosen such that logical and thoughtful analysis of the questions could in most
cases lead to the correct solution. A larger set of questions was pretested, and the
most difficult ones were selected, for example "What is the name of the Dutch
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painter who impresses with his confusing spatial perspectives? van de Velde/
Magritte/ Kandinsky/ Escher." Questions were presented in a random but fixed order.
Results
The correct answers in the knowledge test were counted. Unanswered questions were
counted as wrong. Note that mere guessing would on average result in 25%, or 10,
correct answers. For the main analysis, the control condition was excluded from the
design, to allow three-factorial ANOVAs. A first 2 (stereotype) x 2 (contact) x 2
(profession) ANOVA revealed no significant effects, all ps>.21. The number of
attempted solutions showed no significant effects. In a second ANOVA, the number
of attempted solutions was added as a covariate (see Table 10). Apart from a
significant influence of the covariate, F(1,122)=18.99, p<.001, main effects of two
factors and an interaction between them were found. First, the stereotype main effect
was significant, F(1,122)=4.24, p=.041. Second, the profession main effect was
significant, F(1,122)=5.19, p=.024. Both factors also interacted significantly,
F(1,122)=4.31, p=.040. Both main effects and the interaction were due to an
increased performance of the non-students in the professors priming conditions
(M=23.91). In contrast, the non-students' performance in the students priming
(M=19.98) and the students' performance after both stereotypes (M=19.79 after
students and M=19.77 after professors) was lower and almost equivalent. Note that
these means were corrected for the covariate. Thus, only non-students answered a
higher percentage of those questions that they attempted to solve correctly when they
first thought about professors, irrespective of the social context of the stereotype.
Comparisons of the baseline (tree priming) to the other conditions showed effects
only for non-students. Performance in the baseline condition was lower than in the
two professors conditions. The professors' stereotype prime condition differed
significantly from tree priming, p=.047 (one-tailed). Similarly, the
professors→students prime condition differed marginally from tree priming, p=.059
(one-tailed).
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Table 10. Number of Correct Answers in the Knowledge Test, Study 5
Profession Priming M SE of M
trees 21.28 0.98
students 20.52 1.25
students→ professors 19.65 1.67
professors 23.95 1.23
non-student
professors→ students 23.75 1.22
trees 20.33 0.97
students 20.33 1.26
students→ professors 19.45 1.15
professors 20.52 1.19
student
professors→ students 19.24 1.18
Note. Means are corrected for the number of attempted solutions
Discussion
Both students and non-students took part in the study, and both were primed either
with the professor stereotype or the student stereotype. The students' performance
was basically unaffected by the experimental manipulations. However, the results for
the non-student participants are different. Their performance was equivalent to that
of the students after the neutral priming of trees, and also after priming of students.
However, they outperformed the students when they were primed with professors. Of
those items that they tried to answer, non-students answered more items correctly
after being primed with the professor stereotype, than students did. A further factor
that varied whether the stereotypes were primed on their own, or in the context of the
respective outgroup, did not moderate the results.
Interpreting effects of a quasi-experimental variable like the participants' profession
is difficult, since a causal direction can only be assumed. If, with all necessary
caution, the difference between students and non-students in the professor priming
conditions is interpreted causally, it suggests that students were not able to profit
from the professors priming. The reasons for this--and the difference to the previous
studies which found such effects--are unclear. There seem to be at least two possible
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explanations. First, it might be that for some reason, the students in this sample were
unaffected by this kind of priming manipulation performed over the Internet. Perhaps
some uncontrolled confounding variable differed substantially between the two
categories, such as environmental conditions (e.g., students might have taken part
from a computer pool in the university, but non-student participants from their office
or home computers, which could have resulted in different distractions). Second, it
might be that the experimental conditions, in conjunction with the group
membership, led to the inhibition of a priming effect. Thus, the null effect after
professor priming for students might in fact be interpreted as supporting the
hypothesis that a salient intergroup context leads to comparison and a lack of
assimilation; but note that the effect did not reverse into contrast. If this second
interpretation is correct, the question is how this study differed from the previous
studies which found an assimilation to the professor stereotype in student samples. It
might be that in Germany, as opposed to the Netherlands where Dijksterhuis and
colleagues conducted their studies, students and professors have per se a more
antagonistic relationship which is immediately activated with such a priming.
A problematic limitation of the present study was that no explicit check of awareness
of the prime or suspicion was included in the procedure. Such a measure was in fact
applied, but only together with the debriefings emailed to the participants. Only very
few participants replied and answered this item, and the validity of this measure is
questionable.
In sum, Study 5 showed behavioral assimilation effects of a professor stereotype
priming on non-student participants, but not on student participants. The latter group
of participants was unaffected by the priming manipulations, and several
interpretations are possible. One likely interpretation, which is in line with the
general hypothesis discussed here, is that the students did not profit from the
stereotype priming because they compared themselves to the category of professors,
and thereby rendered professor-inconsistent behavioral representations accessible,
which led to an extinction of the assimilation.
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7 ASSIMILATION IN MINIMAL GROUPS
In the previous series of studies, it was argued that the exposure to a group stereotype
does not always lead to behavioral assimilation, as assumed by Dijksterhuis and
colleagues. It was shown that when a salient intergroup situation (Studies 1, 2) or a
self→other comparison direction (Study 4) favor a difference-testing social
comparison of self and others, groups of persons can also become comparison
standards from which the self and thereby automatic behavior is contrasted.
In general, Dijksterhuis and his colleagues argued that single exemplars are more
likely to function as a comparison standard than groups, and elicit a comparison just
by their distinctiveness. Chapters 3 and 4 cited the respective studies and showed that
in fact, the evidence on contrast from the perception of single exemplars is mixed,
and that additional factors seem necessary to elicit contrast. One of these additional
factors seemed to be extremity, which is the likely cause of contrast in the behavioral
and self-concept measures after Einstein priming reported by Dijksterhuis, Spears, et
al. (1998; see also the comparison to the results from Mussweiler & Strack, 2000b, in
Chapter 4).
The general argument underlying the assumption that outgroups can serve as a
source of contrast was that the social structure determines the process of the
comparison, not mere "perceptual" factors like distinctiveness themselves. The term
social structure is understood here as the way in which others are categorized as
identical to or different from the self. Furthermore, extremity of a target can be
conceptualized as one source of a categorization as different: When an extreme
person is encountered, the person is categorized as different, and this categorization
later determines the comparison process. Now, an interesting question arises: If the
assimilation to a group stereotype can be reversed by a social categorization, is the
same possible for the contrast from an extreme exemplar? That is, if one contrasts
from an outgroup, is there the possibility that one assimilates to an extreme exemplar
if it is categorized as an ingroup member? To put it more formally, this hypothesis
would extend the previous model of Dijksterhuis and colleagues which consisted of
two cells (category→assimilation, exemplar→contrast) to a 2 (target: category vs.
exemplar) x 2 (difference vs. identity comparison hypothesis) table, to which another
row (no comparison) is added. This table (see Table 11) is another way to depict the
ABC model developed in Chapter 4. In the target=category column, it incorporates
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the main hypothesis developed in Chapter 4, namely that the behavioral effects of a
stereotype activation depend on the social categorization of the category.
Additionally, the column target=exemplar shows that different effects of exemplar
activation on automatic behavior can be expected depending on the categorization of
the exemplar with respect to the self. First, if no categorization at all takes place,
assimilation occurs through mere knowledge activation (e.g., Macrae et al., 1998).
Second, if the exemplar is categorized as different from the self, for example due to
its extremity, contrast as a result of a difference-testing comparison is expected (e.g.,
Dijksterhuis, Spears, et al., 1998). Finally, if the categorization arrives at an identical
relation between self and target person, for example due to a shared ingroup
membership, assimilation should ensue.
Table 11. Predictions of the ABC Model as a Function of Target and its Social
Categorization
Target
category exemplar
none (no comparison) (a) assimilation (d) assimilation
different from self (b) contrast (e) contrast
Social
Categorization
identical to self (c) assimilation (f) assimilation
In sum, taking group structures into account leads to the hypothesis that under certain
circumstances single distinctive persons do not necessarily invoke automatic
behavioral contrast: When the other person is a member of a common ingroup, and
thereby influences the ingroup stereotype, contrast might be prevented or even
reversed. Two general lines of research support this hypothesis. The first, recent
work by Mussweiler, investigates how comparisons change the accessibility of
knowledge structures. The second consists of research on comparisons that take into
account the categorization context in which the comparisons take place--whether the
compared objects belong to a shared superordinate category or not. These two lines
will now be described in detail.
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7.1 Comparison to Ingroup Members
Comparisons of Self to Single Persons and Accessibility
The Selective Accessibility Model (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000a) is concerned with
changes in the accessibility of a concept's features after the comparison to another
concept. As outlined in Chapter 4, the model assumes that a comparison is
approached with an initial hypothesis about its outcome, and that thinking about this
hypothesis increases the accessibility of compatible evidence. Mussweiler and Strack
(2000b) argued that comparing oneself to a single exemplar "may selectively
increase the accessibility of standard-consistent knowledge about the self" (p. 24,
emphasis added). They reported evidence that the comparison with single exemplars
does not inevitably lead to an increased accessibility of standard-inconsistent
knowledge as assumed by Dijksterhuis and colleagues (for a more detailed analysis,
see Chapter 4).
Comparisons of Self to Single Exemplars of the Same Category
The research by Mussweiler and colleagues has so far not taken into account that the
self and the comparison standard can belong to the same category that is at the same
time opposed to another (outgroup) category (but see Mussweiler & Bodenhausen, in
press, for intra-category comparisons). However, it has long been hypothesized that
extremity turns assimilation into contrast because it excludes the extreme exemplar
from a shared category (Herr, 1986; Herr, Sherman, & Fazio, 1983). Wänke, Bless
and Igou (2001) extended this idea in a recently published a series of studies,
building on earlier work on the Inclusion/Exclusion Model of Assimilation and
Contrast (Schwarz & Bless, 1992). Their studies take category structures into
account, but focus on the comparison of two persons or objects in general, not on a
comparison of the self to another person. They investigated the role of a shared
category for the context effect of an extreme exemplar on the judgement of another
(target) exemplar. The model implies that the context effects of an extreme exemplar
(such as Einstein in the original studies by Dijksterhuis and colleagues) can take two
routes: Firstly, using the extreme exemplar as a standard of comparison in general
leads to interexemplar contrast (Herr et al., 1983, path c in Figure 7). In addition, the
model sketches a second process involving a superordinate category which includes
both the extreme exemplar and the target. The stereotype of the superordinate
category is thought to assimilate to the extreme exemplar (path a), similar to
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processes found in the literature on stereotype change (see below). The stereotype of
the category in turn is thought to influence the judgement of the target in an
assimilative fashion (path b, cf. Smith, 1998).
Figure 7. Different paths of interexemplar influence: Model of Wänke et al.
(2001).
Thus, while an extreme exemplar can provoke interexemplar contrast by serving as a
comparison standard, the judgment of the target can also be assimilated to the
extreme exemplar if there is a shared and salient superordinate category. Wänke et al.
supported these assumptions in three studies in which the salience of the
superordinate category was manipulated. The bottom line of these studies is that the
interexemplar contrast, which always occurred when there was no shared category or
if the category was not salient, could be reduced to a baseline level if the category
was salient and the group membership of both exemplar and target was emphasized.
However, the shared category manipulation was not able to reverse the contrast and
produce assimilation above a no-extreme-exemplar baseline. Wänke et al. concluded:
"The extreme exemplar is nevertheless used as a standard of comparison. As a result,
assimilation, elicited by the category, and contrast, elicited by the standard of
comparison, cancel each other out" (p. 21). Two more points should be emphasized:
First, Wänke et al. showed these results both with a category well-known to the
participants (a political party), and a new category (a made-up vacuum cleaner
brand). Second, there was some evidence on the assumed mediation by the
superordinate category: Exemplar, category and target were rated for preference, and
the correlations between these preference ratings were much higher when the
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common category was emphasized. Thus, when the exemplar was rated positively, so
was the category and other category members.
This model can be applied to the field of groups: a group acts as the shared category,
the extreme exemplar is a member of the group, and the judged target is the self. The
model then implies that when an extreme exemplar is a member of a shared group,
the exemplar (a) influences the stereotype of the shared group, and (b) that this
stereotype influences the conceptualization of the self. The latter process is known as
self-stereotyping (Turner et al., 1987; Simon & Hamilton, 1994). Since both
processes (a) and (b) are assimilative, the interexemplar contrast (c) found by
Dijksterhuis, Spears, et al. (1998; Dijksterhuis et al., in press) could be diminished or
even reversed by a parallel assimilation. This view fits nicely with more general
assumptions of SCT (see Chapter 4), which assumes that the ingroup stereotype is
abstracted from the ingroup members. The contribution (or weight) of each member
depends on his or her prototypically for the group. Introducing new members, or
changing the prototypicality of members (e.g., by introducing outgroups) changes the
stereotype of the ingroup and thereby the self-stereotype of the members (Hogg,
Turner, & Davidson, 1990; Turner, 1991).
Can this application of the Wänke et al. model to an ingroup stereotype be backed up
by other evidence? Unfortunately, most research on the impact of exemplars on
stereotypes has focused not on ingroups, but on stereotypes about outgroups (e.g.,
Rothbart, 1996; Rothbart & John, 1985). There is however research on the formation
of an ingroup stereotype by projecting knowledge about a special single exemplar:
the self. This process is called self-anchoring (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996). Self-
anchoring is selective, that is, characteristics of the self are projected selectively onto
ingroups (Krueger & Clement, 1996), and it works both for attributes and affective
value (Otten & Moskowitz, 2000; Otten & Wentura, 1999, Otten & Wentura, in
press). The existence of self-anchoring suggests that the arrow (b) in Figure 7 can
also work the other way around, and that the stereotype of the shared category is
influenced both by the exemplar and by the self.
7.2 Study 6: When Albert E instein Is One of Us
To summarize the arguments presented in the previous section, the literature
provides evidence that the exposure to a single exemplar does not inevitably lead to a
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contrasting judgment of the compared object, which in this case is the self. First,
depending on the extremity of the exemplar, the comparison may begin with the
initial hypothesis that the exemplar is similar to the self (Mussweiler & Strack,
2000a, b). Even if the exemplar is extreme, a shared and salient superordinate
category may cancel out the contrast (Wänke et al., 2001) by providing a shared
stereotype and by highlighting shared features. Applied to the realm of intergroup
structures, we can predict that contrast in automatic behavior after the exposure to an
extreme comparison standard is diminished when the extreme comparison standard is
a member of the ingroup.
To test this hypothesis fairly and adequately, a conceptual replication of the
Dijksterhuis, Spears, et al. (1998) study was conducted, using Albert Einstein as one
of the extreme examples. In two experiments, these authors provided evidence that
priming with Albert Einstein led to significantly worse performance in a general
knowledge task than priming with Claudia Schiffer, and that priming with Albert
Einstein made standard-inconsistent self-knowledge more accessible. In the current
study, Claudia Schiffer was replaced with Marilyn Monroe to construct a plausible
cover story, and these exemplars were presented either as uncategorized comparison
standards (equivalent to Dijksterhuis, Spears, et al.), or as members of the
participants' ingroup. Following the reasoning above, it is predicted that the
behavioral contrast elicited by the uncategorized exemplars is diminished or even
reversed when the exemplars are categorized as ingroup members.
Method
Design, Overview and Hypotheses
The study was run on the Internet, disguised as a study on perception, and advertised
on several university campuses. All participants were categorized as members of an
(artificial) group, allegedly following their perception style, and had to solve items
from an IQ test that involved mental folding of objects. Before they worked on these
items, they were asked to think for 5 min either about Albert Einstein (AE) or
Marilyn Monroe (MM). This between-subjects factor thus varied whether they
thought about a stereotypically very smart person or about a stereotypically less
smart person. This factor, called exemplar, was crossed with a second manipulation:
The exemplar (AE or MM) was presented either as a member of the participants'
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ingroup, or was left uncategorized (exemplar categorization). Thus, the experiment
had a 2x2 between-subjects design.
The performance in the mental folding task was the main dependent variable. The
central hypothesis of the experiment was that the performance in the mental folding
task would be contrasted from the stereotype of the exemplar (i.e., better
performance after thinking about an uncategorized MM than AE) when the exemplar
was left uncategorized, but that this contrast would be extinguished or even reversed
when the exemplars were categorized as members of the ingroup. Following the
mental folding task, descriptions of the exemplar and the ingroup were assessed. As a
manipulation check, it was expected that AE would be described as smarter than
MM. Furthermore, it was expected that the ingroup stereotype would be assimilated
to the exemplar's description.
Before the debriefing, participants were asked whether they suspected any influence
of the exemplar description task while they worked on the mental rotation task, and
in what direction such an influence might have been, and what the purpose of the
study might have been.
Participants
After excluding (a) non-native speakers of German, (b) participants who indicated
that they did not take part seriously (c) participants who indicated that they did not
take part for the first time, (d) participants who remembered their own or the
membership of a categorized exemplar wrongly or not all, and (e) participants where
not all test item pictures loaded correctly, 239 participants remained in the sample. 4
of them suspected purposes of the study that were similar to the hypothesis and were
therefore excluded. Additional 14 voiced doubts about the reality of the artificial
groups and were also excluded (together 7.5%).19 Furthermore, 16 participants were
excluded since they perceived a relation between the priming task and the
performance in the mental folding task (see below). Thus, the final sample consisted
of 202 participants. 116 were female, 66 were male, 20 did not disclose their
                                                
19 Additional analyses showed that the results remained the same when these 18 participants
were included in the sample.
122
gender.20 Mean age was 28 (5 missing). As an incentive, participants took part in a
lottery, where one out of 20 won 10 DM.
Procedure and Materials
Artificial categorization. The same artificial figure-ground categorization according
to an alleged perception style as in Studies 1 and 2 was used (for further details, see
the materials section of Study 1). To make the categorization even stronger and more
salient, however, the ingroup "Ground-based perception style," to which actually all
participants were assigned, was described as a minority of only 9 percent of the
population. This was strengthened by an illustration, which showed 10 symbolic
persons: 9 were white and labeled "Figure-based," and 1 was black and labeled
"Ground-based." It was stressed that the perception style was a stable personality
trait, that it developed during childhood and youth, and that not only styles of
thinking but also everyday traits and behavior were influenced by it.
Priming. The priming task was introduced as investigating thoughts about the two
groups and their members. In the categorized targets condition, it was said that the
research on the perception styles had a long tradition ranging back to the 50ies and
60ies, and that during that time a number of well-known persons were tested for their
perception style. Either MM or AE was said to have been tested and found to have a
Ground-based perception style (i.e., the same as the participant). The participants
were then asked to think about MM or AE and type into the computer whatever came
to mind about her or him. In the uncategorized exemplars condition, it was simply
said that we were interested in how the two perception styles influenced thinking
about persons, and that for that reason we asked them about a well-known person.
Depending on the condition, participants were also asked to write down their ideas of
either MM or AE. Note that only the categorization of the exemplars varied; the
participants themselves were always categorized.
Mental folding task. Immediately following the exemplar priming, the mental folding
task was introduced. The task consisted of 15 items, taken from Jäger and Althoff
(1994). In each item, 4 three-dimensional objects (cubes, or more complex objects)
were shown. Only one of these was folded out of a pattern shown next to the objects.
                                                
20 Since in exploratory analyses gender did not moderate the effects, it was not considered
further in the main analyses.
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The participants' task was to determine which object matched the folded out pattern
(see Figure 8). It is my contention that the test depends to a large extent on
concentration, logical analysis and stepwise exclusion of wrong answers. The
participants were encouraged to guess if they were not sure, and they were told that
they could cancel the task if they wanted to. The task was split in two parts, with 8
items in the first and 7 in the second part. The order of items was randomized but
constant across participants.
Figure 8. Example item of the mental folding task.
Stereotypes of exemplars and groups. Next, the participants had to rate MM or AE
on 9 attributes. In between filler attributes, there were 5 intelligence- and
performance-related attributes, intelligent (intelligent), smart (klug), persevering
(ausdauernd), insistent (hartnäckig), too lazy to think (denkfaul). Then, they rated the
ingroup on the same attributes. The rating scales ranged from does not apply at all
(1) to fully applies (5).
Additional measures. Participants also filled OSIO items (overlap self-ingroup,
overlap ingroup-outgroup, and overlap exemplar-ingroup in the categorized
exemplars condition; scales ranged from 1 to 7; for further details, see Study 1).
Participants were asked which perception style they had themselves, and which
perception style MM or AE had (when they were categorized).
After the stereotype and overlap measures, but before the debriefing, participants
were asked what they thought the purpose of the study was, and probed whether they
saw any relation between the exemplar description task and the mental rotation task
while they worked on the latter task. They were asked: "While you worked on the
mental folding task, did you have the impression that your performance might have
been influenced by previously thinking about Albert Einstein (Marilyn Monroe)?"
They answered the questions with yes or no. If the answer was yes, they were asked
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to describe how they thought they might have been influenced. Finally, they were
questioned about their age, their gender, their mother tongue, whether they
participated for the first time, and whether they took part seriously. After the data
were submitted, participants were debriefed by a written explanation of the
procedure and the manipulations.
Results
Perceived Relations Between Exemplar Description and Performance
In total, 16 out of the 221 participants who remained after the first selection phase
(7.2%) indicated that during working on the mental folding task, they had the
impression that the exemplar presentation might have influenced their performance
(see Table 12). This was especially likely when AE was categorized as an ingroup
member. 3 did not answer this question at all.
Table 12. Frequency of Relating Own Performance to Exemplar During Mental
Rotation Task
Exemplar categorization
Exemplar Perceived Relation uncategorized ingroup
no 58 54Monroe
yes 3 3
no 45 45
yes 3 7
Einstein
missing 2 1
Of these 16, only 8 answered how exactly their performance might have been
influenced. Separating these answers by condition, a clear pattern emerged. 1
participant indicated doubts whether he would be able to answer as well as the
uncategorized AE, 1 participant was flattered that the categorized MM belong to the
ingroup, and 6 wrote on the impact of the categorized AE. 5 of these 6 described a
positive influence of AE, mainly in terms of AE as a paragon which they could
emulate. 1 participant described an upward comparison to AE, and that he might
have solved the questions better.
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Since in this study, the pure priming effect was of interest, only participants who
indicated that they did not see any relation between exemplar description and mental
folding task while they worked on the task were retained in the further analyses. All
other participants were excluded. However, for the central results I will point out that
the effects were identical when they were retained in the analysis.
Manipulation Check
First, the ratings of the exemplars on the attributes smart and intelligent were
combined into a single intelligence score (r=.67, p<.001) and analyzed in a 2
(exemplar) x 2 (exemplar categorization) ANOVA. The exemplar main effect was
highly significant, F(1,198)=166.57, p<.001. Neither the exemplar categorization
main effect, F(1,198)=1.66, p=.199, nor the interaction, F<1, reached significance.
Simple effects analyses showed that AE was rated smarter than MM both when they
were left uncategorized, M=4.57 vs. M=3.14, and when they were ingroup members,
M=4.61 vs. M=3.36, both ps<.001. Note that except the uncategorized MM all
exemplars were rated significantly smarter than the midpoint of the scale (3), ts>3.4,
ps<.002. Second, the ratings on persevering, insistent, and too lazy to think were
combined into a single perseverance score (last value recoded, Cronbach's
Alpha=.63), and subjected to the same analysis. Again, only the exemplar effect was
significant, F(1,198)=48.71, p<.001, both other Fs<1. AE was rated as more
persistent than MM when they were uncategorized, M=3.94 vs. M=3.33, and when
they were ingroup members, M=3.97 vs. M=3.26, both ps<.001. All means were
significantly higher than the midpoint of the scale, ts>2.55, ps<.015.
Number of Attempted Solutions
When analyzing performance data, it is instructive to look also at the number of
attempted solutions, which can be used as a covariate (James & Greenberg, 1997).
For both blocks, the number of attempts was divided by the number of items in the
block. Thus, if all items were answered, the score for this block would be 1. On these
scores, a 2 (exemplar) x 2 (exemplar categorization) x 2 (block) MANOVA was
conducted, with the last factor as a repeated measure. There were no significant main
effects of the between subjects manipulations, Fs<1. Their two-way interaction failed
to reach significance, F(1,198)=1.93, p=.167. There was however a main effect of
block, F(1,198)=22.52, p<.001, which was not moderated by two-way interactions,
both Fs<1, but by a significant three-way interaction, of block, exemplar, and
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exemplar categorization, F(1,198)=5.86, p=.029. Table 13 shows the respective
means.
The means and simple effects analyses show that in the first block, in the MM
conditions almost all items were attempted irrespective of her categorization (F<1),
and that in AE conditions the rates were somewhat lower. A 2x2 ANOVA of this
block showed no significant effects, all Fs<1.1. In the second block, there were no
main effects, Fs<1, but there was a marginal crossover interaction, F(1,198)=3.32,
p=.070. The ingroup categorization of AE led to less attempted solutions, while the
ingroup categorization of MM led to more attempted solutions. None of the simple
effects reached significance, ps>.13 (all these and the following simple effects
analyses use SIDAK adjustments).
Table 13. Proportions of Attempted Solutions
Exemplar categorization
uncategorized ingroup
Exemplar M SD M SD
Block 1 Monroe 0.98 0.05 0.99 0.04
Einstein 0.96 0.16 0.99 0.06
Block 2 Monroe 0.86 0.33 0.94 0.19
Einstein 0.91 0.28 0.84 0.33
Note. Score equals 1 if all items were answered.
Correct Solutions, Blocks Analyzed Separately
First, the numbers of correct solutions were analyzed for each block separately. First,
the sums of correct answers were entered in two 2 (exemplar) x 2 (exemplar
categorization) ANOVAs, without covariate. The means are reported in Table 14. In
block 1, both main effects were insignificant, exemplar effect F<1, exemplar
categorization effect F(1,198)=2.24, p=.310. The interaction was almost significant,
F(1,198)=3.90, p=.050. Simple effects analyses showed that the ingroup
categorization of AE increased the number of correct solutions significantly,
F(1,198)=5.42, p=0.011 (one-tailed), while the ingroup categorization of MM did not
decrease it significantly. The interaction can also be analyzed at the exemplar level:
When the exemplars were uncategorized, priming with AE led to less correct
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answers in block 1, F(1,198)=4.55, p=0.017 (one-tailed), but there was no difference
between the AE and MM conditions when the two were categorized as ingroup
members, F<1. In block 2, only the exemplar main effect had an F larger than 1,
F(1,198)=1.32, p=.252. The simple effects analyses showed no significant effects, all
Fs<1.
These effects were largely replicated when the analyses were repeated with the
number of attempted solutions in the respective blocks as a covariate. In block 1, the
covariate explained a significant amount of variance, F(1,197)=10.20, p=.002. Again,
the main effects failed to reach significance, exemplar effect F<1, exemplar
categorization effect F(1,197)=1.66, p=.199. The interaction was marginal,
F(1,197)=3.42, p=.066. When the two exemplars were analyzed separately, the
performance after AE priming was significantly increased when AE was categorized
as an ingroup member, F(1,197)=4.423, p=0.019 (one-tailed), while the MM priming
was unaffected, F<1. Seen from the other side, priming with an uncategorized AE
decreased performance as compared to an uncategorized MM, F(1,197)=3.62, p=0.03
(one-tailed), while there was no difference between the categorized exemplars
conditions, F<1. In block 2, apart from the covariate, F(1,197)=119.41, p<.001, only
the interaction had an F above 1, F(1,197)=1.64, p=.201. On the descriptive level, the
ingroup categorization of AE still increased performance, but the simple effect was
not significant anymore, F(1,197)=1.64, p=0.101 (one-tailed).
Correct Solutions, Both Blocks Together
These analyses, first without, then with covariate, were repeated for the number of
correct solutions in total, that is, summed over the two blocks. Table 14 (last two
rows) reports the means. The ANOVA without covariate revealed no effects, neither
of exemplar, F(1,198)=1.32, p=.253, nor of exemplar categorization, F(1,198)=1.44,
p=.230, nor their interaction, F<1. When included in the model, the number of
attempted solutions was a significant covariate, F(1,197)=54.01, p<.001. Both main
effects were insignificant, Fs<1.1, and the interaction fell short of significance,
F(1,197)=2.28, p=.072, but simple effects analyses revealed that the categorization
mattered in the case of AE: participants answered more items correctly when primed
with the ingroup member AE, as compared to the uncategorized AE, p=.028 (one-
tailed). For MM, the opposite was not significant, p=.283. The interaction can also be
looked at from the perspective of the exemplars: Only when the exemplars were
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uncategorized, AE led to a worse performance, p=.026 (one-tailed). There was no
difference when the exemplars were categorized as ingroup members, p=.357 (two-
tailed).
Table 14. Correct Solutions in the Mental Folding Task, Blocks Separated and
Combined
Exemplar categorization
uncategorized ingroup
Block Exemplar M SD M SD
Monroe 6.16 1.83 6.02 1.96block 1
Einstein 5.31 2.25 6.29 1.95
Monroe 3.9 2.37 4.11 1.71block 2
Einstein 3.58 2.13 3.73 2.31
Monroe 10.05 3.78 10.13 3.25both blocks
Einstein 8.89 4.16 10.02 3.75
Note. Maximal number of correct solution is 8 for block 1 and 7 for block 2. Note
that these means are not corrected for a covariate.
As noted above, it is interesting to check whether these results hold when those
participants who thought about a connection between exemplar and their
performance while they worked on the mental folding task were included in the
analyses. In sum, the results were almost equivalent, but a bit weaker. For instance,
the marginal interaction in the analysis of both blocks combined with a covariate was
insignificant, F(1,216)=2.58, p=.110. In each and every case, the pattern was the
same.
Ingroup Stereotypes
Two performance-related scores for the ingroup stereotype were computed: an
intelligence score from smart and intelligent (r=.564, p<.001), and a perseverance
score from persevering, insistent, and too lazy to think (last value recoded,
Cronbach's Alpha=.61). Unfortunately, data are missing for two cases. Both scores
were analyzed in 2 x 2 ANOVAs (see Table 15). For intelligence, there was a
marginal effect of exemplar, F(1,196)=3.77, p=.054, but no effect of exemplar
categorization F(1,196)=1.75, p=.188, and interaction F<1. The ingroup was
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stereotyped as less smart when AE was primed. For perseverance, the main effect of
exemplar was marginal, F(1,196)=2.81, p=.095, exemplar categorization F<1. The
interaction however was significant, F(1,196)=5.95, p=.016. The ingroup was rated
as more persistent when AE was categorized as a member than when AE was
uncategorized, F(1,196)=3.89, p=0.025 (one-tailed), and for MM the opposite trend
approached significance, F(1,196)=2.11, p= 0.074 (one-tailed).
Table 15. Ingroup-stereotype for Intelligence and Perseverance
Exemplar categorization
uncategorized ingroup
Trait Exemplar M SD M SD
Monroe 3.82 0.72 3.77 0.68ingroup
intelligent
Einstein 3.71 0.59 3.52 0.57
Monroe 3.61 0.73 3.43 0.66ingroup
persistent
Einstein 3.21 0.71 3.5 0.6
How did the stereotypes for exemplar and ingroup relate to each other? For
intelligence, there were significant correlations between exemplar stereotype and
ingroup stereotype when the exemplars were uncategorized, in both the MM
condition, r=.25, p=.057, and the AE condition, r=.27, p=.037. In the ingroup
exemplar condition, for MM the correlation failed to reach significance, r=.20,
p=.140, and was almost zero for AE, r=.03. For perseverance, exemplar and ingroup
stereotype correlated significantly irrespective of categorization for both exemplars,
with rs>.329, ps<.014.
The two stereotype scores intelligence and perseverance have two corresponding
performance variables, correct answers and number of attempted solutions. The
correlations between performance and the respective exemplar- and ingroup-
stereotype were analyzed. There were no significant correlations between either
exemplar or ingroup stereotype and the respective performance indices.
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Overlap Measures and Prediction of Performance
First, the effects of the manipulations on the 3 overlap measures were analyzed. For
the overlap between ingroup and outgroup, there was an effect of exemplar,
F(1,193)=4.45, p=.036, both other Fs<1 (5 missing values). The overlap was seen as
larger after AE priming (M=3.81) than after MM priming (M=3.31). There were no
effects on overlap of self and ingroup, all Fs<1. The total mean was 4.18; the
respective picture shows a small overlap of self and ingroup. The overlap of
exemplar and ingroup was only assessed when the exemplar was categorized. The
overlap was significantly higher for AE (M=5.17) than for MM (M=3.50),
t(94)=4.80, p<.001.
The main hypothesis of the present study was that ingroup categorization of AE (or
MM) would increase (or decrease) performance. Using the overlap measures as an
index of the strength of ingroup categorization, a corollary of this hypothesis can be
tested in linear regressions. It was expected that a high self-ingroup overlap should
predict performance when the exemplar is also seen as an ingroup member. More
specifically, when AE is seen as included in the ingroup, higher overlap with the
ingroup should be correlated positively with performance. This is in fact an
interaction hypothesis. Interaction hypotheses for continuous variables like the
overlap measures can be tested in linear regressions with an additional product term.
Therefore, it was tested whether the participants' performance regressed on the
product term of self-ingroup and target-ingroup overlap. For this purpose, the self-
ingroup overlap and target-ingroup overlap scores were standardized and multiplied.
The product score had high values when both self-ingroup and target-ingroup overlap
had simultaneously high or low values. Next, the total number of correct solutions
was regressed on the two overlap scores and their product, with the number of
attempted solutions as an additional predictor similar to a covariate (the number of
attempted solutions itself was not predicted by the other regressors). Note that these
regressions could only be performed for the categorized exemplars conditions, and
were computed separately for both exemplars. Regressions were performed on the
total number of correct solutions, and on the number of correct solutions in both
blocks separately.
For the MM conditions, only the regression equation in block 2 explained a
significant amount of variance, but there the only significant predictor was the
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number of attempted solutions. For the AE conditions, the regression of the total
number of correct solutions was significant, F(4,36)=5.86, p=.001, but again only the
number of attempted solutions was a significant predictor, β=.51, p<.001. There was
a marginal effect of the self-ingroup overlap, β=.26, p=.085. The interaction term
was not significant, β=.24, p=.119. For the correct solutions in block 1, the total
regression was marginally significant, F(4,36)=2.39, p=.069. The number of
attempted solutions was not a significant predictor, p=.222 (probably due to its low
variability in this block). Self-ingroup overlap was a marginally significant predictor,
β=.29, p=.098, as was the interaction term, β=.31, p=.087. Finally, in block 2, correct
solutions were solely predicted by attempted solutions, β=.64, p<.001, F(4,36)=8.43,
p<.001 (all tests two-tailed).
The marginal interaction in block 1 was explored following the procedure proposed
by Aiken and West (1991). Figure 9 plots the simple slopes of the interaction in the
ingroup AE condition at three levels of exemplar-ingroup overlap: low (i.e., 1 SD
below the mean), average (at the mean), and high (1 SD above the mean). The
covariate number of attempted solutions was set constant at 15, and the lines were
plotted from the minimum of the standardized self-ingroup overlap, -2.1, to the
maximum, 1.8. At low exemplar-ingroup overlap, the simple slope of the linear
regression equaled 0.10, which did not differ from zero, t<1. At average exemplar-
ingroup-overlap, the simple slope was higher with .62, but only marginally
significantly different from zero, t(36)=1.70, p=.097. At high exemplar-ingroup-
overlap, the slope was significantly larger than zero with 1.15, t(36)=2.41, p=.020.
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Figure 9. Simple slopes of regression of correct answers on self-ingroup
overlap, depending on exemplar-ingroup overlap.
For exploratory purposes, these analyses were repeated with the suspicious
participants included in the sample. The results were somewhat stronger: The
interaction term was a significant predictor not only for block 1, but also for the total
number of correct solutions. Simple slope analyses showed that only for high target-
ingroup overlap, the slope was significantly higher than zero.
Discussion
The main goal of this study was to show that the automatic behavioral contrast
evoked by an extreme exemplar is extinguished when the exemplar is a member of
the ingroup. For this purpose, the participants were confronted with one of two
exemplars who differed in their stereotype on intellectual performance: Albert
Einstein and Marilyn Monroe. To test the hypothesis, they were either categorized as
ingroup members or left uncategorized. The hypothesis was supported by the
evidence in the conditions with Albert Einstein, both in experimental and
correlational data. However, the Marilyn Monroe conditions showed no effect,
presumably due to the fact that she was not stereotyped as stupid.
First an overview of the experimental data: When Albert Einstein was categorized as
an ingroup member, the participants solved on average 18.5% more items of the
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mental folding task correctly in the first block of test items than when he was not
categorized. This performance increase in the first block was significant. The effect
disappeared in the second block of test items. Furthermore, it was expected that the
reverse result would be observable for the priming with Marilyn Monroe. However,
there was no evidence for a difference between priming with a categorized and an
uncategorized Marilyn Monroe. Overall, this resulted in an only marginally
significant interaction (for the first block of items). The main result can also be seen
from the perspective of the exemplars: Replicating Dijksterhuis, Spears, et al. (1998),
it was found that the smarter an uncategorized exemplar, the worse the performance--
a contrast effect in automatic behavior after the exposure to a single exemplar (see
also Chapter 3). However, when the exemplars were members of a shared category,
this contrast was prevented.
That no effects were observable in the MM conditions leads us to the conclusion that
these conditions should rather be considered as a baseline. This interpretation is
backed up by the data from the exemplar descriptions. While AE was described as
significantly more intelligent than MM, MM was still not described as dumb: Her
ratings were on average slightly above the midpoint of the scale, and were even
significantly higher than the midpoint if she belonged to the ingroup.
Several points are important about the performance data: First, the effect cannot
solely be explained as a change in the number of attempted solutions and luck in
mere guessing. While there was some variation in the number of attempted items in
block 1, none of the differences reached significance. Furthermore, the results held
when the number of attempted items was added as a covariate. Second, the pattern of
means of block 1 indicates that there was a performance drop for those participants
exposed to an uncategorized AE, and that those participants who had AE as a fellow
ingroup member equaled the performance of both MM conditions. Thus, it seems
that similar to the results of Wänke et al. (2001), a shared superordinate category
canceled out the contrast, but did not result in additional assimilation. However, this
interpretation is speculative since the MM conditions were not true baselines. As a
third point, it is instructive to note that the behavioral priming disappeared in the
second block of items. There, the number of correct solutions was far lower
altogether, and the performance did not differ significantly between conditions. Still
it is interesting to note that on a descriptive level the number of attempted items in
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block 2 was lower for those with an ingroup AE than for those with an uncategorized
AE, but the number of correct solutions was somewhat higher for those with an
ingroup AE. Thus, the priming effect was diminished, but not reversed.
The Wänke et al. model proposed that the stereotype of the superordinate category
mediates the assimilation process. Focusing on two dimensions of the stereotype,
perseverance and intelligence, it was found that the ingroup stereotype was indeed
assimilated to the exemplar for perseverance, but not for intelligence. The ingroup
was seen as more persevering when AE was member than when he was not, and it
was seen as less persevering when MM was a member than when she was not. It
seems likely that the open projection of the exemplar's intelligence in the measure
was counteracted by a corrective process, since the participants were probably well
aware that they had difficulties solving all the items, and that they and their group
could not be as smart as AE--but as persistent. A similar problem probably
determined the correlations between exemplar and ingroup stereotype. There,
positive correlations were found for perseverance (irrespective of the categorization),
but not for intelligence. Apparently, the measures shared a common variance due to
both an exemplar→ingroup induction and an additional priming-like effect that also
works without a shared category; but these processes were stopped when the
experience from the mental folding task provided contradicting evidence. Therefore,
it is not possible to determine whether the stereotype of the shared ingroup really
mediated the effect.
In a rather exploratory last analysis step, the relation of the graphical overlap
measures to the behavioral indices was scrutinized. Since it was argued that
categorization of the exemplar as an ingroup member on the one hand and the
categorization of the self as an ingroup member on the other hand together contribute
to the assimilation effect (paths a and b in Figure 7), the number of correct answers
was regressed on the respective overlap measures, target-ingroup overlap and self-
ingroup overlap, and their product. These analyses were only possible in the
categorized exemplars conditions. While for MM there was no reliable regression,
for the AE group, performance in the first block of items was marginally predicted
by the interaction term. The simple slopes analysis showed that only for a high
perceived overlap of AE and the ingroup, increased self-ingroup overlap also led to
increased performance. This single cell thus replicated the between-subjects
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manipulation of the AE categorization. The fact that the regression only explained
variance in the AE group, but not in the MM group is also consistent with the absent
between-subjects effect of MM categorization.
Finally, one has to ask how automatic the observed behavioral effect was. When
asked about their hypothesis about the purpose of the experiment, 4 out of the 239
(1.67%) voiced suspicions that the effect of the exemplars on their performance was
under investigation; these participants were excluded from the sample. Further 16
participants indicated that they related their performance in the mental folding task to
the exemplar while they worked on the task; these participants were also excluded.
Thus, all participants who remained in the analyses said explicitly that they did not
have the impression that the exemplar presentation influenced their performance. In
fact, when the suspicious participants were included, the results were almost
identical, but marginally weaker. So, it is likely that the vast majority of the
participants showed a spontaneous and unbiased reaction to the exemplar, whether it
was in their own category or not, and that the impact on performance was automatic.
The effects seem not attributable to a mere demand effect, in which the participants
work harder if AE is categorized as their ingroup member because they think that the
experimenter expects it. Still, it is possible and indeed likely that the behavioral
effect was preceded and in fact mediated by conscious deliberations about the own
intelligence during the priming. In the ABC model, it is explicitly assumed that the
comparison process is conscious and based on a noetic awareness of the comparison
standard. In sum, it seems safe to conclude that the behavioral effect of exemplar
presentation can be called a priming, or an effect of previously activated mental
representations on later behavior, even in the conditions with categorized exemplars.
It is important to note that the direction of the effect in the ingroup condition is not
trivial: It is well-established that members of the same group are preferred
comparison standards for evaluations of the self, and that in general comparisons
within categories are preferred (Biernat & Kobrynowicz, 1997; Biernat & Manis,
1994; Biernat, Manis, & Kobrynowicz, 1997). So, it is also possible that by making
AE a member of the ingroup, an even stronger pressure to compare the self to this
highly intelligent member of the same category arises. In that case, the contrast
would be even stronger than after the comparison with an uncategorized AE. But the
data show that this was not the case. This effect can be understood by comparing it to
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a similar phenomenon, namely the moderation of the outgroup homogeneity effect
by a salient social categorization into ingroup and outgroup. Typically, it is found
that outgroups are seen as more homogeneous than ingroups (e.g., Linville, Fischer,
& Salovey, 1989). Recent theorizing in the SCT literature (Haslam et al., 1996;
Simon, 1992) argued that this is so because the outgroup is always judged in a salient
ingroup-outgroup frame of reference, while the ingroup can be judged in its own
frame, and independently from the ingroup-outgroup categorization. When attention
is focused on an outgroup, it is seen as more homogeneous, due to an decreased
perception of difference within the group. When the attention is then focused on the
ingroup in an estimation of its homogeneity, two things can happen: When the salient
ingroup-outgroup distinction breaks down, a comparison within the group leads to
the perception of less homogeneity, resulting in the outgroup homogeneity effect.
However, if the ingroup-outgroup distinction is sustained, the ingroup is also judged
as homogeneous, since the context leads to a focusing on differences between the
groups instead of differences within the group. This is analogous to the present study,
in which a (difference-testing) comparison to another ingroup member (AE) was
prevented by a strong categorization, which was strengthened by a minority status of
the ingroup.
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8 GENERAL DISCUSSION
preserve, recall, recognize, keep, memory, study,
remember, retain
memorization primes, Chartrand and Bargh
(1996)
8.1 Overview of the Present ed Studies
This thesis developed a model of Automatic Behavioral Contrast (ABC). The ABC
model postulates two parallel processes, a stereotype activation process and a
comparison process. Both can follow the perception of a stereotyped group, but only
the stereotype activation process is inevitable. Furthermore, both can change the
accessibility of mental representations of behavior, and therefore both can have
effects on automatic behavior. Let us now consider the two processes.
As a result of the perception of a stereotyped category, the stereotype activation
process inevitably leads to an increased accessibility of stereotype-consistent
behavioral representations. This results in automatic behavioral assimilation: The
perceiver automatically mimics the behavior that is typical for the stereotyped
category, if such behavior is functional in the environment. A prominent example is
slower behavior after activation of the elderly stereotype.
When the self is compared to the category, a comparison process is started. This
process entails an active social comparison of the self to the activated stereotype.
This comparison is either based on an initial similarity hypothesis or on an initial
dissimilarity hypothesis. Depending on the initial hypothesis, either stereotype-
consistent or stereotype-inconsistent behavior is rendered accessible during the
comparison. This accessibility merges with accessibility effects of the stereotype
activation process. Accessibility effects of the two processes can add up or cancel
each other out. Thus, if a comparison focuses on similarities between the self and the
elderly, even slower behavior will ensue. However, if a comparison focuses on
differences between the self and the elderly, the accessibility of typically fast
behavior may be increased, and faster behavior will be likely. It follows that
determinants of the initial hypothesis moderate between assimilation and contrast in
automatic behavior. Furthermore, it follows that the initial similarity assessment
mediates effects of those factors on behavioral outcomes.
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The assumptions that the two processes stereotype activation and self↔stereotype
comparison work in parallel, and that the stereotype activation process is inevitable,
are consistent with previous literature on automatic behavior (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al.,
in press), and the most economical summary of the available body of research. All
other assumptions, for instance that the self is involved in every conceptualization of
a social group, seem to require more complex explanations in order to integrate the
reported findings.
Now, the question is: which factors can determine the direction of the initial
comparison hypothesis? A central hypothesis in this model is that a salient
categorization of the activated stereotype as an outgroup, in opposition to an ingroup
of the perceiver, leads to a dissimilarity-testing comparison, which then results in
behavioral contrast. In short, the model predicts automatic behavioral contrast (ABC)
after the categorization of a social stereotype as an outgroup. The studies reported in
this thesis focused on testing this hypothesis. The general paradigm of the first three
studies was to compare effects of stereotype activation with and without a
categorization as an outgroup. The following three studies then employed different
paradigms. I shall now summarize the evidence for this hypothesis.
Studies 1a and 1b provided the first evidence that automatic behavioral contrast from
members of an outgroup can occur. The approach taken in these studies built on a
classic method in the intergroup research, namely the Minimal Group Paradigm
(Tajfel et al, 1971). First, an outgroup was created by introducing an artificial
categorization, allegedly following the perception style, of which the participants had
never heard before. They were then shown five alleged members of the outgroup,
who were either young or elderly persons. In a subsequent reaction time task they
contrasted their behavior from the implied outgroup stereotype. They reacted faster
when elderly outgroup members were presented, in comparison to the condition in
which young outgroup members were presented. The most important result was that
although a group of persons was presented, the participants did not automatically
assimilate.
Study 2 corroborated and extended these findings. It compared the outgroup
conditions of Studies 1a and 1b with a condition in which the same target persons
were not categorized. The contrast finding was replicated in the categorized
condition; that is, participants again reacted faster after the perception of elderly
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outgroup members than after the perception of young outgroup members.
Furthermore, assimilation was found after the perception of uncategorized targets:
participants who perceived uncategorized elderly person reacted slower than
participants who perceived uncategorized young persons. This finding strongly
supports the idea that the categorization of the targets as outgroup members causes
behavioral contrast. The findings from Studies 1 and 2 show that automatic
behavioral contrast does not necessarily depend on the presence of a single exemplar.
The difference to the results found by other researchers in the past is clearly visible
since the studies modified the procedure developed by Dijksterhuis et al. (in press).
These authors also presented five stimulus persons, who were either young or
elderly, and found behavioral assimilation, that is slower reactions in a subsequent
lexical decision task when elderly persons were presented. Studies 1 and 2 used the
same paradigm, but first induced an ingroup-outgroup distinction for the participants,
and then presented the 5 persons as outgroup members. This resulted in automatic
behavioral contrast, that is faster reactions in the task following the perception of
elderly persons. Furthermore, a direct comparison of Dijksterhuis et al.'s procedure
and the categorization condition in Study 2 showed that the categorization of persons
as outgroup members moderated between assimilation and contrast. The participants
were not aware of this process; they adapted their behavior in a subsequent, allegedly
unrelated, task.
Note that in Studies 1a, 1b and 2, the elderly target persons were not seen as an
outgroup because they were elderly. Instead, the outgroup status was created
independently from the age category, and the age merely stereotyped the artificial
outgroup category. The goal of Study 3 was to replicate these findings with a natural
outgroup category, the elderly themselves. Using a different priming procedure,
unexpected results were found: Instead of getting faster after the perception of an
elderly outgroup, the participants, especially the male ones, got slower. Thus, the
results seemed to suggest that a strong outgroup assimilation occurred, while no
behavioral effects were observed when the stereotype of the elderly was activated as
a single category. Two possible explanations were proposed. First, using the self-
stereotyping measures as a interpretation aid, it seemed possible that the slower
reaction times were in fact a behavioral contrast, but not from the typical elderly trait
slowness in the direction of faster reactions, but from the elderly trait meticulous in
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the direction of relaxed behavior. The pattern of reaction times on the one hand and
self-stereotyping as relaxed on the other hand, as well as the correlation between the
two effects suggested this interpretation. A second possible explanation of the
unexpected slowness was the comparison instruction given to the participants, which
may have inadvertently created a test for similarity. This hypothesis was followed up
in the next study.
The previous studies investigated the effect of an outgroup categorization on
automatic behavioral effects. The underlying assumption was that an outgroup
categorization leads to a dissimilarity-testing comparison. Study 4 differed from the
previous studies, because it did not directly introduce an outgroup. Rather, building
on research by Mussweiler (2001), an alternative manipulation of the initial
hypothesis was used: the direction of comparison. This allowed a test of one
important step of the ABC model, namely that from the initial hypothesis to
behavioral effects. It was hypothesized that a comparison of self to elderly people
would invoke a test for difference, but that a comparison of elderly people to self
would invoke a test for similarity (Tversky, 1977). The behavioral effects confirmed
these hypotheses: participants were fastest when they compared themselves to the
elderly, and slowest when they compared the elderly to themselves. The reaction
times in an additional baseline condition fell in between these two conditions. Thus,
Study 4 supported the idea that the initial hypothesis tested in the comparison
determines the automatic behavior outcomes. Another interesting finding provided a
link to the previous studies: Not only did the comparison of self to the elderly lead to
behavioral contrast, but the elderly persons were also seen as more homogeneous.
This indicated a stronger dichotomy into ingroup and outgroup, which has been
manipulated experimentally in the previous studies.
Study 5 investigated performance in a general knowledge task after activation of the
professor stereotype. Both students and non-students took part in the study. It was
found that only non-students assimilated to the stereotype of professors, as indicated
by better performance in the general knowledge task, compared to a baseline
condition. Participants who were themselves students were unaffected by the
priming, contradicting earlier results from Dijksterhuis and van Knippenberg (1998).
Thus, students did not assimilate to the stereotype of professors, while non-students
did. A possible post-hoc explanation for this effect is that the students held an
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antagonistic attitude to professors, which prevented assimilation because it led to a
salient ingroup-outgroup categorization.
All these studies investigated automatic behavioral contrast after the perception of
social groups. Hitherto, behavioral contrast had only been found after the perception
of single, extreme and distinct exemplars. The ABC model argues that not the
exemplar status per se leads to the difference-testing comparison, but that the social
categorization is the decisive moderator. This led to the hypothesis of contrast from
outgroups which was tested in the previous studies. However, this central assumption
also suggests modified predictions for contrast after the perception of single
exemplars: When the exemplar is a member of the ingroup, the contrast should be
extinguished. This prediction was tested and confirmed in the final Study 6.
Participants who were primed with an uncategorized Albert Einstein performed
worse in an intelligence test, replicating previous results by Dijksterhuis, Spears, et
al. (1998). However, when Albert Einstein was categorized as an ingroup member,
the contrast was extinguished.
In sum, I presented evidence for the hypotheses that outgroups can elicit automatic
behavioral contrast (Studies 1, 2), and that a dissimilarity hypothesis leads to
automatic behavioral contrast (Study 4). Furthermore, both an unexpected behavioral
effect in Study 3 and a null effect in one group of participants in Study 5 can be
interpreted as further instances of behavioral contrast, with the caveats that both
interpretations are post-hoc, and that in Study 5 a quasi-experimental variable has to
be interpreted causally. Finally, the impact of social categorization on automatic
behavioral effects was demonstrated in Study 6 in yet another way, when the contrast
elicited by an extreme single exemplar was extinguished by an ingroup
categorization.
The findings suggest that for the induction of a comparison between the self and a
target, which is responsible for the automatic contrast, the target does not need to be
a single exemplar. Instead, a comparison can also be induced by a salient intergroup
context which defines an ingroup and an outgroup. A group of people who are
perceived as members of an outgroup can serve as the standard of a difference-
testing comparison, and elicit automatic behavioral contrast, even when more than a
single outgroup exemplar is perceived. In this regard, a very interesting point is
revealed by a comparison of the studies reported here: A strong impact of an
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ingroup-outgroup categorization was found in studies that applied a variant of the
minimal group paradigm (Studies 1, 2, 6). It seems that just like in the domain of
social discrimination, minimal group studies can serve as an excellent tool for social
comparison research, and that this procedure can result in a powerful psychological
process. Tajfel (1981) wrote: "it may be interesting to note that, in a paradoxical
sense and seen from a different perspective, they ['minimal' groups] may well be
considered as 'maximal' rather than minimal." (p. 241). The power of minimal group
categorizations is however not only of methodological interest. Conditions of
computer-mediated communication are similar to minimal groups in many respects
(Spears, Lea, & Lee, 1990; Waldzus & Schubert, 2000), and in these environments,
analogous social-psychological processes can be expected (cf. Postmes, 1997).
8.2 Replications of Previous  Findings
In addition to the evidence for the model developed in this thesis, the presented
studies have also replicated earlier findings. In Study 2, a marginally significant
assimilation effect to a group of uncategorized 5 elderly persons (as opposed to 5
young persons) was found. This finding replicated Dijksterhuis et al. (in press). This
study also provided an additional interesting finding: there was a marginal positive
correlation between perceived elderliness of the target persons and the behavioral
effect. With the caveat that the elderliness was assessed after the behavioral measure,
it seems that this is a first hint at a mediating mechanism, although the effects were
very weak in this study. A very similar effect was found in Study 3. There, the
priming of the elderly stereotype consisted of estimating the age of 16 elderly
persons. The age judged during the priming predicted the reaction time in the
subsequent reaction time task. Again, the extremity of the stereotype was related
positively to the behavioral effect. However, this result must also be interpreted with
caution, since the overall effect was not significant.
The priming procedure in Study 3 differed from previously applied methods and did
probably not activate the stereotype as intended. Still, it is interesting that the method
employed--age estimation--did not have the same consequences as forming an
impression. It seems that the actual task performed during the priming is important,
and that it does not suffice to present pictures irrespective of the task to activate the
stereotype (cf. Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn, &
Castelli, 1997). However, since I do not have additional data in which the same
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photos, combined with another stereotype activation task, elicited assimilation, no
clear interpretation is possible.
In Study 5, assimilation to an activated stereotype (professors) was found, although
the assimilating participants were not themselves members of the stereotyped group.
Interestingly, in contrast to earlier findings, participants who were in a more
antagonistic position to the stereotyped group (i.e., students) did not assimilate. Thus,
the results both replicate and modify earlier findings by Dijksterhuis and van
Knippenberg (1998). Finally, the behavioral contrast after presentation of a single
extreme exemplar in Study 6 replicated the results reported by Dijksterhuis, Spears,
et al. (1998).
The reported findings parallel those of Spears et al. (2001), who also found automatic
behavioral contrast from outgroups, in a research program independent from the
current work. Two differences to the present studies are interesting: While the
present studies presented members of an outgroup (Study 1, 2) or persons that
became an outgroup (Study 4), the Spears et al. studies primed the stereotypes in a
more abstract way, and rather independent of specific members. Furthermore, while
the studies in this thesis employed a minimal group categorization (Study 1, 2) and
the focus of comparison (Study 4) to manipulate the comparison process, Spears et
al. asked questions about the ingroup identity. It seems that a contrasting process can
be triggered by a number of different causes, all of which result in a similar effect.
Whenever a stereotype activation is coupled with a strong reminder of a possible
opposite of the group, whereby it becomes an outgroup, behavioral contrast can be
expected.
8.3 Limitations of the Presen ted Studies
However, central points of the ABC model remain untested after this series of
studies. First of all, these studies have not shown that a dissimilarity test indeed
mediates the impact of outgroup categorization on automatic behavioral effects:
While contrast was observed after an outgroup categorization as well as after a
manipulation of the comparison direction, which has previously been shown to
influence the initial comparison hypothesis, it remains to be shown that outgroup
categorization leads to a test of differences between self and the outgroup. This
assumption so far rests on arguments from the intergroup literature (see Chapter 4).
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A potential test of this hypothesis would be a simple explicit verbal or graphical (see
the overlap measures in Studies 1 and 2, and Schubert & Otten, 2000) measure of
perceived similarity of self to the target persons. The studies in this thesis somewhat
neglected such a test; when these measures were applied in the studies on outgroup
contrast, they were used in a different way, mostly to check on the salience of the
categorization. In the intergroup contexts, they did not predict the automatic effects.
However, first promising evidence was found in Study 6, where the assimilation to
Albert Einstein was predicted by an interaction of self-ingroup and Einstein-ingroup
overlap. Future studies should tailor both verbal and graphical measures more closely
to the predicted mediator, the initial hypothesis, to collect evidence directly related to
its role.
A second and related critical point of the argument concerns the effects on the self-
stereotyping. It was expected that the behavioral effects would be accompanied by
parallel changes in the self-stereotype, such that acting faster after contrast from the
elderly would be paralleled by a "younger" self-stereotype. The reasoning behind this
hypothesis was that a manipulation of accessibility should not only lead to automatic
behavioral effects, but also to changes in the self-description because these are
formed on-line and thus depend on accessible constructs associated with the self.
This should be true both of the description of the self and the ingroup. However, the
studies in general failed to support this assumption. First, let us consider the self-
stereotyping measure, in which the participants had to describe their own person. In
Study 3, the male participants showed a marked change in the self-stereotype on the
attribute relaxed, which was also highly correlated with the behavioral effect
(reaction time). In Study 4, no effects on the self-stereotype were found. Now, let us
turn to the ingroup stereotype measures. In Studies 1a and 2, no effects of the
perceived outgroup members were found, while in Study 1b, the outgroup was
stereotyped according to the perceived elderly members, and the ingroup was
marginally contrasted away from it. In Study 6, the results on the ingroup stereotype
were mixed: While the stereotyping in the domain of perseverance followed the
hypothesis, stereotyping in the domain of intelligence were reversed.
In sum, it seems that the manipulations employed in these studies led more easily to
automatic behavioral effects than to changes in explicit self- and ingroup-
descriptions. The matter is complicated, however, by the general procedure that
145
behavioral effects were measured before the explicit measures. Thus, it is not clear
whether self-perception had an impact on the self-description, which seemed to be a
plausible interpretation of the effects in Study 6. However, I assume that changes in
the explicit self-description need indeed more elaborate conscious cognition than
automatic behavioral effects. This seems plausible if one compares procedures where
such effects have been found (e.g., Hogg & Turner, 1989; Mussweiler, 2001) to the
priming procedures applied here.
A promising alternative to these explicit self-stereotyping measures would be an
application of the implicit self-stereotyping measure developed by Dijksterhuis,
Spears, et al. (1998), which was also applied by Mussweiler and Strack (2000b) and
described in more detail in Chapters 3 and 4. Such a measure taps the accessibility of
a self-stereotype, rather than its explicit applicability (Higgins, 1996; Lorenzi-Gioldi,
1991). In a study not included in this thesis, I already tried to use such a measure.
Unfortunately, in this study, the manipulation did not result in reliable behavioral
effects, and also no changes in the self-concept were measurable. A full test of the
ABC requires further attempts to employ such measures. Evidence that automatic
behavioral effects are indeed mediated by an association of the self with traits and
behavioral representations has not been collected so far. Indeed, to my knowledge it
would be the first evidence for a mediating process in the domain of automatic
behavior.
A final limitation of the presented studies is that behavioral contrast was not
demonstrated in comparison to a baseline condition. Studies 1 and 2 used factors that
varied the stereotype of the outgroup, but did not include a baseline. In Study 3, the
contrast explanation was post-hoc, and in Study 4, the contrast differed from the
baseline as predicted, however not significantly. Therefore, it is not absolutely clear
that behavioral contrast from outgroups can go beyond a mere extinguishing of the
default assimilation effect; additional studies have to be conducted to address this
question. However, even when contrast in comparison to a baseline was not
demonstrated in this thesis, note that it is still legitimate to use the term contrast to
denote these findings, even if in an absolute sense only the default assimilation is
extinguished. This is because the two processes work in parallel (cf. Dijksterhuis et
al., in press).
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8.4 Speculations and Implications
As in previous findings in the literature, the presented results verify that the
participants were not aware of the actual behavioral contrast. However, they were
aware of the ingroup-outgroup distinction, and it is very likely that they were also
aware of the age of the outgroup exemplars and (in Studies 1, 2) of the implied
covariation between age and group membership. In the ABC model, I assumed that a
comparison needs a propositional construal of the outgroup, and thus a conscious
(noetic) awareness of it. However, we can speculate when awareness of the outgroup
categorization is not necessary for an automatic contrast. Research suggests that the
concept we is chronically associated with positive connotations (Perdue, Dovidio,
Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990), and that its priming can result in automatic behavioral
consequences like a facilitated approval of ambiguous statements of an unspecified
source (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). Similarly, the concept they or an outgroup status
may be chronically associated with difference and differentiation. Thus, unconscious
activation of an outgroup status as an interobject relation seems possible, which in
turn could influence further cognition (Higgins & Chaires, 1980). Similarly, groups
that were in the past frequently categorized as outgroups may become chronically
associated with that status, and thus immediately lead to contrast without much
deliberate comparison (Wilder & Shapiro, 1984).
The presented results have implications for applications of findings of automatic
behavior. It has been argued that automatic assimilation to social stereotypes serves
social regulation and smoothes interactions in the social environment (Dijksterhuis,
Bargh, et al., 2000; Chartrand & Bargh, 1999). However, our social environment is
neither monolithic nor does it consist only of individuals; an important part of our
social life is influenced by memberships in groups, intergroup relations, and
interactions on a group level. Our findings show that assimilation is rather unlikely
after the perception of outgroups. Indeed, it seems to be against functional concerns
to mimic the behavior of people who are by (group-) definition different. Instead,
assimilation may be enhanced for activated ingroup stereotypes, which become a part
of the self and affect self-related cognition (Smith & Henry, 1996; Smith et al.,
1999).
As an example, consider the implications that Chen and Bargh (1997) drew from
their findings. They subliminally flashed photographs of Blacks to White
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participants, who interacted with a White partner. This priming of the stereotype of
Blacks resulted in more aggressive behavior. Chen and Bargh argued that this
situation might be similar to face-to-face contact with a Black person, where White
persons might become more hostile because their stereotype of Blacks is activated
and mimicked. The present results suggest that in such interactions, categorizing the
Black persons as members of an outgroup may inhibit the assimilation effect or
actually elicit a contrast, unless aggressive behavior is functional for other reasons.
In short, it seems rather unwarranted to draw implications from mere stereotype
priming to actual interactions with members of the stereotyped group, because a
priming may activate the stereotype content without the we-they frame being salient
in an intergroup contact. It is necessary to add though that this reasoning is rather a
cautious note than a definite implication of the present research, because the
behavioral contrasts reported in this thesis were found in an unnatural experimental
situation, the minimal group paradigm. Consequently, the groups created in the
course of the studies were to the participants not very important, new, and only
situationally salient. However, it may well be that in situations with real groups, the
processes observed here may be even stronger.
This brings us back to the question asked at the very beginning of this thesis: Why
did the participants of Bargh et al. (1996) walk slower after being primed with the
elderly stereotype? The arguments and findings presented in this thesis allow the
conclusion that they did so because they did not categorize the elderly as an
outgroup, and because they did not compare themselves to the elderly.
8.5 Conclusion
When automatic behavior serves proper social functioning, it must be moderated by
membership in groups, both our own membership and that of the people we
encounter. The present research has shown that in a salient intergroup context,
members of an outgroup are not mimicked, but that the behavior is contrasted from
their stereotypic features. In a more general context, this points to the usefulness of
re-combining research on stereotypes and their automatic components with research
on intergroup relations.
This recombination not only opens up interesting venues for research on intergroup
relations, but also takes research on automatic behavior to new levels. Consider the
148
development of research on automatic behavior over the last five years: In 1996,
Bargh et al. reasoned that automatic behavior was due to a direct link between
perception and behavior. The intention was to show effects on behavior without
much intervening cognitions, although the effects were of course assumed to be
mediated by an associationistic (cognitive) process. In later publications, the term
perception-behavior link appeared less frequently (e.g., Dijksterhuis & van
Knippenberg, 1998), and the cognitive processes involved in the activation of
behavioral representations were brought into focus. Now, the studies of Dijksterhuis,
Spears, et al. (1998), Spears et al. (2001) and the present studies investigate social
comparisons (i.e., cognitive processes) as causes of automatic behavior. Perception is
still an important antecedent, but the theoretical focus has shifted.
It is my contention that a next step in research on automatic behavior should focus on
the special role of the cognitive structure known as the self. When the self is
compared to other individuals, or defined in terms of a shared group membership, its
content changes. Consequently, the self can be thought of as a fluid and flexible.
Social cognition research is currently exploring this topic with new methodological
tools (Mussweiler, 2001; Mussweiler & Bodenhausen, in press; Smith et al., 1999).
From my perspective, the next question is: When a concept is accessible, does it
matter whether it is associated with the self or not? For example, does it matter
whether stupidity is accessible as a consequence of thinking about supermodels, or
whether it is accessible as a consequence of comparing the self to Albert Einstein and
arriving at the proposition I am stupid? If the self enables "the individual to regulate
himself or herself in relation to an ever-changing social reality" (Turner et al., 1994,
p. 458), does it have a special role in the production of automatic behavior? Although
I brought this dichotomy up from time to time throughout this thesis, it could not do
more than lay the foundation for asking this question.
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SUMMARY
This thesis developed a model of Automatic Behavioral Contrast (ABC). The starting
point for the theoretical argument were previous findings of automatic behavioral
assimilation to stereotypes of social categories. Two prominent examples are the
following effects: Activating the stereotype of the elderly leads to assimilation in the
walking and reaction speed, i.e. slower behavior (Bargh et al., 1996; Dijksterhuis et
al., in press; Kawakami et al., in press), and activating the stereotype of professors
leads to better performance in a general knowledge task (Dijksterhuis & van
Knippenberg, 1998). These effects occur outside of conscious awareness.
However, these results seem to contradict assumptions from theories on intergroup
relations, which in general predict and find contrast from groups of which one is not
a member (Turner et al., 1987). Building on the Selective Accessibility Model from
Mussweiler and Strack (2000), the ABC model was developed. It argues that in
addition to the assimilation effect after stereotype activation, a comparison process
can lead to behavioral contrast effects. The comparison is expected to lead to contrast
if it tests for dissimilarity. That is, if the comparing person actively thinks about
differences between the self and the activated social category, behavior should be
automatically contrasted from that category. Furthermore, the ABC model argues
that a salient ingroup-outgroup distinction should suffice to start such a dissimilarity-
testing comparison. This prediction was tested in 5 studies, before a corollary was
tested in a sixth study.
Studies 1 and 2 created the necessary ingroup-outgroup distinction by inducing an
artificial categorization. As predicted, it was found that the participants automatically
contrasted from elderly members of the artificial outgroup by reacting faster in a
subsequent reaction time task (Study 1). Study 2 supported the hypothesis that the
salient categorization moderates between assimilation and contrast by manipulating it
as a second factor.
Study 3 instructed the participants to compare directly to elderly persons. The results
were not as predicted, since they seemed to suggest assimilation instead of contrast
when the participants compared themselves to the elderly. However, additional data
indicated that the effect might in fact be interpretable as a contrast, but on a different
comparison dimension. Following up on this study, study 4 investigated the role of
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the comparison process more directly, by manipulating its direction. As predicted
from earlier theorizing (Mussweiler, 2001; Tversky, 1977), it was found that a
comparison of the self to the elderly lead to contrast, while a comparison of the
elderly to the self lead to assimilation.
Studies 5 and 6 investigated the effects of social stereotypes on intellectual
performance. Study 5 found that only non-students assimilated to the stereotype of
professors, while students did not. This finding is in line with the ABC model.
Finally, study 6 concentrated on the impact of an ingroup instead of an outgroup
categorization. Earlier theoretical models (Dijksterhuis, Spears, et al., 1998) argued
that a distinct single exemplar elicits automatic behavioral contrast (e.g., thinking
about Albert Einstein leads to worse intellectual performance). Modifying this
assumption, it was found that a contrast from Albert Einstein was extinguished when
he was categorized as an ingroup member.
The present arguments and findings contribute both to the literature on automatic
effects of stereotype priming and to the literature on social categorization of self and
others. They show that automatic and unconscious behavior is moderated by the
structure of the social environment. Behavior is not automatically assimilated to a
group if this group is an outgroup.
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
In dieser Arbeit wurde untersucht, welchen Einfluss die Aktivierung sozialer
Stereotype auf automatisches Verhalten hat, und wovon dieser Einfluss moderiert
wird. Die zentrale These des entwickelten Modells lautet, dass Verhalten
automatisch und unbewusst von Stereotypen solcher Gruppen kontrastiert wird, die
als Fremdgruppen kategorisiert werden. Kontrast bedeutet in diesem Fall, dass das
Gegenteil desjenigen Verhaltens ausgeführt wird, das für die Fremdgruppe typisch
ist.
Grundlage für das entwickelte theoretische Modell waren Ergebnisse, die
automatische und unbewusste Assimilation (also keinen Kontrast!) an soziale
Stereotype zeigten, nachdem diese Stereotype mental aktiviert wurden. So ist belegt,
dass die Aktivierung des Stereotyps alter Menschen eine Verlangsamung von Schritt-
und Reaktionsgeschwindigkeit zur Folge hat (Bargh et al., 1996; Dijksterhuis et al.,
im Druck), und dass die Aktivierung des Stereotyps von Professoren zu besseren
Leistungen in einem Allgemeinwissenstest führt (Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg,
1998). Der Einfluss der Stereotypaktivierung auf das Verhalten geschieht außerhalb
der Aufmerksamkeit und ist nicht bewusst.
Die kognitionspsychologische Grundlage automatischen Verhaltens ist in der
gemeinsamen Repräsentation von Wahrnehmungs- und Verhaltensinhalten zu
suchen. Automatisches Verhalten kann entstehen, weil die mentalen
Repräsentationen, die während der Wahrnehmung eines Stereotyps aktiviert werden,
Verhaltensrepräsentationen voraktivieren, die später eigenes Verhalten steuern
(Bargh et al., 1996).
Auffällig ist allerdings, dass die Teilnehmer in den Experimenten zu automatischen
Verhaltenseffekten nach Stereotypaktivierung an Gruppen assimilieren, denen sie gar
nicht angehören. So ahmen junge Menschen das Verhalten alter Menschen nach. Das
widerspricht Beobachtungen und Theorien zu intergruppalen Beziehungen, die in
bewusst gesteuertem Verhalten bei einander antagonistisch gegenüberstehenden
Gruppen Kontrasteffekte finden. Eine Analyse der genauen Bedingungen in den oben
genannten Studien, in denen automatische Assimilation an fremde Stereotype
gefunden wurde, zeigte, dass diese Versuche es offenbar vermieden, eine
antagonistische Intergruppenbeziehung herzustellen. Das führte zu der Hypothese,
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dass die Induktion eines sozialen Vergleichs der eigenen Person (des Selbst) mit
einer antagonistischen Fremdgruppe zu einem Kontrast in automatischem Verhalten
führen sollte.
Zur genaueren Spezifizierung dieser Hypothese wurde das Selective Accessibility
Model von Mussweiler und Strack (2000) hinzugezogen. Auf seiner Grundlage
wurden die Hypothesen aufgestellt, dass eine antagonistische Intergruppenbeziehung
zu einem sozialen Vergleich führt, in dem als Folge einer Unähnlichkeitsvermutung
speziell über Unterschiede zwischen der eigenen Person und der Fremdgruppe
nachgedacht wird. Dieses Nachdenken über Unterschiede führt zur verstärkten
kognitiven Zugänglichkeit stereotyp-inkonsistenter Verhaltensrepräsentationen, die
ihrerseits Kontrast in automatischem Verhalten zur Folge haben. Diese Hypothese
wurde in vier Studien überprüft, bevor eine fünfte Studie ein Korollar der Hypothese
testete.
In zwei ersten Studien (Studien 1a, 1b) wurden die Versuchsteilnehmer mit Hilfe
einer künstlichen Kategorisierung einer Gruppe zugeteilt, die sich von einer anderen
fremden Gruppe unterschied. Im Anschluss wurden die Teilnehmer gebeten, sich
einen Eindruck von fünf angeblichen Mitgliedern der Fremdgruppe zu machen, die
nacheinander dargeboten wurden. Diese fünf Personen waren, abhängig von der
zufällig zugewiesenen Bedingung, entweder alt oder jung. Danach wurde die
Reaktionsgeschwindigkeit der Teilnehmer in einer Wortentscheidungsaufgabe
gemessen. Frühere Untersuchungen hatten gezeigt, dass eine solche Darbietung zur
Assimilation an das Altersstereotyp führt, so dass die Wahrnehmung älterer Personen
langsamere Reaktionen zur Folge hat (Dijksterhuis et al., im Druck). Im Gegensatz
zu diesen Ergebnissen zeigte die meta-analytisch zusammengefasste Evidenz der
Studien 1a und 1b, dass die Teilnehmer schneller reagierten, nachdem die älteren
Fremdgruppenmitglieder dargeboten wurden, als wenn jüngere
Fremdgruppenmitglieder zu sehen waren. Das heißt, dass die Teilnehmer ihre
Reaktionsgeschwindigkeit automatisch vom Stereotyp der Fremdgruppe
kontrastierten.
In Studie 2 wurden dieses Ergebnis repliziert. Zusätzlich wurden Bedingungen
eingeführt, in denen die fünf dargebotenen Personen nicht kategorisiert waren. In
diesen Bedingungen wurde also das Altersstereotyp aktiviert, ohne dass es
gleichzeitig mit der Fremdgruppe verknüpft wurde. Die Ergebnisse zeigten
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tatsächlich eine signifikante Interaktion zwischen den Faktoren Alter der Personen
und ihrer Kategorisierung. Wie in Studie 1 führten ältere Personen zu schnelleren
Reaktionen, wenn sie als Fremdgruppenmitglieder kategorisiert waren; wurden sie
aber nicht kategorisiert, verursachten sie langsamere Reaktionen. Dieses Ergebnis
belegt somit die kausale Rolle der Fremdgruppenkategorisierung in der Moderation
zwischen Assimilation und Kontrast.
In diesen Studien wurde die Kategorie alter Menschen nicht selbst als Fremdgruppe
angesehen; statt dessen wurde eine künstliche Kategorie mit älteren Personen
stereotypisiert. In der folgenden Studie 3 sollte überprüft werden, ob Kontrast auch
dann erfolgt, wenn alte Menschen selbst Ziel eines sozialen Vergleiches werden.
Dazu wurden drei Bedingungen verglichen: eine Bedingung, in der nur das Stereotyp
aktiviert wurde, eine Bedingung, in der ein sozialer Vergleich mit mehreren alten
Personen induziert wurde, und eine Kontrollgruppe ohne Bezug zu alten Menschen.
Verhaltenseffekte wurden wieder anhand der Reaktionsgeschwindigkeit gemessen.
Überraschenderweise zeigt sich, dass die Versuchsteilnehmer signifikant langsamer
arbeiteten, nachdem sie sich mit älteren Menschen verglichen hatten, was der
Hypothese widerspricht; dagegen wurde kein Unterschied zwischen der
Kontrollgruppe und der einfachen Aktivierung des Altersstereotyps gefunden. Die
Ergebnisse einer nachfolgenden Selbstbeschreibungsaufgabe deuten allerdings
darauf hin, dass die Versuchsteilnehmer, und besonders die Männer unter ihnen, sich
in der Vergleichsbedingung von dem Altersstereotyp "penibel und sorgfältig"
abgrenzten, und sich danach als besonders locker charakterisierten. Diese Lockerheit
korrelierte hoch mit den langsamen Reaktionen, die somit post-hoc doch als
Verhaltenskontrast interpretiert werden können.
Studie 4 testete die oben dargestellte Hypothese, dass die Ähnlichkeitsvermutung,
mit der ein sozialer Vergleich begonnen wird, über seine Folgen für automatisches
Verhalten entscheidet. Dazu wurde eine alternative Manipulation benutzt, von der
bekannt ist, dass sie die Ähnlichkeitsvermutung beeinflusst: die Richtung des
Vergleichs. So fühlen wir uns in der Regel anderen Menschen ähnlicher, wenn wir
die anderen mit uns vergleichen, als wenn wir uns selbst mit den anderen
vergleichen: Der Andere ist mir ähnlich, aber ich bin dem Anderen unähnlich
(Mussweiler, 2001). In Studie 4 wurde überprüft, ob dieser Effekt auf die
Ähnlichkeitswahrnehmung auch automatisches Verhalten als Folge des Vergleich
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beeinflusst. In zwei Bedingungen wurden die Teilnehmer gebeten, 16 ältere
Menschen mit der eigenen Person zu vergleichen, oder die eigene Person mit den 16
älteren Menschen zu vergleichen. Tatsächlich reagierten die Teilnehmer in einem
anschließenden Reaktionszeittest in der ersten Bedingung langsamer als in der
letzteren.
All diese Studien untersuchten Kontrast in automatischem Verhalten nach der
Wahrnehmung einer Gruppe von Personen. Die entsprechenden Befunde
widersprechen früheren theoretischen Modellen, die einen solchen Kontrast nur nach
der Wahrnehmung einer distinkten einzelnen Person vorhersagten. So fanden
Dijksterhuis, Spears et al. (1998), dass Nachdenken über Albert Einstein zu einem
Kontrasteffekt in der Leistung in einem Allgemeinwissenstest führte, d.h. schlechtere
Leistungen verursachte. Das zentrale Argument meines Modells ist, dass die
wahrgenommene Gruppenzugehörigkeit zwischen Assimilation und Kontrast
moderiert. Dementsprechend lautet ein Korollar der Eingangshypothese, dass der
Kontrast nach der Wahrnehmung einer distinkten einzelnen Person aufgehoben
werden sollte, wenn diese Person der Eigengruppe, also der selben Gruppe wie der
Wahrnehmende, angehört. In der letzten dargestellten Studie ergab sich tatsächlich,
dass wie in früheren Studien Nachdenken über Albert Einstein zu schlechteren
Leistungen führte, wenn dieser unkategorisiert dargeboten wurde. Wurde er
allerdings als Mitglied einer (künstlichen) Eigengruppe eingeführt, verschwand der
Kontrasteffekt.
Zusammengenommen zeigen die berichteten Studien, dass entgegen früheren
theoretischen Modellen die Wahrnehmung einer sozialen Kategorie und die
Aktivierung ihres Stereotyps zu Kontrasteffekten in automatischem Verhalten führen
kann, wenn diese soziale Kategorie als Fremdgruppe angesehen wird. Umgekehrt
kann die Kategorisierung einer distinkten einzelnen Person als Eigengruppenmitglied
Kontrasteffekte verhindern. Die soziale Kategorisierung von wahrgenommenen
Gruppen und ihren Mitgliedern moderiert also zwischen Assimilation und Kontrast.
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APPENDIX
The following two tables give an overview of studies on automatic behavioral effects
of construct and stereotype priming.
Table 1. Effects of Construct Primes, Excluding Stereotypes
Authors Study Prime Behavior Effect Type
Bargh, Chen, &
Burrows (1996)
1 scrambled
sentences
priming rudeness
interrupting a
conversation
assimilation
Darley & Batson
(1973); Greenwald
(1975)
1 reading and
thinking about
parable of Good
Samaritan
helping sick
person
assimilation,
moderated to
small effect by
conflicting goal
Dijksterhuis & van
Knippenberg (1998)
4 thinking about
traits intelligence
vs. stupidity
Trivial Pursuit
performance
assimilation
Carver et al. (1983) 2 scrambled
sentences
priming
aggression
shocks
delivered to a
learner
assimilation
Epley & Gilovich
(1999)
1, 2 scrambled
sentences
priming
conformity vs.
nonconformity
vs. control
agreement with
others
assimilation to
conformity
prime, no effect
of
nonconformity
prime
(table continues)
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Hertel & Fiedler
(1998)
1, 2 memorization of
words related to
cooperation or
competition
resource
allocation
between self
and stranger
assimilation to
positive
cooperation and
contrast from
negative
competition
prime
Hertel & Kerr (in
press)
1 memorization of
words related to
loyalty vs.
fairness*
loyalty with
ingroup
members
resulting in
ingroup
favoritism vs.
equality
assimilation
Macrae & Johnston
(1998)
1, 2 scrambled
sentences
priming
helpfulness
picking up
dropped pencils
assimilation,
moderated to
null effect by
impediment (1)
and conflicting
goal (2)
Wilson & Capitman
(1982)
1, 3 prose passage
with "boy meets
girl" script
flirting assimilation,
moderated to
null effect by
time
Note. *The priming of loyalty used both positively valued connotations of loyalty
and negatively valued connotations of disloyalty; the fairness priming was similar.
Behavior assimilated to the positively valued concept.
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Table 2. Studies on Automatic Behavioral Effects of Stereotypes
Authors Study Prime Behavior Effect Type
Bargh et al.
(1996)
2a, 2b scrambled
sentences on
elderly
stereotype
walking
speed
assimilation
Dijksterhuis &
van
Knippenberg
(1998)
1, 2, 3, 4 imagination of
typical professor/
hooligan
knowledge
task
assimilation,
moderated to null
effect by short duration
of priming
Dijksterhuis,
Spears, et al.
(1998)
1 imagination of
typical professor
vs. supermodel
knowledge
task
assimilation,
moderated to contrast
by additional exemplar
Dijksterhuis,
Spears, et al.
(1998)
2a, 2b scrambled
sentences on
elderly (plus
judgmental task)
with/ without
exemplar
walking
speed
no assimilation for
mere stereotype,
contrast after exemplar
Dijksterhuis &
van
Knippenberg
(1999)
1 scrambled
sentences prime
on politicians
long-
windedness
in essay
assimilation,
moderated to null
effect by self-
awareness
Dijksterhuis &
van
Knippenberg
(1999)
2 imagination of
typical professor/
hooligan (2)
knowledge
task
assimilation,
moderated to null
effect by self-
awareness
(table continues)
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Dijksterhuis,
Aarts, et al.
(2000)
1, 2 LDT with
subliminally
presented words
related to the
elderly
recall of
LDT target
words
assimilation, mediated
by strength of
association between
stereotype label and
forgetfulness in 2
Dijksterhuis,
Bargh, et al.
(2000)
2, 3 questions about
the elderly (2),
subliminal
priming in LDT
(3)
recall of
environ-
mental
objects (2)
or LDT
targets (3)
assimilation (less
recall), moderated to
null effect when made
aware of possible
priming effect
Dijksterhuis et
al. (in press)
1, 3 photos of 5
elderly persons
speed in
LDT
assimilation,
moderated to contrast
by single exemplar (1),
moderated to null
effect by accuracy
motivation (3)
Kawakami et al.
(in press)
1, 2, 3 categorization of
persons into
young and old
speed in
LDT
assimilation, not
mediated by stereotype
activation
Levy (1996) 1,2 subliminal
flashing of
category labels
"old" plus
senility vs.
wisdom
associations
memory
perfor-
mance
elderly participants
assimilate to concepts;
no effects or slight
contrast for young
participants
(table continues)
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Macrae et al.
(1998)
4 reference to
Michael
Schumacher
reading
speed
assimilation
Musch & Klauer
(2001)
1 imagination of
typical professor/
hooligan
general
knowledge
test
assimilation, especially
by male participants
Pendry &
Carrick (2001)
1 photo and info on
punk vs. bank
accountant
conformity
in Ash-like
paradigm
assimilation (less
conformity after punk
prime)
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